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The Human Right of Self-Defense
David B. Kopel,1 Paul Gallant2 & Joanne D. Eisen3
I. INTRODUCTION
“Any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to
force, is necessarily limited by the right of self-defense.”4
Is there a human right to defend oneself against a violent attacker? Is
there an individual right to arms under international law? Conversely, are
governments guilty of human rights violations if they do not enact strict
gun control laws?
The United Nations and some non-governmental organizations have
declared that there is no human right to self-defense or to the possession
of defensive arms.5 The UN and allied NGOs further declare that
1. Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy Analyst,
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., http://www.davekopel.org. Author of The Samurai, the Mountie,
and the Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies? (1992). Coauthor
of Gun Control and Gun Rights (2002). French, Spanish, and Portuguese translations of national
constitutions and of English decisions written in Law French are by Kopel.
2. Senior
Fellow,
Independence
Institute,
Golden
Colorado.
http://www.independenceinstitute.org.
3. Senior Fellow, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado. Coauthor (with Kopel and
Gallant) of numerous articles on international gun policy in publications such as the Notre Dame
Law Review, Journal of Law, Economics & Policy, Texas Review of Law and Politics, Engage,
UMKC Law Review, and Brown Journal of World Affairs. We would like to thank Peter Allen for
editing assistance; Tyler Martinez, John Pate for research assistance; Dr. Rob S. Rice
(ccat.sas.upenn.edu/rrice/rrice.html) and Prof. Michael Hendy (www.curculio.org) for help with
Latin and Italian (Hendry) translations and other assistance with pre-modern sources; and Dr.
Jeanine Baker for statistical assistance. The authors are solely responsible for any errors.
4. In re Hirota and Others, 15 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT’L L. CASES 356, 364 (Int’l
Mil.. Trib. for the Far East, 1948) (no. 118, Tokyo trial) (also stating that under the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, a state is the initial judge of the necessity of self-defense against an impending attack, but not
the final judge); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 181 (2d ed.
1994) (“This postulate [from Hirota] may have always been true in regard to domestic law, and it is
currently accurate also in respect of international law . . . . [T]he right of self-defence will never be
abolished in the relations between flesh-and-blood human beings . . . . “).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 6, 15 and Parts II–III; see also Sami Faltas, Glenn
McDonald. & Camilla Waszink, Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons
Collection and Destruction Programmes, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Geneva, Small Arms Survey), at
8, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2001-op02weapons_collection.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (stating that “when successful, practical
disarmament will tend to reinforce the state’s monopoly of force [and] must therefore be
accompanied by safeguards against the abuse of this monopoly.”).
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insufficiently restrictive firearms laws are themselves a human rights
violation, so all governments must sharply restrict citiz en firearms
possession.6
This Article investigates the legal status of self-defense by
examining a broad variety of sources of international law. Based on those
sources, the Article suggests that personal self-defense is a wellestablished human right under international law and is an important
foundation of international law itself.
Since the 1990s, the United Nations has been focusing increasing
attention on international firearms control. UN-backed programs have
promoted and funded the surrender and confiscation of citizen firearms
in nations around the world.7 The United Nations subsidized the
proponents of an October 2005 national gun confiscation referendum in
Brazil.8 A subcommission of the United Nations Human Rights Council
(HRC) has declared that there is no human right to personal self-defense
and that extremely strict gun control is a human right which all

6. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, 58th Sess., Adoption of the Report on the Fifty-eighth Session to the Human Rights Council,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/Sub.1/58/L.11/Add.1
(Aug.
24,
2006),
available
at
http://hrp.cla.umn.edu/documents/ A.HRC.Sub.1.58.L.11.Add.1.pdf. [hereinafter U.N. Human
Rights Council].
7. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Micro-disarmament: The
Consequences for Public Safety and Human Rights, 73 UMKC L. REV. 969 (2005) (describing
efforts to confiscate guns from citizens in Cambodia, Albania, Mali, and other nations).
8. See UNESCO, International Programme for the Development of Cooperation, New
Projects Approved 2005: Part III: Latin American and the Caribbean (UNESCO headquarters:
Paris, Mar. 7–9, 2005), at 13–18, available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/18699/
11134898021Latin_America_and_Caribbean_2005__new_projects_approved_.pdf/Latin+America+
and+Caribbean+2005++new+projects+approved+.pdf (UNESCO grant to the Brazilian gun
prohibition lobby Viva Rio, to promote women’s participation in the gun confiscation referendum);
UN highlights Brazil gun crisis, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4628813.stm (“The UN has urged lawmakers to approve plans for a referendum in October
on whether to ban the sale of firearms . . . . The UN and disarmament groups are using shocking
statistics to put pressure on Brazil’s parliamentarians.”); Cf. Tip of the Hat, SMALL ARMS & HUMAN
SEC. BULL., Oct. 2004, at 7 (UNESCO awarded a prize to the Brazilian gun prohibition lobby Viva
Rio for a campaign to urge Brazilians to voluntarily surrender their guns to the government),
available at http://www.iansa.org/documents/2005/Bul4English.pdf.
The referendum was defeated. See Brazilians Reject Gun Sales Ban, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005.
Rubem Fernandes, the head of Viva Rio, explained what he had learned from the experience: “First
lesson is, don’t trust direct democracy.” Rebum Fernandes, Lessons From the Brazilian Referendum,
Remarks to the World Council of Churches, (Jan. 17, 2006) in WAYNE LAPIERRE, THE GLOBAL
WAR ON YOUR GUNS 187 (2006). He also noted that the argument “I have a right to own a gun”
became “a very profound matter” in the debate on the referendum. Id. Fernandes was speaking at
PrepCom 2006, a UN-sponsored meeting to prepare participants for the major UN gun control
conference in June–July 2006. Side Events, Prepcom 2006 (Preparatory Committee for the
Conference to Review Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent,
Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects), United
Nations, Jan. 9–20, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/prepcom/sideevents.html.
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governments are required to enforce immediately. 9 The full Human
Rights Council is expected to take up the issue and promulgate similar
orders.10 The declaration implements a report for the HRC prepared by
Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey.11
According to the Frey standard adopted by the United Nations, even
the most restrictive gun laws in the United States, such as those in
Washington, D.C., or New York City, are violations of current human
rights law, because they are insufficiently stringent. For example, a
person in New York City who obtains a permit to possess a shotgun may
use that shotgun for a variety of purposes (e.g., collecting, shooting clay
pigeons, bird hunting, or home-defense), whereas the UN and Frey
would require that a license enumerate “specific purposes” for which a
gun could be used.12 In addition, every jurisdiction in the United States is
in violation of present human rights law (according to the UN) in that
state laws allow law enforcement officials to use deadly force (e.g., a
handgun) to prevent the commission of certain crimes (such as rape or
sexual assault on a child) even when the law enforcement officer has no
reason to believe that the victim might be killed or seriously injured.13
The anti-self-defense and anti-firearms ownership mandates from the
United Nations are unlikely to be directly adopted as law by Congress or
by state legislatures in the United States. Nevertheless, there are a variety
of ways, discussed infra, in which purported international law mandates
can be imposed on American citizens without legislative consent.14
Part II of this Article sets forth the basic claims about human rights
and firearms made by the United Nations and by international gun
prohibition activists. Part III details the report on gun control, selfdefense, and human rights prepared by the United Nations Special
9. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 48–50.
11. For Frey’s interim reports, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on
the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, 55th Sess., Prevention of Human Rights Violations
Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003)
(prepared by Barbara Frey), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
8de4967bdc9b662dc1256d720052bbf1/$FILE/G0314738.pdf; see also Barbara Frey, Progress
Report on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light
Weapons, delivered to the Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/
smallarms2004-2.html.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See text at Part III.C., note 48 item 8. The U.N. subcommission’s report does not
specifically mention self-defense standards for non-government actors. However, item 14 of the
subcommission’s report (requiring governments to prevent serious human rights violations by
private persons) would appear to also mandate a ban on defensive use of firearms by private persons
in self-defense against non-lethal threats (e.g., rape), in light of the Frey Report’s insistence that such
use of force is a serious violation of human rights. See id. at item 14; Frey Report, infra note 48.
14. See text at Part III.C.
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Rapporteur on firearms and human rights violations.
Part IV examines the claims of the UN Report in light of the work of
the classical founders of international law, including Hugo Grotius. Part
V examines those same claims in light of the history of major legal
systems which have contributed significantly to the creation of
international law, including Roman law, Spanish law, Islamic law, and
Anglo-American law. Part VI looks at contemporary constitutions,
statutes, and treaties.
Part VII addresses the claim that gun control is already an
international human right because it is necessarily implicit in the right to
life.
Part VIII investigates whether a right to self-defense would
necessarily imply a right to arms. This Article concludes that it must
imply such a right, although not necessarily a right to possess firearms
under all circumstances.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL GUN PROHIBITION AGENDA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
Since the end of the Cold War, many disarmament activists have
turned their focus from controlling government-owned arms of mass
destruction to prohibiting civilian possession of firearms. Increasingly,
firearms prohibition advocates have claimed that firearms prohibition is
necessary to protect human rights.15 The theory posited by the
15. See, e.g.:
Scholars:
Derek Miller & Wendy Cukier, Can. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade, Regulation of Civilian
Possession of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Biting the Bullet, Policy Briefing 16, at 5, available at
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf (follow “BtB civ
possession.pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 5, 2007) (“[T]he proliferation of weapons, and in
particular the issue of civilian possession, is regarded as the leading threat to Human Security.
Maintaining a focus on the reduction of small arms death and injury in the context of international
Human Rights is widely seen as critical.”); WENDY CUKIER, ANTOINE CHAPDELAINE & CINDY
COLLINS, GLOBALIZATION AND FIREARMS: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 11 (Fall 2000),
available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/E2-372-2000E.pdf (“The problem of firearms is a
concern for a wide range of constituencies . . . . While they focus on different aspects of the problem
and solutions appropriate to different contexts, the overarching goal many share is the prevention of
firearms injury and death in the context of international humanitarian and human rights.”); Carmen
Rosa de León-Escribano, Cent. Am. Network for the Constr. of Peace and Human Sec. [IEPADES],
Small Arms and Development in Post Conflict Societies 10 (July 2006) (citing an International
Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA) document: “There are clear signs which show that
small firearms—as instruments of violence—contribute to human and social destruction,
endangering human rights and the rule of law and undermining political stability and economic
development.”).
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs):
Joint letter from Int’l Sec. Info. Serv. Eur. et al. to Eur. Parliament, Mar. 15, 2001,
http://www.quaker.org/qcea/archive/smallarmsletter.htm (“[T]he international NGO community has
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identified the proliferation and misuse of small arms as a serious humanitarian challenge with
implications for development, human rights, peace and global justice.”); UN Arms Control Meet
Opens with Call for Global Treaty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 26, 2006 (According to Amnesty
International Secretary General Irene Khan, “Arms proliferation has facilitated some of the worst
human rights tragedies of our times, including massacres, mass displacement, torture and
mistreatment.”); Thalif Deen, Disarmament: Does the World Really Need 14 Billion Bullets a Year?,
INTERPRESS SERVICE, June 15, 2006 (“The bullet trade is out of control,” says Oxfam, and “it is
fueling conflict and human rights abuses worldwide.”); Small Arms Working Group [SAWG], Small
Arms
and
Human
Rights,
at
10,
Jul.
26,
2006,
http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg/2006factsheets/Small_Arms_and_Human_
Rights.pdf (“Small arms are used to commit a wide variety of human rights abuses . . . .”); DEBBIE
HILLIER & BRIAN WOOD, OXFAM GB & AMNESTY INT’L, SHATTERED LIVES: THE CASE FOR TOUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL, at 24 (2003) (“[T]he easy availability of arms tends to increase
the incidence of armed violence, prolong wars once they break out, and enable grave and widespread
abuses of human rights.”); Friends Comm. on Nat’l Legislation [FCNL], What is the UN Programme
of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons?, para. 2, Aug. 7, 2006,
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php? item_id=1836&issue_id=46 (“The connection between the
growing proliferation of SALW and the usage of these weapons to commit heinous crimes, violate
human rights and threaten human security . . . .”); Environmentalists Against War [EAW], Curb
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, para. 10, July 20, 2004,
http://www.envirosagainstwar.org/know/read.php?itemid=1666 (“These weapons directly contribute
to widespread human rights violations . . . .”); Human Rights Watch [HRW], Small Arms and
Human Rights: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the U.N. Biennial Meeting on Small
Arms, at 3, July 7, 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/ small-arms-070703.htm (last visited
Sept. 8, 2006) (“Small arms facilitate countless human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law around the globe.”); Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk, SMALL ARMS
SURVEY 1 (2004) (“The widespread proliferation and misuse of small arms threatens the realization
of basic human rights and security in various ways.”); Int’l Action Network on Small Arms
[IANSA], 2006: Bringing the Global Gun Crisis Under Control, at 8, 2006,
http://www.iansa.org/members/IANSA-media-briefing-low-res.pdf (“More human rights abuses are
committed with small arms than with any other weapon.”); Amnesty Int’l, UN: Oral Statement on
Small Arms and Light Weapons, para. 2, Aug. 15, 2002, www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGIOR400222002?open&of=ENG-325 (“A wide variety of cases of serious human rights abuse
examined by Amnesty International involve the deliberate or reckless misuse of small arms and light
weapons”); 2006 Review Conference at risk of failure, Response from IANSA to the President’s Nonpaper of 3 July 2006, REVCON NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://www.iansa.org/un/review2006/documents/
RevConNewsWednesday5july.pdf (“Illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light
weapons fuels gross violations of international human rights law and serious breaches of
international humanitarian law.”); The Arias Found. for Peace and Human Progress [AFPHP], The
Arms
Trade
Treaty:
No
More
Arms
for
Atrocities,
at
3
available
at
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/ACT300022003ENGLISH/$File/
ACT3000203.pdf (follow ACT300022003ENGLISH hyperlink near document title “no more arms
for atrocities”) (“The proliferation and misuse of conventional arms—everything from tanks to
grenade launchers to hand pistols—fuels poverty, conflict and human rights violations around our
world.”); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Targeting the Weapons: Reducing the Human Cost
of Unregulated Arms Availability, at 5, June 2005 (“Inadequate controls on arms transfers, combined
with the frequent use of weapons in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights,
contribute to undermining respect for the law.”); World Council of Churches [WCC], WCC
Executive Committee Statement on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, at 2, Sept. 16,
2005 (“Their presence [small arms and light weapons] fuels conflict, exacerbates abuses of human
rights . . . .”); South Asian Movement Against Small Arms, Issue 1, Aug. 2005 (“[T]he proliferation
of small arms and light weapons . . . also gives rise to abuse of human rights, strengthens the
criminals and instills fear among the innocent.”).
Media:
UN World Conference on Small Arms Collapses Without Agreement, AFRICA NEWS, July 7, 2006
(“The Control Arms Campaign has called on governments to establish such a treaty and to agree
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disarmament community is that fewer firearms will lead to fewer human
rights abuses.
The theory is enthusiastically promoted by the world’s leading gun
control lobby, the International Action Network Against Small Arms
(IANSA), an umbrella network to which almost all national and regional
gun control groups belong.16 IANSA’s director, speaking on behalf of the
organization, has endorsed the prohibition of possession of a firearm for
self-defense.17 IANSA also works toward the confiscation of all nongovernmentally-owned firearms, except for single-shot low-power rifles
owned by hunters.18 Amnesty International and Oxfam work very closely
with IANSA, and the three of them have formed a fourth lobbying group

global guidelines for small arms sales to stop weapons fuelling human rights abuses and poverty
around the world.”); Empty Rhetoric on Gun Control Means Little to Those in Conflict, THE IRISH
NEWS LTD., June 19, 2006 (“[I]rresponsible arms sales continue to fuel conflicts, undermine
development and contribute to countless human rights abuses.”); Brian Wood, A Dirty Trade in
Arms, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, June 2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/06/10dirtytrade (“The
proliferation of arms, especially small arms, has had a lasting [negative] impact on human rights.”).
U.N.:
S.C. Res. 1467, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1467 (March 18, 2003), available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/ small-arms-annex-070703.pdf (“The Security Council expresses
its profound concern at the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. . . . These
contribute to serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, which the
Council condemns.”); Patricia Lewis, U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research [UNIDR], Disarmament
Forum: Taking Action on Small Arms, at 3, Feb. 2006 (“[S]mall arms play a huge role in crime,
sexual violence, domestic violence, suicide and human rights abuses such as torture.”).
Governments:
Press Release, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliamentarians in Nairobi Urge All Parties to Ensure
that Food Relief Should Not be Used for Political Ends (May 12, 2006), http://www.ipu.org/presse/nai9.htm ([T]hey urged parliaments to combat SALW proliferation and misuse as a key element in
national strategies on conflict prevention, peace-building, sustainable development, protection of
human rights . . . .”); Malawi Forms NGO to Control Firearms, AFRICA NEWS, Apr. 27, 2006
(Acting Inspector General of Malawi Police, Often Thyolani: “The availability and spread of these
weapons [small arms] is one of the main factors undermining development and fuelling conflict,
crime and human rights abuses.”).
16. IANSA is headquartered in London.
17. When IANSA Director Rebecca Peters debated Wayne LaPierre, the Executive Vice
President of the National Rifle Association at the Oxford Union, LaPierre argued that people should
be able to have guns to resist criminals or genocidaires. Peters retorted: “It’s not going to be up to
each individual person to be like a hero in a movie defending against this threat to freedom.”
LaPierre touted a NRA advertising campaign which had asked: “[S]hould you shoot this rapist
before he cuts your throat?” Peters replied: “Women need to be protected by police forces, by
judiciaries, by criminal justice systems. People who have guns for self-defense are not safer than
people who don’t. . . . [H]aving a gun in that situation escalates the problem.” Rebecca Peters &
Wayne LaPierre, IANSA, The Great Gun Debate, Debate at King’s College (Oct. 12, 2004),
http://www.iansa.org/action/nra_debate.htm [hereinafter Peters & LaPierre Debate].
18. See, e.g., Peters & LaPierre Debate, supra note 17; Q&A Early Afternoon (CNN
International television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2002) available at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0210/23/i_qaa.01.html (Peters states that civilians should not have “rifles that they
can kill someone at 100 meters distance, for example. There needs to be a much greater degree of
proportionality in the firepower that’s available.”).
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known as “Control Arms.”19
IANSA and the United Nations work together in support of their
common agenda. IANSA is “the organization [sic] officially designated
by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) to coordinate
civil society involvement to the UN small arms process.”20 On June 26,
2006, the day the United Nations gun control conference opened, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed IANSA head Rebecca Peters
and re-iterated the UN’s support for her efforts.21 At the conference,
IANSA staff served on the delegations of some nations.
The 2006 gun control conference was the follow-up to the UN’s first
major gun control conference, held in 2001.22 The conferences were
intended to produce a treaty or some other legally binding international
instrument. One proposed provision was a ban on the transfer of firearms
to “non-state actors”, which meant anyone not approved by the national
government; examples would include the Kurds in Iraq under the
Saddam Hussein regime, rebel groups in Sudan, and the army and navy
of Taiwan (which the UN considers to be a province of China).23
Historically, the “non-state actor” ban would have outlawed aid to antiNazi guerillas during World War II, anti-communist rebels during the
Cold War, and the American rebels during the War for Independence.24
Another objective was complete registration of all firearms and all
firearms owners in national and international databases.25 Because of
19. See, e.g., HILLIER & WOOD, supra note 15.
20. IANSA’s 2004 Review—The Year in Small Arms, http://www.iansa.org/documents/
2004/iansa_2004_wrap_up_revised.doc (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
21. Annan Receives Arms Petition by One-millionth Signer, Vows to Transmit Call Onward,
NEWS
CENTRE,
June
26,
2006,
available
at
U.N.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18997 &Cr=small&Cr1=arms; see also Control
Arms, http://www.controlarms.org/events/unreview.htm.
22. Preparatory conferences were held in 2003 and 2005. The post-2001 conferences were
held under the title of “The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.”
23. The U.N. News Centre refers to “Taiwan” as “Taiwan, Province of China.” See Saint
Kitts and Nevis Says Taiwan, Province of China, Should Be UN Member, UN NEWS CENTRE, Oct. 2,
2007,
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24138&Cr=general&
Cr1=debate. The U.N. Statistics Division calls Taiwan a “province” of China. See United Nations
Statistics
Division,
“Series
by
Country:
China,”
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/
cdb_da_itypes_cr.asp?country_code=157. The United Nations Global Youth Leadership Summit
expelled two Taiwanese citizens from a 2006 meeting because the United Nations does not
recognize Taiwan “as a nation separate from China.” Darren Sands & Iris Kuo, “Taiwanese
observers asked to leave summit,” United Nations Office of Sport for the Development of Peace,
available at http://www.un.org/youthsummit/journal.asp?page=JournalTues3.
24. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Firearms Possession by
“Non-State Actors”: the Question of Sovereignty, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 373 (2004); David B.
Kopel, The UN Small Arms Conference, 23 SAIS REV. 319 (2003).
25. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Gunning Against Guns, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2001,
available at http://davekopel.com/NRO/2001/Gunning-Against-Guns.htm.
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opposition from the United States and some other countries, neither of
the conferences achieved their goal, and no treaty or other binding
international legal instrument was produced.26
Shortly after the end of the 2006 conference, a subcommittee of the
United Nations Human Rights Council declared that strict gun control is
already mandated by international human rights law.27 Oxfam and
Amnesty International have also stated this position.28
III. THE FREY REPORT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION/COUNCIL
A. The Background of the Creation of the Frey Report
On August 14, 2002, the United Nations Human Rights Commission
appointed University of Minnesota Law Professor Barbara Frey as
Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations
committed with small arms and light weapons.29 Frey was already known
to the Human Rights Commission since she was an alternate expert
member of the U.S. delegation to a HRC subcommission, having been
nominated in 2000 to a four-year term by the Clinton administration,
which strongly supported UN gun control efforts.
In international organizations, a Special Rapporteur is an expert who
is chosen to advise the organization on a particular issue.30 A Special
26. See, e.g., The UN Small Arms Conference, supra note 24; Nick Wadhams, U.N.
Conference on Arms Ends in Failure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 2006 (“A two-week U.N.
conference reviewing efforts to fight the illegal weapons trade ended in failure Friday, with nations
too divided on too many contentious issues to agree on the best way to combat a scourge that fuels
conflict worldwide.”); Lynne Griffith-Fulton, The Small Arms Review Conference Ends With No
Agreement, 27 THE PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR 3–4 n.3 (2006).
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mons06a.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
27. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6.
28. Under international human rights law, every person has a duty to respect another’s right
to life. More importantly, states have a duty to take positive measures to prevent acts of violence and
unlawful killings, including those committed by private persons. There is growing recognition that
states’ duties under international human rights law include exercising due diligence to ensure that
basic rights—certainly the right to life and security of the person—are not abused by private actors.
Where a foreseeable consequence of a failure to exercise adequate control over the civilian
possession and use of arms is continued or increased violence, then states might be held liable for
this failure under international human rights law. HILLIER & WOOD, supra note 15, at 81.
29. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/25,
The Prevention of Human Rights Violations Caused by the Availability and Misuse of Small Arms
and Light Weapons, ¶ 5, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch
/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/6d123295325517b2c12569910034dc4c/10a32527edc27cd4c1256c1d0038ee
46?OpenDocument.
30. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the
Commission on Human Rights, Urgent Appeals and Letters of Allegations on Human Rights
Violations,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.info/
english/bodies/chr/special/communications%20english.pdf (describing functions of Special
Rapporteurs for the Human Rights Commission).
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Rapporteur has a duty of “impartiality,” at least in theory.31 The Human
Rights Commission’s description of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate
indicated the kind of reports the Commission wanted; the mandate
precluded any investigation of whether firearms are ever used to protect
human rights or whether the confiscation of firearms (or other
restrictions on firearms) are ever enforced in ways which violate human
rights. Rather, the Special Rapporteur’s sole mission was to detail the
link between firearms possession and human rights violations.32
As Special Rapporteur, Frey began producing interim papers and
studies.33 On March 16–18, 2005, in her capacity as Special Rapporteur,
Frey participated in a multi-day political strategy meeting in Brazil
assisting the proponents of an October 2005 referendum to ban the
personal possession of firearms in Brazil. The meeting was part of a
public relations program for the gun confiscation referendum which was
funded by UNESCO.34 (In the election, 64% of Brazilian voters rejected
the gun prohibition referendum.)35

31. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special Procedures Assumed by the
Human Rights Council, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm.
32. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 29, ¶ 5 (Frey was tasked with
“preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights violations committed with
small arms and light weapons . . . .”). “Small arms and light weapons” is a term which includes
mortars, machine guns, portable anti-tank weapons, and a variety of other military weapons. SMALL
ARMS SURVEY 2002: COUNTING THE HUMAN COST 10 (Peter Batchelor & Keith Krause eds., 2002)
(“small arms” are “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine
guns, and light machine guns.” “Light weapons” are “heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel
and mounted grenade launchers, portable antitank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable
launchers of anti-tank and antiaircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100mm caliber”).
Frey, however, wrote only about firearms and presumed that all firearms (including non-military
type firearms) were “small arms and light weapons.”
33. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of
Human Rights, 55th Sess., Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and
Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003) (prepared by Barbara Frey),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/8de4967bdc9b662dc1256d720052bbf1
/$FILE/G0314738.pdf; Progress Report on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed
with Small Arms and Light Weapons, supra note 11.
34. Brazil . . . Strengthening of Communications Networks and International Partnerships
(International Programme for the Development of Communications, UNESCO), available at
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/file_download.php/53d7121e58db595db8571998a273f592Latin+
America+and+Caribbean+2005++new+projects+approved+.pdf. Viva Rio, the Brazilian gun
prohibition lobby, receives funding from UNESCO and UNICEF. Viva Rio, “Fight for Peace Sports
Centre” (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2004), at 5 available at http://www.globalgiving.com/pfil/
807/projdoc.doc.
35. See Brazilians Reject Gun Sales Ban, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005. Among the reasons for
the defeat were Brazil’s traditions of hunting and target shooting; concerns about the notoriously
corrupt Brazilian police; the need for self-defense in Brazil’s crime-ridden cities, many of which
enjoy little protection from the police; and concerns about corruption in the regime of President Lula
da Silva, who was the main proponent of the referendum.
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B. The Human Rights Commission
In December 2005, the United Nations abolished the Human Rights
Commission. The Commission had been widely criticized for inattention
to human rights. The Human Rights Commission had encouraged
terrorist bombings of Israeli civilians,36 refused to pass resolutions
criticizing human rights violations perpetrated by the genocidal regime in
Zimbabwe,37 and refused to condemn the Libyan and Sudanese slave
trade.38 Mary Robinson, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human
Rights, helped allow the Durban Conference Against Racism to become
a forum for aggressive and vicious anti-Semitism, and to fail to mention
the existence of—let alone condemn—the current slave trade in Africa.39
In 2005, the Commission was chaired by a representative of the Libyan
dictatorship of Moammer Qaddafi, 40 a regime which, ever since
36. A few days after thirty Israelis celebrating the Passover Seder were murdered by a
terrorist bomber, the Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution endorsing “all available means
including armed struggle” against Israelis. See Anne Bayefsky, How the U.N.’s Human Rights
Investigations Do Yasser Arafat’s Dirty Work, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 29, 2002. The resolution was
understood as endorsing suicide bombing of civilians; hence, Britain and Germany, which often
abstain on anti-Israel resolutions, voted against the resolution. The resolution passed by 40 to 5. See
DORE GOLD, TOWER OF BABBLE: HOW THE UNITED NATIONS HAS FUELED GLOBAL CHAOS 41–42
(2005).
37. See Brett D. Schaefer, No Funding for U.N.’s Farcical Rights Council, BALT. SUN, Oct.
10,
2007,
available
at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/balop.un10oct10,0,1259104.story;
Joseph
Klein,
They
Deserve
Each
Other,
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?
GUID={F4D00D8E-263D-4AE6-98DB-101F4EDAF2B0} (“Iran hopes to emulate the example of
its fellow repressive regimes like Sudan, Zimbabwe and Cuba who have avoided challenges to their
human rights records in the past by taking over the machinery of the Human Rights Council’s
predecessor, the UN Commission for Human Rights.”).
38. Nile Gardiner & Baker Spring, Reform the United Nations, Oct. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/BG-1700.cfm; Letter from Tommy
Calvert, Jr., Chief of External Operations, Abolish: The Anti-Slavery Portal Jan. 27, 2003,
http://ga0.org/freedom_action/alert-description.html?alert_id=2002698.
39. The World Conference Against Racism began to go off-track when the February 2001
pre-conference in Tehran turned into an anti-Israel fest, and Ms. Robinson applauded the
conference’s results. As the Durban conference neared, Robinson sided with the Arab dictatorships
in equating Israel with Nazi Germany. Under Robinson’s supervision, the Tehran pre-conference
barred participation by Jewish, Baha’i, and Kurdish NGOs. Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An
Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 31
(2002). Ms. Robinson is a strong advocate of the U.N.’s gun control campaign. See Interview by
Control
Arms
with
Mary
Robinson,
Honorary
President,
Oxfam
Int’l,
http://www.controlarms.org/famous_faces/ mary_robinson.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007);
Campaign Launched to Control Small Arms Trade, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 18, 2004,
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/01/18/d40118130381.htm.
40. Najat Al-Hajjaji, the Libyan ambassador to the United Nations. One of the best-known
HRC’s Special Rapporteurs is Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. Mr. Ziegler is
also vice president of North-South XXI, the organization that bestows the “Moammar Khaddafi
Human Rights Prize.” Mr. Ziegler won the $250,000 prize himself in 2002, sharing the award that
year with French holocaust denier Roger Garaudy. U.N. Watch, Jean Ziegler’s Campaign Against
America: A Study of the Anti-American Bias of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,
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Qaddafi’s coup in 1969, has had one of the worst human rights records in
the world.
Given the Human Rights Commission’s complicity with
genocidaires, terrorists, and slave-traders, and given that some
Commission member governments are state sponsors of genocide,
terrorism, and slave-trading,41 those governments’ interest in appointing
a Special Rapporteur dedicated to gun prohibition was consistent with
those governments’ pragmatic interest in preventing resistance by the
victims of genocide, slave-capturing, and state terrorism.42
The Human Rights Commission’s reputation as an adversary of
human rights harmed the UN’s reputation, and finally led SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan to ally, at least publicly, with reform advocates.43 In
March 2006, the old UN Human Rights Commission was replaced by the
new UN Human Rights Council. As with the old Commission, the new
Council did not require that members have a democratic form of
government, or meet any tangible standards regarding human rights.44
Members of the Council in 2007 included dictatorships such as Cuba,
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Russia, China and Pakistan.45 The new Human
Oct.
2005,
http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp?
ct=1760293; see also U.N. Watch, Switzerland’s Nominee to the UN Human Rights Council and the
Moammar Khaddafi Human Rights Prize, June 20, 2006, http://www.unwatch.org/ziegler/ (follow
“Exposed: Jean Ziegler & the Khaddafi Prize”).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 36 –40; see infra text accompanying notes 43–47.
42. For one notable example of the type of resistance that successful gun confiscation would
prevent, see Vahram Leon Shemmassian, The Armenian Villagers of Musa Dagh: A HistoricalEthnographic Study, 1840–1915 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with
authors) (detailing successful use of firearms by Armenian villagers in Musa Dagh, in modern-day
Turkey, in 1915, to resist mass murder by the Ottoman Empire).
43. E.g., Kofi Annan, Office of the Spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General, Sec’y-Gen.’s
Address to the Comm’n on Human Rights,, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid=1388 (“We have reached a point at which the Commission’s declining credibility
has cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole, and where piecemeal
reform will not be enough.”); Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs, United States State Department, The UN Commission on Human Rights:
Protector or Accomplice?, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, Apr. 19, 2005,
available at http://www.state.gov/ p/io/rls/rm/44983.htm.
44. Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.48 (Apr. 3, 2006),
(declaring that votes for membership in the Council “shall take into account the contribution of
candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and
commitments made thereto” and that Council members shall “uphold the highest standards in the
promotion and protection of human rights”). That the language is of no practical significance in
keeping extreme abusers of human rights off the Council is demonstrated by election of Cuba, Saudi
Arabia, and other extreme violators of human rights to the Council. Even a proposal to bar
membership to governments which are under Security Council sanctions for human rights abuses
were rejected. Eye on the U.N., Summary of the Outcome of the Human Rights Commission
Negotiations: Nothing to Show, http://www.eyeontheun.org/un-reform.asp?p=77 (last visited Nov.
11, 2007).
45. Brett D. Schaefer, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Repeating Past Mistakes,
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Rights Council appears to often follow the same path as the old Human
Rights Commission.46 For example, like the Commission, the Council
identifies a litany of human rights abuses allegedly perpetrated by Israel,
but never any abuses perpetrated by Israel’s adversaries. In the Council’s
first year of operation, the only country which was named as actually
being engaged in human rights violations was Israel.47
C. The Frey Report
Having been selected as Special Rapporteur by the old Human
Rights Commission, Frey delivered her final report to the new Human
Rights Council on July 27, 2006.48 On August 24, 2006, the UN Human
Rights Council’s subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights endorsed the Frey report, and announced that all national
governments were required by international human rights law to
implement various listed gun control provisions; the subcommission
recommended that the full Human Rights Council also adopt the report
and issue a similar mandate.49 Of course the subcommission has little
power to enforce its wishes directly, but the declaration gives national
government officials, including courts, considerable support to promote
restrictive gun laws which are, according to the UN, mandated by
Address Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Sept. 6,
2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/hl964.cfm. The Council has fortyseven members, of which only half (twenty-four) are rated “free” by Freedom House. Freedom
House, Freedom in the World 2006: Selected Data from Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of
Political
Rights
and
Civil
Liberties,
Sept.
1,
2006,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/charts2006.pdf.
46. Schaefer, supra note 45.
47. Id.; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session
of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10/Add (July 5, 2006) (prepared by Musa
Burayzat), available at http://www.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/ docs/L.10add.1.doc; U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Second Special Session, U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/S-2/2
(Aug.
11
2006),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.S-2.2_en.pdf
(condemning Israel for its tactics in the war in Lebanon, but not criticizing any of the numerous
violations of international human rights law by Hezbollah, including the use of civilians as human
shields, and the deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians for terrorist missile attacks); Brett D.
Schaefer, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Disastrous First Year and Discouraging
Signs for Reform, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/
tst072607a.cfm (stating that seventy percent of the HRC’s resolutions in its first year were aimed at
Israel; John Duggard, the Council’s Special Rapporteur for human rights in the “occupied
Palestinian territory” considers his mission to include reporting only on human rights abuses by
Israelis, but not by Arabs).
48. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons,
U.N Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27 (July 27, 2006) (prepared by Barbara Frey), available at
http://www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/20060823.pdf. [hereinafter Frey Report].
49. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6.
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international law. The full Human Rights Council is scheduled to take up
the issue, and indications at the time of this writing suggest that the full
Council will ratify most or all of Frey’s report. The Chairman of the full
Human Rights Council has already announced his enthusiastic support
for the Frey Report, the subcommission’s adoption of the report, and the
prospect of using the Human Rights Council to advance a worldwide gun
control mandate.50
The Frey Report, then, is not simply a scholarly paper that will be
filed away in a United Nations library. It is an effort to establish a new
norm of international human rights law, and this effort to establish the
new norm is supported by the United Nations Human Rights Council, as
one aspect of the UN’s far-ranging support for restrictive and
confiscatory firearms policies.
The United Nations General Assembly began drafting an
international Arms Trade Treaty in late 2006. A stated purpose of the
Arms Trade Treaty is to prohibit arms transfers which violate human
rights.51 As interpreted by the HRC and Frey, every firearms sale in the
United States would be a human rights violation; this is because even the
most restrictive jurisdictions in the United States—such as Washington,
D.C., or New York City—do not meet the minimum Frey/HRC gun
control standards.52
50. Luis Alfonso de Alba, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Human Rights Council
and Efforts to Reduce Small Arms and Light Weapons Related Violence, in Small Arms and Human
Security
Bulletin,
HD,
3–4,
Nov.
2006–Feb.
2007,
http://www.hdcentre.org/Small%20Arms%20and%20Human%20Security%20Bulletin (link to issue
8).
51. Arms Trade Treaty, How Would an ATT Work? http://www.armstradetreaty.org/att/
howwould.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee includes
IANSA itself, and is dominated by IANSA members, such as the Brazilian gun prohibition lobby
Viva Rio, Oxfam, and Amnesty International. Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, About Us,
http://www.armstradetreaty.org/att/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The Steering
Committee’s “About Us” page lists only two “Useful websites”: IANSA and Control Arms (a
prohibitionist consortium of IANSA, Oxfam, and Amnesty International). Arms Trade Treaty
Steering Committee, About Us.
52. For example, New York City and Washington, D.C., allow persons to acquire long guns
(rifles or shotguns) to be used for any and all lawful purposes. (D.C. law allows armed self-defense
in business premises, but not in the home; New York City allows self-defense in the home or in
business premises.) The New York and D.C. laws violate the HRC Sub-Commission requirement
that “Possession of small arms shall be authorized for specific purposes only; small arms shall be
used strictly for the purpose for which they are authorized.” U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6.
The HRC Sub-Commission requires that gun possession be allowed only with a license that must be
periodically renewed. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva,
supra note 6. Although all American states require some form of background check for retail
purchases of firearms (and some have a similar requirement for informal private transfers, such as
gifts) only a few American states require a license for handgun possession; few states require a
license for long gun possession. Hardly anywhere, except in New York State for handguns, does the
licensing requirement inquire (as the HRC demands) into the applicant’s “purpose” for wanting a
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With the proposed Arms Trade Treaty being vigorously promoted by
IANSA and its allied delegations at the United Nations, the Frey/HRC
declarations about human rights and firearms will likely be incorporated
into the new treaty.
While it is unlikely that a severely restrictive international gun
control treaty could be ratified by two-thirds of the United States Senate,
there are many mechanisms by which unratified treaties can work their
way into U.S. law. For example, some eminent international
disarmament experts have taken the position that the president of the
United States may announce that a treaty has entered into force, and
thereby become the law of the United States even if the U.S. Senate has
never voted to ratify the treaty.53 The United States Supreme Court has
cited unratified treaties (and even an African treaty), and various
contemporary foreign law sources, as guidance for interpreting United
States constitutional provisions.54 Likewise, other scholars, writing in a
UN publication, argue that United Nations gun control documents
(notwithstanding the fact that the documents, on their face, have no
binding legal effect) represent “norms” of international law.55 Attorney
Joseph Bruce Alonso has detailed how the theories being developed by
gun.
The HRC Sub-Commission states that “Governments should take steps to encourage voluntary
disarmament.” U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra
note 6. Some American cities occasionally encourage disarmament, by promoting “buy-back”
programs in which people receive cash or some other benefit for surrendering their guns. But the
much more common program is for American governments to encourage armament, by running
hunter safety education and other programs encouraging people to learn how to use firearms safely.
While all American states require safety training in order to acquire a hunting license, and most
states require safety training in order to obtain a permit to carry a concealed handgun for protection
in public places, very few states require a safety test or formal training to possess a handgun, and
almost none impose a test or training requirement for long guns. The HRC Sub-Commission states
that safety training should be mandatory for possession of any gun. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights in Geneva, supra note 6.
53. Baker Spring, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Current Nuclear Proliferation Challenges,
Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl968.cfm (discussing Weapons
of Mass Destruction Comm’n, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Arms, June 1, 2006, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf).
54. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 55 (2005) (rejecting a U.S. Senate reservation to the
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; citing the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States has not ratified, and the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing the never-ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (citing European
court cases, and favorably citing an amicus brief filed by Mary Robinson, a gun prohibitionist who
promoted anti-Semitic propaganda at the U.N. Durban Conference on Racism, see Lantos, supra
note 39); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (citing the European Union’s position on capital
punishment).
55. Nadia Fischer, Outcome of the United Nations Process: The Legal Character of the
United Nations Programme of Action, in ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW at 165–66
(2002).
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IANSA and its allies would allow American manufacturers,
governments, or gun owners to be sued in foreign courts.56
D. No Right of Self-Defense
The most startling of the claims in the Frey/HRC report is that there
is no human right of self-defense. She states:
No international human right of self-defence is expressly set
forth in the primary sources of international law: treaties,
customary law, or general principles. While the right to life is
recognized in virtually every major international human rights
treaty, the principle of self-defence is expressly recognized in
only one, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human
Rights), article 2.57

Frey specifically cites, and rejects, an article arguing that there is a
human right of self-defense against genocide.58 Elsewhere, she has, in
accord with the IANSA position, stated that “It is the State that must be
responsible—and accountable—for ensuring public safety, rather than
civilians themselves.”59
Frey then argues that a state’s failure to restrict self-defense is itself a
human rights violation. According to Frey, a government violates the
human right to life to the extent that a state allows the defensive use of a
firearm “unless the action was necessary to save a life or lives.”60 Thus,
firearms “may be used defensively only in the most extreme

56. Joseph Bruce Alonso, The Second Amendment and Global Gun Control, 15 J. ON
FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y. 1 (2003).
57. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21.
58. Id. at 16 n.14 (discussing David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting
Genocide a Human Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2006) (“The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirms the existence of a universal, individual right of self-defense, and also a right
to revolution against tyranny. . . . Taken in conjunction with Anglo-American human rights law, the
human rights instruments can be read to reflect a customary or general international law recognizing
a right of armed resistance by genocide victims.”).
59. Reducing Gun Violence, Improving Security: National Arms Control Efforts, SMALL
ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY BULLETIN, April (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, Switz.),
Apr. 2005.
60. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 26 (citation markers omitted):
“International bodies and States universally define self-defence in terms of necessity and
proportionality. Whether a particular claim to self-defence is successful is a fact-sensitive
determination. When small arms and light weapons are used for self-defence, for instance, unless the
action was necessary to save a life or lives and the use of force with small arms is proportionate to
the threat of force, self-defence will not alleviate responsibility for violating another’s right to life.”
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circumstances, expressly, where the right to life is already threatened or
unjustifiably impinged.”61 Frey also states that law enforcement officials
may only use firearms in similar circumstances.62
In other words, it is a human rights violation for a state to allow its
citizens or its law enforcement officers to use firearms to protect victims
of rape, robbery, or mayhem. As this paper will detail infra, in Parts IV,
V, and VI, Frey’s hyper-narrow conditions on permissible self-defense—
and her denial of the existence of a human right to self-defense—are
inconsistent with a long and well-established tradition of human rights
law.
The issue of whether international law mandates highly restrictive
gun control, as Frey and the HRC claim, is discussed in Part VII. Then,
Part VIII addresses the related question of to what extent, if any, an
international right of self-defense would imply a right to some type of
arms, or to firearms.
IV. THE FOUNDERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Regarding the vast body of non-treaty international law, Frey offers a
throwaway line: “No international human right of self-defence is
expressly set forth in the primary sources of international law: treaties,
customary law, or general principles.”63 Such assertion is incorrect.
Frey’s claim that non-treaty sources of international law do not
recognize a right of self-defense is unsupportable when those sources are
examined. In fact, the fundamental “general principle” of international
law is the personal right of self-defense—as shall be detailed.
One source of international law is the opinion of leading
scholars.64 During the classical period of international law, the opinion of
scholars was perhaps the most important source of international law,
since there were few treaties of broad applicability.

61. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 27 (citation markers omitted):
The use of small arms and light weapons by either State or non-State actors automatically raises the
threshold for severity of the threat which must be shown in order to justify the use of small arms or
light weapons in defence, as required by the principle of proportionality. Because of the lethal nature
of these weapons and the jus cogens human rights obligations imposed upon all States and
individuals to respect the right to life, small arms and light weapons may be used defensively only in
the most extreme circumstances, expressly, where the right to life is already threatened or
unjustifiably impinged.
62. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
63. Id. ¶ 21.
64. See, e.g., Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, § 1(d) (The International Court of Justice shall
apply “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.”).
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We begin this survey with the first international law treatise, from
Italy in the fourteenth century.65 We then follow the development of
international law in the treatises of the great Spanish and Italian scholars
through the early seventeenth century.
Dutchman Hugo Grotius published the greatest and most influential
treatise of international law in 1625.66 It remained of preeminent
importance even in the early twentieth century.
Second only to Grotius’s magnum opus was Samuel Pufendorf’s
1674 eight-volume work.67 Most of the international law treatises were
written in Latin, the universal second language of educated persons in
Europe and the Americas. Both Grotius and Pufendorf became even
more influential thanks to the French translations, with copious
annotations, by Jean Barbeyrac. The Barbeyrac editions became the
standard editions of Grotius and Pufendorf, and the foundation for
English translations.
The 1725 treatise of Switzerland’s Emmerich de Vattel is generally
considered to complete the trilogy of the three classic works of
international law.68 Another Swiss scholar, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui was
notably influential, especially among the American Founders.69
Among all the scholars, we see some consistent themes: personal
self-defense is an essential human right. Self-defense is likewise an
essential foundation of international law, as the rules and limits of
personal self-defense were scaled up to international application, with
appropriate modifications.
The scholars were highly concerned with shaping international law
so as to impose rules on the conduct of war. The code of chivalry had
once provided some limits on warfare (such as not targeting civilians),
but as warfare passed from the hands of armored, aristocratic knights to
large mercenary armies, warfare became more brutal, most notably in the
Thirty Years War, which devastated German civilians.
The great international law scholars succeeded, as warfare in the
eighteenth century was fought according to standards which were more
respectful of the rights of non-combatants than were the wars of the

65. “Multa ignoramus quae nobis non laterent, si veterum lectio nobis esset familiaris.” (We
are ignorant of many things that would not be hidden from us if the readings of old authors were
familiar to us.) Arthur Lyon Cross, English History and the Study of English Law, 2 MICH. L. REV.
649, 652 (1904) (quoting the Roman philosopher, Macrobius); The Case of Marshalsea, 10 COKE
REP. 68, 73 (E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling, 1738) (1614) (quote rendered as “Quod multa ignoramus
quae nobis non laterent si veterum lectio fuit nobis familiaris.”).
66. See infra Part IV.B.1.
67. See infra Part IV.B.2.
68. See infra Part IV.B.3.
69. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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preceding century. The scholars changed the way that governments
behaved—convincing the governments that they had a legal obligation to
constrain the conduct of their militaries; the way the scholars succeeded
was by building a system of international law in which the right of
personal self-defense was the cornerstone.
A. Before Grotius
1. Giovanni da Legnano
Hailed as “a second Aristotle,” the fourteenth century Milanese
scholar Giovanni da Legnano authored “the earliest attempt to deal, as a
whole, with the group of rights and duties which arise out of a state of
War.”70 Legnano was no Aristotle, but he may justly be regarded as the
scholar who began the systematic analysis of international law which has
continued to the present.
Legnano classified wars into different categories, including
“universal corporeal war” (nation against nation), “reprisal” (a
government taking revenge against foreigners for harm done to one of its
subjects), and “particular war” (self-defense).71 Like the scholars in the
succeeding centuries, Legnano saw no fundamental difference between
individual violence and government violence. To be sure, there were
important distinctions among the various categories of war, but all types
of fighting were simply variants on the same theme.
As with most scholarship of the time, Legnano’s principal sources
were Roman law,72 the Bible, other philosophers, and logic.
According to Legnano, “self-defense proceeds from natural law, and
not from positive law, civil or canon.”73 While positive law did sanction
self-defense, self-defense was not an artificial creation of positive law,

70. Thomas Erskine Holland, Introduction to GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, DE BELLO, DE
REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO ix (Thomas Erskine Holland ed. 1917) (1360) [hereinafter LEGNANO].
Legnano is a city in northern Italy, near Milan. For many of the authors discussed in this Part, the
author’s “name” is a combination of a given name (e.g. “Giovanni”) and a geographical location
indicating where the author is from (e.g., “da Legnano”). The geographical location is not really a
“name” in the modern sense; nevertheless, we follow the convention of many authors in using the
geographical appellation as if it were a “last name” in modern usage.
71. LEGNANO, supra note 70, at 217.
72. See discussion infra Part V.C.
73. LEGNANO, supra note 70, at 278. “Positive law” is law formally created by a government
or governments. The works of the founding classical authors have been reprinted many times, in
many different editions. We recognize that not all present or future readers will be using the same
printed editions which we have used. Some readers may also wish to consult editions written in other
languages. Thus, the page numbers which we use in our pinpoint cites may not be the page numbers
in the editions which some readers may use.

43]

THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

61

but rather was an inherent instinct.74
Although the fourteenth century world was strictly hierarchical,
Legnano allowed for self-defense against one’s superior, or even against
a judge, if it were clear that the defender was the victim of an
unprovoked violent attack.75 Even a slave could defend his own life
against a master, because the law did not allow masters to kill their
slaves.76
Self-defense is lawful, wrote Legnano, not only in defense of life,
but also in defense of lawfully possessed property,77 with deadly force if
necessary.78 The principle of self-defense allows a person to come to the
aid of a relative or friend whose person or property is being attacked.79
Aiding others is not compulsory, however, unless a person can do so
safely.80
Notably, a victim is not required to use only the precise level of force
that his assailant uses: “suppose a strong and vigorous man strikes me
with his fist, and I am a poor fellow who cannot stand up to him with the
fist. May I defend myself with a sword?” Legnano answered in the
affirmative.81
2. Honoré de Bonet and Christine de Pisan
Honoré de Bonet’s The Tree of Battles popularized Legnano’s ideas
in a simpler form.82 Like many other international law writers, Bonet was
very concerned with curbing the tendency of soldiers to victimize noncombatant peasants and other non-combatants.83
In the hierarchical world of the Middle Ages, Bonet showed the
primacy of the right of self-defense by explaining that subordinates could
rightfully defend themselves against their superiors: a serf against his
lord, a monk against his abbot, a son against his father; to fail to defend
oneself against a deadly attack would be tantamount to suicide, and
74. Id.
75. Id. at 289.
76. Id. at 291.
77. Id. at 297.
78. Id. at 299–300.
79. Id. at 294–95.
80. Id. at 295.
81. Id. at 303.
82. HONORÉ BONET, THE TREE OF BATTLES (G.W. Coopland trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1949) (late 14th century).
83. Id. at 188–89 (arguing that traditional practices should be enlarged regarding noncombatants having a right to safe conduct passage during war, regarding the protection of all animals
used for tilling the soil, and that farm laborers should have the same immunity from military attack
as does the farmer owner).
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would lead to damnation.84 Of course it was permissible to defend one’s
wife.85 More generally, the defense of the innocent needed no license
from the sovereign.86 Helping a third person who is the victim of a
potentially homicidal attack was allowed, but not required. 87
The Founding Mother of international law, Christine de Pisan (13641430), spread the ideas of Legnano and Bonet further.88 Pisan’s father
was an Italian scholar who was called to join the court of France’s King
Charles V; her father ensured that she received a broad and deep
education, of the type that at the time was only provided to boys.89 After
her husband died when she was only twenty-five years old, she made
herself the first woman to support herself by writing.90 She wrote a
variety of works of fiction and non-fiction, which extolled heroic women
and women’s rights to self-determination.91
In 1409 she penned Le Livre des Faits d’Armes et de Chevalrie (The
Book of Feats of Arms and Chivalry).92 Later in the century, William
Caxton translated the book into English. Because Pisan and Bonet were
writing in a vernacular language (French), their ideas were accessible to
a larger audience than the Latin-reading élites who were the main
audience for other scholars. The English translation of Pisan further
magnified her influence.
Le Livre des Faits d’Armes et de Chevalrie was written for knights,
and included advice about military strategy and tactics (mainly based on
Roman sources), as well as standards for the legitimate conduct of
warfare—particularly the imperative not to deliberately harm noncombatants. Pisan affirmed that a knight could defend himself, including
with deadly force, for “a man in deffense is permytted to hurt another”,
since “Iuste deffense” was “preuyleged.”93 She rejected the idea that a
victim could be prosecuted for using deadly force just because the
84. Id. at 170.
85. Id. at 166.
86. Id. at 137.
87. Id.
88. CHRISTINE DE PISAN, THE BOOK OF FAYETTES OF ARMES AND OF CHYVALRYE (A.T.P.
Byles, ed., William Caxton trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1932) (1409).
89. A.T.P. Byles, Introduction to CHRISTINE DE PISAN, THE BOOK OF FAYTTES OF ARMES
AND OF CHYVALRYE, at xi (A.T.P. Byles ed., 2002).
90. Microsoft
Encarta
Online
Encyclopedia,
s.v.
“Christine
de
Pisan,”
http://encarta.msn.com/text_761553009__0/ Pisan_Christine_de.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
91. Id. (discussing ÉPÎTRE AU DIEU D’AMOUR [LETTER TO THE GOD OF LOVE] (1399)
(rejecting courtly love conventions which idealized and falsified women’s nature); BOOK OF THE
CITY OF LADIES (1405) (biographies of heroic women from antiquity and from Christian history;
arguing that women are as intelligent as men, are not blameworthy for rape, and can be great
warriors); DITIÉ EN L’HONNEUR DE JEANNE D’ARC [SONG IN HONOR OF JOAN OF ARC] (1429)).
92. Byles, supra note 89, at xii.
93. PISAN, supra note 88, at 211.
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government claimed that the assailant’s attack was not intended to be
deadly.94
3. Francisco de Victoria
During the sixteenth century, the higher education system of Spain
was the greatest in the world, and the greatest of the Spanish universities
was the University of Salamanca. At Salamanca, as at other universities,
the most prestigious professorship was that of head Professor of
Theology—a position which included the full scope of ethics and
philosophy.
When the Primary chair in Theology at the University of Salamanca
became open in 1526, Francisco de Victoria (1486–1546) was selected to
occupy the most important position in the University.95 He was chosen,
in accordance with the custom of the time, by a vote of the students.96 As
one of Victoria’s biographers observed, “It is no slight tribute to
democracy that a small democratic, intellectual group should have
chosen from among the intellectuals the one person best able to defend
democracy for the entire world.”97
Victoria came from the Dominican Order—which governed itself
through democratic, representative procedures, according to procedures
in the Order’s written constitution.98 During the period between the
destruction of the Roman Republic by Julius Caesar in the first century
BC, and the founding of the Dominicans in the thirteenth century AD, the
Western world had very little experience with functional, enduring
systems of democratic government. The Dominican Order served as one
of the incubators of democracy for the modern world.

94. Id. at 211–12.
95. Ernest Nys, Introduction to FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI
RELECTIONES 69 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bates trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1532).
An important predecessor of Victoria was Alfonso Tostado, a leading Spanish theologian and
canonist of the fifteenth century. He addressed many topics, including just war. Tostado wrote that:
“in a just war everything that a man can seize becomes the property of the captor, both by divine law
and by the Law of Nations, and it is just to kill; but an unjust war does not differ from brigandage.”
Id. at 63. Except for the requirement that a war be just, Tostado set no limits on how the war be
conducted, save that there must be no “violation of truth.” Id. As a modern commentator explains,
Tostado saw personal self-defense and national self-defense as essentially identical: “The author has
before his eyes, we must point out, not only public war, but also private war, when it is conducted in
accordance with the rules laid down by the law of the country.” Id.
96. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE
VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS 73 (Oxford University Press 1934).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 275–80 (citing ERNEST BARKER, THE DOMINICAN ORDER AND CONVOCATION: A
STUDY OF GROWTH AND REPRESENTATION IN THE CHURCH DURING THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
(1913)).
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University lectures were open to the public, and Victoria attracted
huge audiences of students and laymen. He quickly became known as the
best teacher in Spain.99 He was the founder of the “celebrated school of
Salamanca”: a group of Spanish scholars, at the University of Salamanca
and other Spanish universities, who applied new insights to the
Scholastic system of philosophy.100 (Scholasticism, a dialectical
methodology for academic inquiry, had been developed centuries before
by Thomas Aquinas and other scholars.)
Victoria had been educated in Paris, and, as an eminent Dominican
scholar, he was part of a continent-wide community of Dominican
intellectuals. Accordingly, Victoria was an internationalist. In addition,
“Victoria was a liberal. He could not help being a liberal. He was an
internationalist by inheritance. And because he was both, his
international law is a liberal law of nations.”101
Francisco de Victoria’s classroom became “the cradle of
international law.”102 “Victoria proclaimed the existence of an
international law no longer limited to Christendom but applying to all
States, without reference to geography, creed, or race.”103
Victoria was a key source for Grotius104 as transmitted via the
Spanish legal scholars Ferdinand Vasquez and Diego Covarruvias.105
The Spanish conquest of the New World impelled the sixteenthcentury’s scholarly inquiry into international law. Many Spaniards were
intensely concerned with whether the conquests had been moral and
legal. Indeed, it is to the credit of Spain that many of its leading
intellectuals and scholars strongly denounced the abuse of Indians and
urged that Spanish policy conform to international law. The actual
99. Id. at 95.
100. Nys, supra note 95. The earlier Scholastics, including Aquinas, argued for a right of
personal defense, and for a right to community self-defense to overthrow a tyrant. See David B.
Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 519 (2006). Another leading
Salamancan was the Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536–1624). Today, Spain’s leading liberal think tank
is named for him, the Instituto Juan de Mariana. (www.juandemariana.org). In 1599, Mariana wrote
De Rege et Regis Institutione (The King and the Education of the King) which elaborated the right of
popular revolution against tyrants. J.H.M. Salmon, Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontism, and
the Royalist Response, 1580–1620, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450–
1700, at 75–77 (J.H. Burns ed., 1996) (citing 2 JUAN DE MARIANA, DE REGE ET REGIS
INSTITUTIONE, at ch. 6 (1599)).
101. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 280.
102. Id. at 75.
103. Id. at 10a–11a. In Spanish, “Victoria” is the proper spelling for the man in general (e.g.,
“Victoria was very intelligent”), while “Vitoria” is the spelling for discussion of him as a theologian
or jurist (e.g., “Vitoria developed more sophisticated answers to some of the questions raised by
Thomas Aquinas.”). Id. at 70. To avoid confusion, this Article uses “Victoria” (except when a direct
quote or formal citation uses “Vitoria”).
104. See discussion infra text accompanying notes Part IV.B.1.
105. Nys, supra note 95, at 98.
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behavior of the Spanish government in the New World was hardly
admirable on the whole, but Spain was far ahead of France, England, and
other colonial powers, because Spain at least had a group of influential
scholars who raised the right questions—and who sometimes affected the
course of government policy.
The issue of treatment of the Indians had been raised at the Spanish
court of Queen Isabella as early as 1494; a special commission of
theologians and canonists had actually convinced the Queen of the legal
and moral necessity of a humanitarian policy, but the Queen eventually
yielded to the demands of colonists who insisted on unfettered power of
exploitation.106
The debate continued in Spain during ensuing decades, leading to
Francisco de Victoria’s 1532 treatise De Indis (On the Indians).107 The
first two sections of the treatise demolished every argument that
Christianity, or the desire to propagate the Christian faith, or even the
express authority of the Pope, could justify the conquest of the Indians.
Victoria wrote that heretics, blasphemers, idolaters, and pagans—
including those who were presented with Christian evangelization and
then obstinately rejected it—retained all of their natural rights to their
property and their sovereignty.108
In section three, Victoria examined other possible justifications for
the conquest. He argued in favor of an unlimited right of free trade. 109 If
a Frenchman wanted to travel in Spain, or to pursue peaceful commerce
there, the Spanish government had no right to stop him. Similarly, the
Spanish had the right to engage in commerce in the New World. A
Frenchman had the right to fish or to prospect for gold in Spain (but not
on someone’s private property), and the Spanish had similar rights in the
New World. If the Indians attempted to prevent the Spanish from
engaging in free trade, then the Spanish should peacefully attempt to
reason with them. Only if the Indians used force would the Spanish be
allowed to use force, “it being lawful to repel force with force.”110
Victoria also argued in favor of a duty of humanitarian intervention,
because “innocent folk there” were victimized by the Aztecs’ “sacrifice
of innocent people or the killing in other ways of uncondemned people
for cannibalistic purposes.”111 The principle of humanitarian intervention

106. Id. at 84.
107. Id. at 69.
108. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 115–49. The famous phrase was causa iusti belli non est
diversitas religionis.
109. Id. at 151–54.
110. Id. For the Roman law principle which Victoria quoted, see discussion infra Part V.D.
111. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 159.
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against human sacrifice and other atrocious crimes against humanity was
not limited to Spaniards and Aztecs, but was universally applicable.112
A related theory was that “title may be found in the cause of allies
and friends.”113 He noted that the Spanish had allied with the Tlaxcalans
in their just war against the Aztecs, and that in successful pursuit of this
just war, the Spaniards were entitled to the ordinary fruits of conquest
and victory.114
Historically, it was the combination of the two theories which had
actually led to the Spanish victory over the Aztecs. In the thirteenth
century, the Aztecs had begun conquering Mexico, and by the fifteenth
century, they had brought most of central Mexico under their control.
Rather than assimilating the conquered tribes into a unified empire, as
the ancient Romans had done, the Aztecs used the other tribes as “human
stockyards.”115 The conquered tribes were required to supply,
collectively, between 20,000 and 200,000 victims for human sacrifice
every year. Aztecs were not sacrificed.116
The Aztec priests, often wearing flayed human skins, skillfully cut
out the hearts of living victims. Their favorite victims were children,
whose tears were supposed to be a special source of pleasure to the Aztec
gods. The dead bodies were then eaten by the Aztec upper class, which
used cannibalism as their major source of protein.117
Hernando de Cortes landed in Mexico with 508 soldiers, 100 sailors,
sixteen horses, and firearms.118 Although the Aztecs had neither firearms
nor horses, it would have been impossible for Cortes to conquer the
Aztecs if not for the alliances Cortes formed with other Indian tribes,
who contributed 200,000 fighters to his cause.119
While Spanish title in the New World could be legitimately
defended, according to Victoria, Spain’s subsequent abuses of the
Indians could not. As Victoria put it: “I fear measures were adopted in

112. Id.
113. Id. at 160.
114. Id.
115. Roger McGrath, Atrocities Azteca, CHRONICLES, Oct. 2006, at 13.
116. Id.; see also ROSS HASSIG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND WAR 30 (Gabriel PalmerFernandez ed., 2004) (During the 1487 rededication of the Great Temple in Tenochtitlan, 80,400
victims were slaughtered in human sacrifice).
117. McGrath, supra note 115.
118. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Cortés, Hernán, Marqués Del Valle De Oaxaca,”
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9026431/Hernan-Cortes-marquis-del-Valle-de-Oaxaca
(last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
119. Id. Spanish title to the Inca Empire would also, under Victoria’s theory, be legitimate,
since the Inca and his minions were also enthusiastic practitioners of human sacrifice. See generally,
BURR CARTWRIGHT BRUNDAGE, EMPIRE OF THE INCA (1985).
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excess of what is allowed by human and divine law.”120 Or as he wrote
on another occasion: the pillage of the Indians had been “despicable,”
and the Indians had the right to use defensive violence against the
Spaniards who were robbing them.121
Victoria produced a follow-up treatise, commonly known as On the
Law of War, in which he examined the lawfulness of how the Spanish
had conducted their wars in the New World, as measured by international
legal standards of war.122
In the treatise, Victoria explained various reasons why personal and
national self-defense are lawful; one reason is that a contrary rule would
put the world in “utter misery, if oppressors and robbers and plunderers
could with impunity commit their crimes and oppress the good and
innocent, and these latter could not in turn retaliate upon them.”123
His “first proposition” was: Any one, even a private person, can
accept and wage a defensive war. This is shown by the fact that force
may be repelled by force.124 Hence, any one can make this kind of war,
without authority from any one else, for the defense not only of his
person, but also of his property and goods.125
From the first proposition, about personal self-defense, Victoria
derived his second proposition: “Every state has authority to declare war

120. VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 158.
121. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 79–81.
122. Victoria’s treatises are actually compilations of his lecture notes, although they are so
thorough they read very much like a book.
123. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 167.
124. Here Victoria cited Justinian’s Digest, the Roman law treatise discussed infra at text
accompanying notes Part V.D.
125. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 167. Victoria was a prolific scholar, and wrote about selfdefense in other treatises as well. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IIa–IIae, at 193–95 (John P. Doyle trans., 1997) (Distinguishing “will” from
“intent” and pointing out that a person acting in self-defense might “will” the death of an assailant
but not “intend” the death—just as a person who asked that his own gangrenous arm be amputated
might “will” the amputation but not “intend” it.). Could a person exempt himself from a moral
obligation to obey the law, if he sincerely believed that the rationale for the law was inapplicable to
him? Victoria said “no.” As an example, he pointed to the law against the nighttime carrying of
weapons:
For the fact that dangers often arise from the practice of carrying weapons by
night, is sufficient reason for prohibiting the practice to all; otherwise the law
would be entirely inefficacious, since every individual would suppose that it
had not been laid down for him, but for others; and in like manner, with
regard to other precepts, the reason should be viewed not from a particular but
from a universal standpoint.
Francisco de Victoria, Reflectio of the Reverend Father, Brother Franciscus de Victoria Concerning
the Civil Power (De Potestate Civili) (Gwladys L. Williams trans.), in SCOTT, supra note 96, at xc.
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and to make war” in self-defense.126 State self-defense is broader than
personal self-defense, since personal self-defense is limited to immediate
response to an attack, whereas a state may act to redress wrongs from the
recent past.127
The personal right to self-defense was likewise used to create
humanitarian restrictions on war. Victoria examined whether, in national
warfare, it is lawful to deliberately kill innocent non-combatants.
Victoria explained such killings could not be just, “because it is certain
that innocent folk may defend themselves against any who try to kill
them.”128 Because self-defense by innocents is just, the killing of
innocents is unjust. “Hence it follows that even in war with Turks it is
not allowable to kill children. This is clear because they are innocent.
Aye, and the same holds with regard to the women of unbelievers.”129
To a reader in 2008, it sounds strange to hear an eminent Catholic
theologian refer to “unbelievers.” Nonetheless, Victoria’s point was that
international law protected everyone, not just Christians. He believed
that basic moral principles applied globally. He was likewise at the
forefront in insisting that the moral rules which applied to ordinary
individuals also applied to the great and the powerful, including
governments. Victoria was the world’s most renowned scholar urging
humanitarian limits on war; the principle he used to prove those
humanitarian limits was the personal right of self-defense.
In other writings, Victoria directly connected the right of selfdefense to a right of defense against tyranny—either in a personal or in a
political context.130 Thus, a child has a right of self-defense against his
own father if the father tries to kill him; a subject may defend himself
against a murderous king; and people may even defend themselves
against an evil pope.131 And, of course, innocent Indians or Muslims may
defend themselves against unjust attacks by Christians.
In 1536, Pope Paul III held a conference in Rome where Victoria’s
ideas were presented. The next year, the Pope declared that anyone who
enslaved an Indian would be excommunicated, and he forbade Catholics
from taking the lives or property of Indians, including non-Christian
Indians.132
126. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 168.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 178–79.
129. Id.
130. 2 VICTORIA, supra note 95, at 195–97; BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS
296 (1997).
131. Id.
132. POPE PAUL III, SUBLIMUS DEI (1537) reprinted in LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE:
A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION BETWEEN BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINÉS DE

43]

THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

69

In 1542, the Spanish King Charles I enacted The New Laws of the
Indies for the protection of Indians.133 Unfortunately, the laws met with
substantial resistance from the Spanish colonists. In 1550, the king and
his “Council of Fourteen” heard argument on the issue in “the Valladolid
debate.” Unfortunately, the Council appears not to have issued a
decision, thereby leaving the Indians unprotected, in practice, until the
promulgation of new laws in 1573, which may well have been influenced
by the arguments raised previously by Victoria and other
humanitarians.134
4. Pierino Belli
In the mid-sixteenth century, the Italian Pierino Belli (1502-1575)
served as a high-ranking military advisor to the Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V and King Philip II of Spain. In 1561, he was appointed as a
counselor to the Duke of Savoy, and in that capacity provided guidance
on many important legal issues.135
Belli wrote a treatise, published in 1563, in which he explicated the
international law of war, based on natural law. Belli’s explicit purpose
was to moderate the conduct of war, particularly the wholesale pillaging
and abuse of civilians which characterized the era.136
Belli advocated far-reaching restrictions on the methods of just
warfare, including a significant time lapse between when war is declared
and when the fighting begins, moderate treatment of prisoners, respectful
treatment of all non-combatants, and generous treatment of the
inhabitants of an occupied territory, so long as they did not wage war
against the occupying army.137
Although Belli’s book was highly praised upon publication, its
reputation was somewhat obscured in subsequent centuries because
Alberico Gentili (a major influence on Grotius)138 did not give Belli the
SEPÚLVEDA IN 1550 ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS
21 (1994) (English translation).
133. Id. Charles I of Spain also ruled the Holy Roman Empire as Charles V. Another scholar
active in carrying forward the arguments for the rights of the Indians was Domingo de Soto. In the
mid-sixteenth century, after Victoria retired, Domingo de Soto was the leading scholar of the School
of Salamanca. He agreed with Victoria about community defense and self-defense. ANABEL S.
BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT 139–
40 (2003).
134. HANKE, supra note 132, at 113–22.
135. Arrigo Cavaglieri, Introduction, to PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO
TRACTATUS [A Treatise on Military Matters and Warfare] 11a (Herbert C. Nutting, trans., William
S. Hein 1995) (1563).
136. Id. at 13a.
137. Id. at 15a–16a.
138. See infra text accompanying notes Part IV.A.6.
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credit he deserved for influencing Gentili’s own thinking.139 The modern
view is that Belli was a leader in separating theology from law, and that
he was “the first to attempt . . . to raise the treatment of international law
to the dignity of an independent scientific discipline.”140
According to Belli, defensive war is lawful, for “Surely nature
teaches us to oppose force with force, and arms with arms.”141 Belli’s
citations for the principle were to a Roman law rule about personal
defense, and to a Canon law (Catholic Church law) rule about warfare.142
“And inasmuch as it is permissible to fight on one’s own behalf, much
more may we do so to save the state, i.e. in defence of liberty and
fatherland.”143 Personal and collective self-defense were conceptually
identical.
Belli argued that soldiers should, in most cases, be subject to the
ordinary law applicable to everyone else.144 One of Belli’s proofs of his
standard was the Roman law’s rule that “at night it is permissible to
oppose a soldier who is breaking in, just as you would resist any other
person, since no respect needs to be shown a soldier who has to be
opposed with a weapon, as if he were a robber.”145
5. Francisco Suárez
Thirteen-year-old Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) enrolled at the
University of Salamanca in 1561, which by then was well established as
the leading university in Europe.146 At the age of 23, he was appointed to
a chair in philosophy at the University of Segovia. During his career, he
taught at Salamanca, in Rome, and at the University of Coimbra.147

139. Cavaglieri, supra note 135, at 18a–26a.
140. Id. at 26a (citing G. CHIALVO, IL PRECURSORE ITALIANO DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
20–24 (1919)).
141. BELLI, supra note 135, at 61.
142. Id., (citing DIG. 1.1.3 (personal defense), and Decretum, 2.23.1.1. (warfare)).The cited
sources are discussed infra Part V.D–G.
143. BELLI, supra note 135, at 62.
144. Id. at 214.
145. Id. (citing and paraphrasing Justinian’s Code, 3.23.1; the Code is discussed infra at Part
V.D.). Another international law author from the same period, the Spaniard Balthazar Ayala, focused
almost exclusively on narrowly military issues such as rules for discipline of soldiers, and treatment
of deserters. He stated that a tyrant who had usurped the throne could lawfully be overthrown; but
unlike most of the other international law authors, he stated that a tyrant who had acquired the
sovereignty lawfully could never be overthrown, no matter how cruel his rule. 2 BALTHAZAR
AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE LAWS OF WAR AND ON THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND ON
MILITARY DISCIPLINE 17 (John Pawley Bate trans., 1995) (1582).
146. James Scott Brown, Introduction to 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, at S.J. 5a (Gwladys L. Williams ed., William S. Hein 1995).
147. Id. at 7a–8a.
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Suárez wrote fourteen books on theological, metaphysical, and political
subjects, and was widely recognized as one of the preeminent scholars of
his age, and one of the founders of international law. 148
Self-defense is “the greatest of rights,” wrote Suárez. 149 It was a
right which no government could abolish, because self-defense is part of
natural law.150
The irrevocable right of self-defense has many important
implications for civil liberty. A subject’s right to resist a manifestly
unjust law, such as a bill of attainder, is based on the right of selfdefense.151
Similarly, as a last resort, an individual subject may kill a tyrant,
because of the subject’s inherent right of self-defense, by “the authority
of God, Who has granted to every man, through the natural law, the right
to defend himself and his state from the violence inflicted by such a
tyrant.”152
Unlike some modern scholars, Suárez did not make the mistake of
assuming that “the state” was identical to “the government.” Rather, the
state itself could exercise its right of “self-defence” to depose violently a
tyrannical king, because of “natural law, which renders it licit to repel
force with force.”153 The principle that “the state” had the right to use
force to remove a tyrannical government was consistent with Suárez’s
principle that a prince had just power only if the power were bestowed
148. TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 301.
149. Id. at 314.
150. Jurisdiction could not be reasonably applied to “do away with the right of self-defence—
springing from the law of nature—against a criminal charge, especially a charge that was so grave;
for it would not be permissible that the Emperor should abolish those things which proceed from the
natural law.” 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in 2 SUÁREZ, supra
note 146, at 273 (quoting the Constitutions of Pope Clement, bk. 2, tit. 11, ch. 2).
151. Id. at 101.
152. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, DEFENSIO FIDEI CATHOLICAE ADVERSUS ANGLICANAE SECTAE
ERRORES [DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH AGAINST THE ERRORS OF THE ANGLICAN SECT] 714
(1613) [hereinafter A DEFENCE]. Suárez argued that General precepts of natural law all have implicit
exceptions. For example, the natural law rule that a deposit should be returned to its owner did not
apply when the owner meant to use it to harm the state. Likewise, “Thou shalt not kill” had an
exception for self-defense. SUÁREZ, supra note 146, at 261; see also id. at 313–14.
153. A DEFENCE, supra note 152, at 718; see also FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Work on the Three
Theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity: Divided into Three Treatises to Correspond with
the Number of the Virtues Themselves, in 2 SUÁREZ, supra note 146, at 854–55 [hereinafter A Work
on the Three Theological Virtues] (the state is superior to the ruler, and has a natural right of selfdefense against a tyrant; the state also has the right to enforce the implicit term of its contract with a
ruler—namely that the ruler act for the good of the public). Cf. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 80 (1828) (“state” is “A political body, or body politic;
the whole body of people united under one government, whatever may be the form of
government. . . . More usually the word signifies a political body governed by representatives. . . . In
this sense, state has some times more immediate reference to government, sometimes to the people
or community.”). The “repel force with force” principle is from Roman law, discussed infra text
accompanying notes Part V.D.
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by the people.154
Like the other founders of international law, Suárez paid particular
attention to the laws of war. The legitimacy of state warfare is, according
to Suárez, derivative of the personal right of self-defense, and the
derivation shows why limits could be set on warfare.155 Armed selfdefense against a person who is trying violently to take one’s land is “not
really aggression, but defence of one’s legal possession.”156 The same
principle applies to national defense—along with the corollary (from
Roman law) that the personal or national actions be “waged with a
moderation of defence which is blameless” (that is, not grossly
disproportionate to the attack).157
For the individual and for the state, defense against an aggressor is
not only a right, but a duty (such as for a parent, who is obliged to defend
his child).158
While Suárez was a Catholic, he was extremely influential on
Protestant writers. The great British historian Lord Acton wrote that “the
greater part of the political ideas” of John Milton and John Locke “may
be found in the ponderous Latin of Jesuits who were subjects of the
Spanish Crown . . . .” such as Suárez.159 Suárez was also a major
influence on Grotius.160
6. Alberico Gentili
Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) was “perhaps the most important of
the fore-runners of Grotius.”161 Gentili was an Italian lawyer who fled to
Germany, and then England, after his family became Protestants. He was
appointed Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, teaching Roman law.162

154. Salmon, supra note 100, at 238 (citing 4 SUÁREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE §
2, at 123 (1612)).
155. A Work on the Three Theological Virtues, supra note 153, at 804.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Decretals, Bk. V, tit. Xxxix, chap. Iii, Id. at 802–03. (“Secondly, I hold that defensive
war not only is permitted, but sometimes is even commanded. This first part of this proposition . . .
holds true not only for public officials, but also for private individuals, since all laws allow the
repelling of force with force. The reason supporting it is that the right of self-defence is natural and
necessary. Whence the second part of our proposition is easily proved. For self-defence may
sometimes be prescribed, at least in accordance with the order of charity. . . . The same is true of the
defence of the state, especially if such defence is an official duty . . . .”).
159. JOHN DALBERG ACTON, THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 82 (1993).
160. Brown, supra note 146, at 18a–19a.
161. Coleman Phillipson, Introduction to ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 10a
(William S. Hein 1995) (1598).
162. Id. at 12a–13a.
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As the preeminent scholar of international law in England, he was
frequently consulted on the leading controversies of his time. At the
request of the English government, Gentili rendered a legal opinion on
the Mendoza affair—in which Spain’s ambassador to England had been
discovered to be participating in a plot to overthrow Queen Elizabeth.
Gentili insisted on the principle of the inviolability of ambassadors; the
English government acceded to his international law reasoning, and so
the Spanish ambassador Mendoza was expelled rather than executed.163
Gentili was praised in the twentieth century as “the first great writer
on modern international law, the first clearly to define its subject-matter,
and to treat it in the way which is on the whole consonant to the
conception and practice of our own time.”164 This was, in part, because
“The theological basis of the subject, which was generally affirmed or
assumed by his predecessors, was once for all undermined by Gentili,
and a more acceptable foundation was substituted.”165 Unlike many of
his predecessors and successors, Gentili did not found his system on
natural law.166
Rather, Gentili’s approach was founded on “the basic axiom of
human solidarity,” that “‘ubi societas ibi ius’ [Where there is society,
there is law.] is as applicable to a group of peoples as it is to a group of
individuals.”167 His greatest work was De Jure Belli libri tres (On the
Law of War, Three Books).168
His views on self-defense were consistent with the mainstream of the
other international law founders. He explained self-defense as an instinct
of all living things, and a “natural” reason for taking up arms.169 This
“most accepted of all rights” of “private individuals” is a right which
allows a victim to defend himself even if he could safely retreat; private
self-defense has the same intellectual basis as the right of states to violent
self-defense:
For to kill in self-defence is just, even though the one who
kills may flee without danger and to save himself. . . . These
163. Id. at 13a.
164. Id. at 18a (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 18a. Gentili was at the forefront of an intellectual movement which was replacing
theology with jurisprudence as the “masterscience” of moral philosophy and inquiry. See DIEGO
PANIZZA, POLITICAL THEORY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN GENTILI’S DE IURE BELLI: THE GREAT
DEBATE BETWEEN ‘THEOLOGICAL’ AND ‘HUMANIST’ PERSPECTIVES FROM VITORIA TO GROTIUS
(NYU Institute for International Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2005/15, 2005), available at
http://www.iilj.org/events/documents/Panizza.pdf.
166. Phillipson, supra note 161, at 51a.
167. Id. at 23a.
168. Id. at 16a.
169. GENTILI, DE JURE, at 58–59 (bk. 1, ch. 13).
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views have been admitted in the case of private individuals,
and I consider them still more valid with regard to states . . .
And it is a necessary right; for what can be done against
violence, says Cicero, without resort to violence? This is the
most generally accepted of all rights. All laws and all codes
allow the repelling of force by force. There is one rule which
endures forever, to maintain one’s safety by any and every
means.170

Gentili pointed out that there is a unanimously-agreed duty of
individuals to come to the defense of other innocents, even strangers.
“That it is even lawful to kill another in defence of a stranger is a view
approved by all the scholars.”171 From this duty he derived a state duty of
humanitarian intervention to protect people who are being victimized by
a tyrant, and to protect nations which are being victimized by
aggressors.172 “And if these things are true in the case of private
individuals, how much truer they will be of sovereigns . . . .”173
As a lawyer, Gentili used well-known truths about personal defense
in order to make broader points about international law. In one case, for
example, an English merchant ship reasonably feared that it was about to
be attacked by an armed Tuscan ship. The English ship then fired the
first shot, in anticipatory self-defense. Gentili argued that international
maritime law allowed for anticipatory self-defense, as an extension of the
universally accepted rule that allowed for anticipatory personal
defense.174
170. Id. The Cicero quotation is from MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON INVENTION (De
inventione) (84 BC) (bk. 2, ch. 22) (“invention” in the title is meant in the sense of “the construction
of arguments”). For more on Cicero, see infra text accompanying notes 257, 353–58, 384.
171. GENTILI, supra note 169, at 69 (bk. 1, ch. 15).
172. Id. at 68–78 (bk. 1, chs. 15–16).
173. Id. at 70 (bk. 1, ch. 15).
174. ALBERICO GENTILI, Of an English Ship Which Fought with a Tuscan Ship and Was
Captured, in HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO [PLEAS OF A SPANISH ADVOCATE, TWO
BOOKS] 122–24 (Frank Frost Abbott trans., William S. Hein 1995) (1661). This book was a
posthumously published collection of Gentili’s arguments on maritime law, compiled by his brother.
In the English Ship case, Gentili was attempting to convince a court to reverse its decision that
allowed the Tuscan to keep the captured English ship. The book does not specify which court was
hearing the case, or whether Gentili’s plea was successful. Regarding personal defense, Gentili
stated:
“The defense of the Englishmen was proper, because they feared offense, and
simply because the other man is making ready to attack me, I may lawfully
take the offensive and slay him. Of course I do not have to wait till I am
attacked; it is my duty to being myself.” This is said to be the more humane
view, a view tested in according with facts in the courts, and “approved
moreover by all the doctors.” “One should anticipate offense, that which is
potential as well as that which is actual.”
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B. The Grotius Trinity
1. Hugo Grotius
The Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a child prodigy
who enrolled at the University of Leiden when he was eleven years old.
Hailed as “the miracle of Holland,” he wrote over fifty books, and “may
well have been the best-read man of his generation in Europe.”175
His classic The Rights of War and Peace has “commonly been seen
as the classic work in modern public international law, laying the
foundation for a universal code of law.”176 It was “the first authoritative
treatise upon the law of nations, as that term is now understood.” 177 “It
was at once perceived to be a work of standard and permanent value, of
the first authority upon the subject of which it treats.”178 Thus, “in about
sixty years from the time of publication, it was universally established in
Christendom as the true fountain-head of the European Law of
Nations.”179 In short, “it would be hard to imagine any work more central
to the intellectual world of the Enlightenment.”180
Three centuries later, when World War One was being settled,
Grotius was still considered “the founder of modern civilized interstate
relations.”181
During the sixteenth century, there were twenty-six editions of the
original Latin text, as well as translations into French, English, and

Id., at 123. (The internal quotes are cited to “Ias. l. ut vim n. 9” and “Alb. d. 14.” The first citation is
Gentili’s idiosyncratic cite form for the Digest, 1.1.3. Arthur Williams, Index of Authors Cited by
Gentili, in HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO, at 275. The other citation may be commentary on
the Digest by Albericus (a/k/a Alberico de Rosate), of Bergamo, Italy. The Digest is discussed infra
Part V.D.).
175. David B. Bederman, Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’
De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1996).
176. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, inside jacket (Liberty Fund 2005)
(reprint of 1737 English translation by John Morrice of the 1724 annotated French translation by
Jean Barbeyrac) (1625), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt
&staticfile=show.php?title=1877&Itemid=99999999. When the Carnegie Institution began a
republication and translation series of the “leading classics of International Law,” the General Editor
noted that “The masterpieces of Grotius will naturally be the central point in the series . . . .” James
Brown Scott, Preface to GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO a2
(Thomas Erskine Holland ed., 1995) (reprint of 1917 Carnegie edition) (1360). Hugo Grotius is the
Latin form of the name; “Huig de Groot” is his Dutch name.
177. GEORGE B. DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005) (1900).
178. Id.
179. 2 ROBERT WARD, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN
EUROPE FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS TO THE AGE OF GROTIUS 374–75 (2005)
(1795).
180. Richard Tuck, Introduction to 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at xi.
181. Id.
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Dutch. The next century saw twenty Latin editions, and multiple editions
in French, English, Dutch, German, Russian, and Italian.182
Writing in the middle of the Thirty Years War, Grotius was
explicitly working to counter the tendency of the period towards
unrestrained warfare, and warfare for spurious causes.183 “I observed
throughout the Christian World a Licentiousness in regard to War, which
even barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of,” he stated in his
introduction.184 As one historian explained:
The actual conduct of warfare in the Middle Ages and even in
later times was often marked by atrocious and barbaric
cruelty. The belligerents were wont to assume that they were
not subject to any restraint, whether of law or morality or
humanity. They had recourse to every kind of available act,
instrument, or device that might lead to the annihilation of the
enemy. Accordingly, they burned down towns, devastated
lands, destroyed sacred places, objects, and buildings and
things of art; they put prisoners to the sword or mutilated
them, massacred the non-combatant population—old, young,
and feeble alike, ecclesiastics as well as laymen—and
dishonoured women. There is no need to enlarge this sinister
catalogue: let it suffice to say that belligerents made use of
everything that diabolical ingenuity could devise and
unrestrained ferocity actuate, of every proceeding that would
create a state of terror.185

The purpose of The Rights of War and Peace was to civilize warfare,
especially to protect non-combatants from attack. To do so, Grotius
started with the right of personal defense: “Grotius grounded his theory
of laws, or rights, in ‘the design [intentio] of the Creator’ as manifested
in the constitution of the natural world. Two principles were uppermost:
self-defense and self-preservation.”186
As Grotius observed, even human babies, like animals, have an
instinct to defend themselves.187 Moreover, self-defense was essential to
social harmony, for if people were prevented from using force against

182. Id. at x.
183. GEORGE BOWYER, COMMENTARIES ON UNIVERSAL PUBLIC LAW 6; DAVIS, supra note
177, at 16–17.
184. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, ¶ 29, at 106.
185. Phillipson, supra note 161, at 40a.
186. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at inside jacket.
187. Id. at 183–84 (bk. 1, ch. 2, § 1.3).
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others who were attempting to take property by force, then “human
Society and Commerce would necessarily be dissolved.”188
After listing numerous examples from Roman law and the Bible in
which personal self-defense and just war were approved, Grotius
declared that “[b]y the Law of Nature then, which may also be called the
Law of Nations,” some forms of national warfare were lawful, as was
personal warfare in self-defense. The rationale for both was succinctly
expressed in the Roman maxim: “[I]t is allowed to Repel Force by
Force.”189 Examples of personal and national use of force were woven
together seamlessly, for the same moral principles applied to both.
Like Giovanni da Legnano, Grotius classified “Private War” (which
was justifiable individual self-defense) and “Public War” (which was
justifiable government-led collective self-defense) as two types of the
same thing.190 Regarding personal self-defense:
We have before observed, that if a Man is assaulted in such a
Manner, that his Life shall appear in inevitable Danger, he
may not only make War upon, but very justly destroy the
Aggressor; and from this Instance which every one must allow
us, it appears that such a private War may be just and lawful.
It is to be observed, that this Right of Self-Defence, arises
directly and immediately from the Care of our own
Preservation, which Nature recommends to every one . . . .191

Relying on the Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, Grotius
explained that defensive violence is based on the intention of selfpreservation, not the purpose of killing another.192
Self-defense is also appropriate not just to preserve life, but also to
prevent the loss of a limb or member, rape,193 and robbery: “I may shoot
that Man who is making off with my Effects, if there’s no other Method
of my recovering them.”194 To this discussion, Jean Barbeyrac—
Grotius’s most influential translator and annotator195—added the

188. Id. at 184–85 (bk. 1, ch. 2, § 1.3) (quoting TULLY, ON DUTIES [DE OFFICIIS], bk. 3, ch. 5
(44 BC) (“Tully” is a pen name for Marcus Tullius Cicero.). For more on Cicero, see infra text
accompanying notes 257, 353–58, 384.
189. Id. at 185–89 (bk. 1, ch. 2, §§ 2–4) (quoting LIVY (Titus Livius), AB URBE CONDITA [A
HISTORY OF ROME] bk. 42, ch. 41).
190. Id. at 240 (bk. 1, ch. 3, § 1).
191. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 397.
192. Id. at 398. For Aquinas, see infra text at notes Part V.G.
193. Id. at 401–02.
194. Id. at 408.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 220–22.
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footnote: “In Reality, the Care of defending one’s Life is a Thing to
which we are obliged, not a bare Permission.”196
“What we have hitherto said, concerning the Right of defending our
Persons and Estates, principally regards private Wars; but we may
likewise apply it to publick Wars, with some Difference,” Grotius
explicated.197 Grotius then noted various differences; for example,
personal wars (that is, individual violence) are only for the purpose of
self-defense, whereas public wars (those undertaken by a nation) could
have the additional purposes “of revenging and punishing Injuries.”198
Gentili had argued that a nation could attack another nation if the
former feared the growing power of the latter.199 Grotius called Gentili’s
doctrine “abhorrent to every principle of equity.”200 Grotius’s counterargument was the national self-defense restrictions which come directly
from the rules of personal self-defense.201 “In other words, Grotius
extends to public war the basic criteria laid down with regards to
individual self-defence, which, in emphasizing the classical requirement
of ‘immediacy’ and ‘certainty’ . . . .”202
Grotius also wrote that victorious warriors must not abuse the bodies
of the dead.203 As Barbeyrac elaborated, there is no legitimate purpose in
mutilating the dead, because “this is of no Use either for our Defence, the
Support of our Rights, or in Word for any lawful End of War.”204
While Grotius approved only in rare circumstances of a people
carrying out a revolution against an oppressive government, he did argue
that other nations have a right and a moral obligation to invade and
liberate nations from domestic tyranny.205
Several years before writing his masterpiece, Grotius wrote The Free
Sea (Mare Librum), which was a foundational book of maritime law, and
hence of international law itself.206 While setting forth general principles
196. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 403 n.3. Barbeyrac also cited his own discussion in note 5
of his annotated edition of Pufendorf, bk. 2, ch, 5, § 2, and also Pufendorf’s analysis in § 14 of that
chapter. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (The Lawbook Exchange
2005) (reprint of 1726 London edition of the 1706–07 Barbeyrac French translation and annotation,
with English translation by Mr. Carew) (1672).
197. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 416.
198. Id.
199. PANIZZA, supra note 165, at 20.
200. Id. at 25.
201. Id. at 26.
202. Id.
203. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 1312.
204. Id. at 1312 n.3.
205. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 356–72; 2 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 1159–62.
Barbeyrac’s footnotes in these sections, and elsewhere in the book, argued for a much broader right
of revolution. E.g., 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, at 343 n.4 (Barbeyrac note).
206. David Armitage, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA xii (David Armitage ed.,
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of international law, The Free Sea was specifically written to address the
1603 controversy involving a Dutch captain who seized a Portuguese
vessel in the Straits of Singapore.207 As in The Rights of War and Peace,
Grotius derived the principles of international law from the essential
natural laws of self-defense and self-preservation.208
In The Free Sea, he also explained that natural law is immutable, and
cannot be overturned by governments.209 Suárez had made the same
point explicitly,210 and the principle is implicit in most of the other
classical founders of international law. Accordingly, if a government
purports to enact a law abolishing the right of self-defense (or
constricting the right so that it becomes a practical nullity), that law
should be considered void ab initio—at least according to the
foundational principles of international human rights law.
Below, we will address whether a right to self-defense implies a right
to arms which are necessary for self-defense.211
Grotius had begun On the Rights of War and Peace during the first
decade of the Thirty Years War, which continued to ravage Europe,
especially Germany, until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Among the
terms of the Peace was Spanish recognition of Dutch independence, thus
ending a series of wars which had raged, intermittently, in the Low
Countries for eight decades.212 These wars had been fought with an awful
ferocity, and non-combatants suffered terribly.
Grotius’s biographer Hamilton Vreeland wrote that the 1648:
[P]eace embodied principles which Grotius had striven to
expound, such as the independence and equality of sovereign
states, and was founded upon the equitable and merciful
doctrines which he had labored to impart . . . . The old order
had changed, and the new which came in was largely the work
of Hugo Grotius.213

Richard Hakluyt trans., 2004) (1609).
207. Id. at xii–xiii.
208. Id. at xiii. See also, HUGO GROTIUS, Defense of Chapter V of the Mare Liberum, in THE
FREE SEA, supra note 206, at 77, 99 (first published approximately 1615 as a response to a critique
by William Welwood) (“The freedom of blameless defense proceeds from the law of nature, yet that
this is licit has been handed down in rescripts by the emperors.”).
209. GROTIUS, supra note 206, at 6, 43. See also id. at 38 (“the Pope hath no authority to do
these things which are contrary to the law of nature.”).
210. See supra text accompanying note Part IV.A.5.
211. See infra text accompanying notes Part VIII.
212. Grotius had earlier noted how the Netherlands were preserving their new-found freedom
from Spanish domination: “liberty scarce gotten but defended by taking arms.” GROTIUS, THE FREE
SEA, supra note 206, at 8.
213. HAMILTON VREELAND, HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE OF
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According to the international law historian Henry Wheaton, in the
second part of the seventeenth century:
[T]he influence of the writings of the publicists, including
Grotius and his successors, was perceptibly felt in the councils
and conduct of nations. The diplomacy . . . state papers are
filled with appeals, not merely to reasons of policy, but to the
principles of right, of justice, and equity; to the authority of
the oracles of public law; to those general rules and principles
by which the rights of the weak are protected against the
invasions of superior force by the union of all who are
interested in the common danger.214

The international law intellectuals had changed the world of action.
The intellectuals had demonstrated how to address serious questions of
war and foreign policy by logically reasoning from basic principles of
justice—starting with “the greatest of all rights,”215 the right of selfdefense. Now, the generals, admirals, and diplomats were doing the
same. The result could be seen, inter alia, in the War of the Spanish
Succession (1701–1714):
[W]hen the contending armies crossed and recrossed parts of
the soil on which the Thirty Years’ War had been waged,
Marlborough and Prince Eugene, and other commanders,
exhibited in their conduct a sharp contrast with Wallenstein
and Tilly, who had devastated those fields seventy years
before. Destruction of property by fire and of peoples by
massacre was practically abandoned; governments paid the
costs of war, not the captured individuals; and prisoners were
treated with justice and mercy. Grotius’ influence was
becoming felt, and warfare was growing less cruel.216

INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (Fred B. Rothman 1999) (1917).
214. HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 79–80
(William S. Hein 1982) (1845).
215. See Suarez discussion, supra Part IV.A.5, 2d para.
216. VREELAND, supra note 213. Gustavus Adolphus, the commander of the Swedish forces
during the Thirty Years War, had always carried a copy of On the Rights of War and Peace.
WHEATON, supra note 214, at 55. Perhaps the treatise moderated his conduct.
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2. Samuel Pufendorf
The Swedish scholar Samuel Pufendorf was the first person ever
appointed as a Professor of the Law of Nations—a position that was
created at the University of Heidelberg for Pufendorf to teach Grotius’s
text.217 Pufendorf also served as a counselor to the King of Sweden and
the King of Prussia. In 1674 his eight volume magnum opus was
published: Of the Law of Nature and Nations.218 It was instantly
recognized as a work of tremendous importance, and was published in
many editions all over Europe. “[T]he two works [Grotius and
Pufendorf] together quickly became the equivalent of an encyclopedia of
moral and political thought for Enlightenment Europe.”219
Pufendorf advanced the theories of Grotius, while also taking into
account subsequent philosophers such as John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes. Pufendorf was not the first to argue that international law
applied beyond the relations of Christian nations with each other, but his
over-riding concern for the common human community made the theme
especially important in his book. Like Grotius, Pufendorf was greatly
interested in restraining warfare, but Pufendorf painted on a broader
canvas; as he looked for ways to make the global community live
together more peaceably, he also looked at how individuals could live
together successfully in society. Repeatedly he argued that the right,
duty, and practice of self-defense—at the personal level and at the
national level—are essential for the preservation of society, both locally
and globally.
Pufendorf’s treatise grew even more influential after the 1706–07
publication of a French translation by the French lawyer Jean Barbeyrac
(1674–1744), which was supplemented by Barbeyrac’s own copious
notes and commentary. Barbeyrac, who was a Professor of Law at
Groningen University, in the Netherlands, and a Member of the Royal
Academy of Sciences in Berlin, also produced an annotated French

217. Jean-Jacques Barbeyrac, The Life of Hugo Grotius, in 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE, supra note 176, at 69.
218. PUFENDORF, supra note 196.
219. Tuck, supra note 180, at xi. John Locke recommended that, after mastering Latin, a
young person should read Cicero’s Offices, then Pufendorf’s Officio Hominis & Civis (an abridged
version of Of the Law of Nature and Nations), and then the multi-volume treatises of Grotius or
Pufendorf, with the latter being “perhaps . . . the better of the two.” Thereby, the young person
would be “instructed in the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations of society, and the
duties resulting from thence.” JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION, § 186
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1922) (1692), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ mod/1692lockeeducation.html. [reprinted in the series English philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries (c. 1910) Harvard classics, no. 38].
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version of Grotius in 1724.220 Grotius and Pufendorf had already been
translated into many languages in dozens of editions, but the Barbeyrac
editions themselves were soon also translated all over Europe and
became the most popular editions.
Grotius and Pufendorf, as translated and annotated by Barbeyrac,
remained the preeminent authorities on international law for centuries
afterward. In 1854, the English legal scholar George Bowyer wrote that
Barbeyrac’s translations “make the two works together one Corpus of the
Law of Nations which has not been equaled in extent, learning, richness
of illustration, and acumen.”221 Barbeyrac was in complete accord with
Pufendorf and Grotius about the fundamental human right of selfdefense, and his annotated versions offered extensive additional support
for that right.222
Pufendorf followed Hobbes’s theory that states are imbued with the
same qualities as are individual persons and are governed by the same
precepts of natural law. “Law of nature” was the term used when
referring to individuals, and this same law, when applied to states, was
called the “law of nations.”223
In contrast to the pessimistic spirit of Hobbes, Pufendorf saw that
humans had a natural inclination towards peaceful co-operation with
each other: “Tis true, Man was created for the maintaining of Peace with
his Fellows; and all the Laws of Nature, which bear a Regard to other
Men, do primarily tend towards the Constitution and Preservation of this
universal safety and Quiet.”224 The advocates of the right of self-defense
are sometimes caricatured as social isolationists who believe only in the
law of the jungle, and who believe in nothing greater than atomistic
individualism. Pufendorf was just the opposite. Like Grotius, he affirmed
the right of self-defense because it is a sine qua non for civilization.
Self-defense is an essential foundation of society, for if people did
not defend themselves, then it would be impossible for people to live
together in a society. Not to use forceful defense when necessary would
220. Tuck, supra note 180, at x.
221. BOWYER, supra note 183, at iv. For biographical information on Bowyer, see New Advent
Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Sir George Bowyer,” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02724c.htm.
222. For example, Barbeyrac wrote a long introduction to Pufendorf in which he argued that
Pufendorf’s treatise was far superior to much of the moral philosophy from previous times. While
Barbeyrac praised Jesus and Confucius, he carefully dissected the numerous inconsistencies and
absurdities (as Barbeyrac saw them) of some early Christian writers (such as Tertullian) who had
been pacifists. Jean Barbeyrac, “An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality,” in
PUFENDORF, supra note 196, § 9 19–25.
223. Id. at 149–50 (bk. 2, ch. 3, § 23); THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND
DE CIVE), 275 (Berand Gert ed., Charles T. Wood, T.S.K. Scott-Craig & Bergnard Gert trans.,
Hackett 1991) (De Cive 1647); WHEATON, supra note 214, at 92–93.
224. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 183 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 1).
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make “honest Men” into “a ready Prey to Villains.”225 “So that, upon the
whole to banish Self-defence though pursued by Force, would be so far
from promoting the Peace, that it would rather contribute to the Ruin and
Destruction of Mankind.”226
Pufendorf denied “that the Law of Nature, which was instituted for a
Man’s Security in the World, should favor so absurd a Peace as must
necessarily cause his present Destruction, and would in fine produce any
Thing sooner than Sociable life.”227
Pufendorf explained that there is much broader latitude for selfdefense in a state of nature than in civil society; preemptive self-defense
is disfavored in the latter.228 However, Pufendorf continued, civil society
does not forbid imminent preemption in circumstances in which the
victim has no opportunity to warn the authorities first: “For Example, if a
Man is making towards me with a naked Sword and with full
Signification of his intentions toward me, and I at the same time have a
Gun in my Hand, I may fairly discharge it at him whilst he is at a
distance . . . .”229 Similarly, a man armed with a long gun may shoot an
attacker who was carrying a pistol, even though the attacker is not yet
within range to use his pistol.230
Making the same point as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who in
1921 would write “detached reflection is not required and cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,”231 Pufendorf wrote that
“it is scarce possible that a Man under so terrible Apprehension should
be so exact in considering and discovering all Ways of Escape, as he who
being set out of the danger can sedately deliberate on the Case.”232 Thus,

225. Id. at 184 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 1).
226. Id.
227. Id. Likewise:
But what Possibility is there of my living at Peace with him who hurts and
injures me, since Nature has implanted in every Man’s Breast so tender a
concern for himself, and for what he possesses, that he cannot but apply all
Means to resist and repel him, who either respect attempts to wrong him.
Id. at 214 (bk. 3, ch. 1, § 1).
228. Id. at 189–90 (bk. 2, ch. 5, §§ 6–7). As a general rule, anticipatory self-defense is always
allowed in a state of nature; in a civil society, it is allowed only if the potential victim first informs
the government authorities of the danger, and the authorities then refuse to take action to protect the
victim. Id.
229. Id. at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 8).
230. Id.
231. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). For more on Brown, see David B.
Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the
Nineteenth Century, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 294 (2000).
232. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 9).
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while a person should safely retreat rather than use deadly force,
Pufendorf recognized that safe retreat is usually impossible.233 Nor is
there any requirement that a defender use arms which are not more
powerful than the arms of the aggressor.234
Self-defense, using lethal force if necessary, is permissible against a
non-deadly aggressor who would maim the victim, or who would inflict
other less-than-lethal injuries.235 Lethal force in self-defense is also
permissible to prevent rape236 or assault.237 It is also permitted to prevent
robbery: “[I]t is clearly evidence that the Security and Peace of Society
and of Mankind could hardly subsist, if a Liberty were not granted to
repel by the most violent Courses, those who come to pillage our
Goods . . . .”238
What if one person attacks another’s honor—such as by boxing his
ears? Pufendorf acknowledged that in a state of nature there is a limitless
right to redress any attack, but he insisted that in a civil society, the
proper recourse in case of an insult or an attack on honor is to be found
in resort to the courts, not in deadly force.239 It should be remembered
that Pufendorf was writing at a time when the educated gentlemen of
233. Id. at 193–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 13).
234. Id. at 191 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 9).
As if the Aggressors were so generous, as constantly to give notice to the
other Party of their Design, and of the Arms they purpos’d to make use of;
that they might have the Leisure to furnish themselves in like manner for the
Combat. Or if these Rencounters we were to act on our Defence by the strict
Rules of the common Sword Plays and Tryals of Skill, where the Champions
and their Weapons are nicely match’d and measur’d for our better Diversion.
Id.
235. Id. at 192 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 10).
For what an age of Torments should I undergo, if another Man were allow’d
perpetually to lay upon me only with moderate Blows, whose Malice I could
not otherwise stop or repel, than by compassing his Death. Or if a Neighbour
were continually to infest me with Incursions and Ravages upon my Lands
and Possessions, whilst I could not lawfully kill him, in my Attempts to beat
him off? For since the chief Aim of every human Socialness is the Safety of
every Person, we ought not to fansy in it such Laws, as would make every
good and honest Man of necessity miserable, as often as any wicked Varlet
should please to violate the Law of Nature against him. And it would be
highly absurd to establish Society amongst Men on so destructive a Bottom as
the Necessity of enduring Wrongs.
Id. at 186 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 11).
236. Id. at 192 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 11).
237. Id. at 193–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 13).
238. Id. at 198 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16); see also id. at 186 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 3).
239. Id. at 192–94 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 12).
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Europe often killed each other in duels because one man had insulted
another’s honor. Pufendorf’s strict rule denying that deadly force could
be used in defense of honor was one aspect of his broader view that selfdefense was properly made for the repose, safety, and sociability of
society.
Pufendorf rejected the view that self-defense is a form of punishing
criminals, and that the prerogative of punishment belongs exclusively to
the state. 240 Pufendorf agreed that genuine punishment—for retribution,
after a crime had been completed—was, in a civil society, exclusively a
state function.241 “But Defence is a thing of more ancient date than any
Civil Command . . . .” and accordingly, no state could legitimately forbid
self-defense.242
The chapter “Of the Right of War” began with a detailed restatement
of the natural right of personal self-defense.243 Then, following the
methodology of the other classical international law scholars, Pufendorf
extrapolated from the fundamental principles of self-defense the broader
rules of national warfare, including Just Cause, prohibitions on attacks on
non-combatants, prohibitions on the execution of prisoners, prohibition
on wanton destruction of property, limitations on what spoils might be
taken in war, and similar humanitarian restrictions.244
Pufendorf had argued that a victim has a right to defend himself
against an aggressor even if the aggressor might not have a fully-formed
malicious intent (such as if the aggressor were insane).245 Barbeyrac
agreed, and applied the example specifically to a prince, who through
self-indulgence in his own violent fits of anger, or through excessive
drink, formed a transient, but passionate, determination to take a
subject’s life. Barbeyrac held that “we have as much Right to defend
ourselves against him, as if he acted in cold Blood.” 246 He suggested
that the behavior of future rulers would be improved if subjects did not
meekly submit to a ruler’s murderous fits of temper.247
More generally, Pufendorf conceded the right of resisting a tyrant as
another application of the right of self-defense. If the ruler makes himself
into a manifest danger to the people, then “a People may defend

240.
241.
242.
defense).
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 190 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 7).
Id.
Id. at 198 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16) (also noting that a state may regulate the boundaries of selfId. at 832–33 (bk. 8, ch. 6, §§ 1–2).
Id. at 833–48 (bk. 8, ch. 6).
Id. at 187–88 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 5).
Id. at 187–88 n.1 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 5).
Id.
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themselves against the unjust Violence of the Prince.”248 Pufendorf
announced his agreement with Grotius that it is absurd to claim that
because subjects cannot have courtroom jurisdiction over a sovereign,
subjects are therefore forbidden to use force to overthrow a tyrant. “As if
to defend one’s Life against an injurious Assailant were to proceed
against him in a judicial manner!” scoffed Pufendorf.249
Pufendorf acknowledged the argument that, in a state, it might be
illegal for anyone to call “that the Subjects have to take up Arms against
the chief Magistrate; since no Mortal can pretend to have a Jurisdiction”
over a sovereign.250 Pufendorf denied that self-defense—including
collective self-defense against barbarous domestic tyranny—is dependent
on either jurisdiction or a lawful call: “As if Defence were the Effect of
Jurisdiction! Or, as if he who sets himself to keep off an unjust Violence,
which threatens his Life, has any more need of a particular Call, than he
who is about to fence against Hunger and Thirst with Meat and
Drink!”251
Pufendorf repeated with approval Grotius’s analysis that a people
would never enter into a social compact if the price were to surrender
their right of resisting an unjust and violent government. It would be
better to suffer the “Fighting and Contention” of a state of nature than to
face “certain Death” because they had given up the right to “oppose by
Arms the unjust Violence of their Superiors.”252
Barbeyrac stated that if a government attempts to hinder people from
the peaceful exercise of religion according to personal conscience, then
“the People have as natural and unquestionable a Right to defend the
Religion by Force of Arms . . . as to defend their Lives, their Estates, and
Liberties . . . .”253
Likewise, at the conclusion of Pufendorf’s chapter on self-defense,
Barbeyrac included a long note on a subject which he chided Pufendorf
for omitting: John Locke’s theory of the right to resistance against a
government which usurps powers which had never been granted by the
people—a theory with which Barbeyrac plainly agreed.254
Barbeyrac quoted at length, and with great approval, John Locke’s
explication that a tyrant is in a state of war with the people.255 The point
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 721–22 (bk.7, ch. 8, § 6).
Id. at 723 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 7).
Id. (italics omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 719 n.2 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 5).
Id. at 201 n.2 (bk. 2, ch. 5, § 19).
Id. at 720–21 n.1 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 5) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT § 210 (1690)).
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is in accord with Giovanni da Legnano’s observation that warfare is
warfare, regardless of the number of people involved.256 It also echoes
the point made by Cicero, St. Augustine, and Philo of Alexandria that
robbery is robbery, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a small gang
leader with a few followers or a tyrant with a standing army.257
Barbeyrac’s humanitarian vision is squarely opposed to the
apologists for state violence (eighteenth century, and twenty-first
century) who assert that governments have an inherent right to use
domestic violence and an exemption from the rules which constrain
individual violence. The American revolutionaries considered Barbeyrac,
Pufendorf, and Grotius to be part of the seamless fabric of humanitarian
philosophy that justified violent resistance to Great Britain as legitimate
self-defense against the British government’s efforts to destroy the
orderly peace of free and civil society.258
256. See LEGNANO supra note 70, pt. IV.A.1, 2d para.
257. The preeminent Christian theologian St. Augustine of Hippo asked: “If justice be taken
away, what are governments but great bands of robbers?” ST. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY
OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 1984) (translation of 1459
edition) (early fifth century) (bk. 4, ch. 4). To illustrate the point, Augustine used a story attributed to
Cicero:
Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great
by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what
he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold
pride, “What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with
a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art
styled emperor.”
Id. See also CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 67 (James E.G. Zetzel ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (54–51 BC) (bk. 3, para. 24a) (final sentence of the story; the story
appears in a section of Commonwealth from which several pages of the original text have been lost).
Philo of Alexandria, the leading Jewish legal scholar of the first century BC, agreed with the
Romans that all forms of theft are merely variations on a single type of attack on society: an assault
on the right of ownership of private property. Thus, a petty thief was no different in principle from a
tyrant who stole the resources of his nation, or a nation which plundered another nation. See EDWIN
R. GOODENOUGH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JEWISH COURTS OF EGYPT: LEGAL ADMINISTRATION
BY THE JEWS UNDER THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE AS DESCRIBED BY PHILO JUDAEUS 230–31 (2002).
Cf. Kathleen A. Parrow, From Defense to Resistance, 83 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 18 (pt. 6, 1993) (citing HIPPOLYTE PISSARD, LE CLAMER DE HARO DANS
LE DROIT NORMAND 118–19 (1911) (the Norman cry of haro, used to call out citizens to pursue a
thief, was usable against magistrates who flagrantly abused their power or exceeded their
jurisdiction; Norman jurists regarded such government criminals as larrons [robbers]).
258. To take but one example, consider “Novanglus,” a series of 1775 newspaper essays in
which John Adams set forth the most sophisticated legal and philosophical arguments for the
colonists’ right of resistance. In essay number six, Adams justified the Boston Tea Party and similar
violent acts of resistance. In the third paragraph of the essay, he reminded readers: “Grotius B. 1, c.
3, § 1, observes, ‘that some sort of private war may be lawfully waged. It is not repugnant to the law
of nature, for any one to repel injuries by force.’” Several paragraphs later, Adams cited Grotius for
the point that it was not seditious to resist a ruler who was assuming powers which had never been
granted to him:
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The same course is justly used against a legal magistrate who takes upon him
to exercise a power which the law does not give; for in that respect he is a
private man,—“Quia,” as Grotius says, “eatenus non habet imperium,”
[Because he does not have the authority to that extent]— and may be
restrained as well as any other; because he is not set up to do what he lists, but
what the law appoints for the good of the people; and as he has no other power
than what the law allows, so the same law limits and directs the exercise of
that which he has.
Then, Adams quoted verbatim a massive footnote by Barbeyrac, in which Barbeyrac had woven
together Grotius, Pufendorf, Jean LeClerc (a liberal Swiss Protestant philosopher and theologian),
Locke, and Algernon Sidney (a seventeenth-century British advocate of resistance to tyranny), to
show that revolution against tyranny was a way to restore civil society, to show that resistance was
justified before the tyranny become omnipotent, and to reassure the public that resistance would not
lead to mob rule:
When we speak of a tyrant that may lawfully be dethroned by the
people, we do not mean by the word people, the vile populace or rabble of the
country, nor the cabal of a small number of factious persons, but the greater
and more judicious part of the subjects, of all ranks. Besides, the tyranny must
be so notorious, and evidently clear, as to leave nobody any room to doubt of
it, &c. Now, a prince may easily avoid making himself so universally
suspected and odious to his subjects; for, as Mr. Locke says in his Treatise of
Civil Government, c. 18, § 209,—‘It is as impossible for a governor, if he
really means the good of the people, and the preservation of them and the laws
together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family not
to let his children see he loves and takes care of them.’ And therefore the
general insurrection of a whole nation does not deserve the name of a
rebellion. We may see what Mr. Sidney says upon this subject in his
Discourse concerning Government:—‘Neither are subjects bound to stay till
the prince has entirely finished the chains which he is preparing for them, and
put it out of their power to oppose. It is sufficient that all the advances which
he makes are manifestly tending to their oppression, that he is marching
boldly on to the ruin of the State.’ In such a case, says Mr. Locke, admirably
well,—‘How can a man any more hinder himself from believing, in his own
mind, which way things are going, or from casting about to save himself, than
he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in was carrying him
and the rest of his company to Algiers, when he found him always steering
that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and
provisions, did often force him to turn his course another way for some time,
which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the winds, weather, and other
circumstances would let him?’ This chiefly takes place with respect to kings,
whose power is limited by fundamental laws.
“If it is objected that the people, being ignorant and always discontented,
to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and the uncertain
humor of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; the same author will
answer you, that ‘on the contrary, people are not so easily got out of their old
forms as some are apt to suggest. England, for instance, notwithstanding the
many revolutions that have been seen in that kingdom, has always kept to its
old legislative of king, lords, and commons; and whatever provocations have
made the crown to be taken from some of their princes’ heads, they never
carried the people so far as to place it in another line.’ But it will be said, this
hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. ‘No more,’ says Mr. Locke,
‘than any other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable, and find
themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors
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As for humanitarian intervention in other nations, Pufendorf
recognized that it was often a pretext for aggression. He favored

as you will for sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended or
authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same
will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be
ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon
them. 2. Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in
public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient
laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without
mutiny and murmur. 3. This power in the people of providing for their safety
anew by a legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust
by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the
probablest means to hinder it; for rebellion being an opposition, not to
persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of
the government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by
force justify the violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when
men, by entering into society and civil government, have excluded force, and
introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity, among
themselves; those who set up force again, in opposition to the laws, do
rebellare, that is, do bring back again the state of war, and are properly,
rebels,’ as the author shows. In the last place, he demonstrates that there are
also greater inconveniences in allowing all to those that govern, than in
granting something to the people. But it will be said, that ill affected and
factious men may spread among the people, and make them believe that the
prince or legislative act contrary to their trust, when they only make use of
their due prerogative. To this Mr. Locke answers, that the people, however, is
to judge of all that; because nobody can better judge whether his trustee or
deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, than he who
deputed him. ‘He might make the like query,’ (says Mr. Le Clerc, from whom
this extract is taken) ‘and ask, whether the people being oppressed by an
authority which they set up, but for their own good, it is just that those who
are vested with this authority, and of which they are complaining, should
themselves be judges of the complaints made against them. The greatest
flatterers of kings dare not say, that the people are obliged to suffer absolutely
all their humors, how irregular soever they be; and therefore must confess,
that when no regard is had to their complaints, the very foundations of society
are destroyed; the prince and people are in a state of war with each other, like
two independent states, that are doing themselves justice, and acknowledge no
person upon earth, who, in a sovereign manner, can determine the disputes
between them.
After the massive quotation from Barbeyrac, Adams made a direct appeal to authority:
If there is any thing in these quotations, which is applicable to the destruction
of the tea, or any other branch of our subject, it is not my fault; I did not make
it. Surely Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Locke, Sidney, and Le Clerc, are
writers of sufficient weight to put in the scale against the mercenary scribblers
in New York and Boston [that is, the newspaper essayists to whom Adams
was responding] . . . .”
John Adams, Novanglus, essay 6, 204–06, reprinted in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMS (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?
option=com_staticxt& staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=592&Itemid=27 (quoting PUFENDORF, supra
note 196, at 720 n.1 (bk. 7, ch 8, § 6)).
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humanitarian intervention if, and only if, the subjects of the country
themselves had the right to “take Arms to repress the insupportable
Tyranny and Cruelties of their own Governors.”259
3. Emmerich de Vattel
Along with Of the Law of Nature and Nations by Pufendorf, The
Law of Nations, by the Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel, was
considered one of the two great books founded on the work of Grotius.260
Vattel (1714–1767) was notably influential on the American founders,
among others.261
The full title of Vattel’s book stated the connection between natural
and international law: The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of
Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns.262
Vattel agreed with other scholars that the right of personal selfdefense is the foundation of the national right to engage in defensive
war.263 Self-defense is both a right and a duty: “Self-preservation is not
only a natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can
entirely and absolutely renounce it.”264
The right of self-defense applies whenever the government does not
protect an individual, and it includes a right to defend oneself against
rape or robbery, not merely against attempted homicide:
[O]n all these occasions where the public authority cannot
lend us its assistance, we resume our original and natural right
of self-defence. Thus a traveler may, without hesitation, kill
the robber who attacks him on the highway; because it would,
at that moment, be in vain for him to implore the protection of
the laws and of the magistrate. Thus a chaste virgin would be
praised for taking away the life of a brutal ravisher who

259. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 844 (bk. 8, ch. 6, § 14).
260. WARD, supra note 179, at 377.
261. Microsoft
Encarta
Online
Encyclopedia,
s.v.
“International
Law,”
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761571627/ Internationl_Law.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
262. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS [Droit des gens; ou,
Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains]
(The Lawbook Exchange 2005) (Joseph Chitty trans., 1854) (1758), available at
http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel.htm.
263. Id. at 211 (bk. 2, ch. 5, §§ 66–67).
264. Id. at 79 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 54). Here Vattel disagreed with Juan de Mariana, who had
suggested that an individual could choose not to protect himself, in the spirit of charity. See
MARIANA, supra note 100, at IV.A.3, para. 4.
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attempted to force her to his desires.265

Vattel wrote that the right of revolution against tyranny is also an
extension of the right of self-defense; like an ordinary criminal, a tyrant
“is no better than a public enemy against whom the nation may and
ought to defend itself.”266
Vattel agreed with the consensus of Grotius, Pufendorf, and the
Spanish humanitarians, that there is a right and duty of humanitarian
intervention. Vattel formulated the duty in terms of self-defense: When a
prince’s tyranny gives “his subjects a legal right to resist him . . . in their
own defence,” then every other nation should legitimately come to the
aid of the people, “for, when a people, from good reasons take up arms
against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist
brave men in the defence of their liberties.”267 “As to those monsters
who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and
horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, whom every brave man
may justly exterminate from the face of the earth.”268
265. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 142 (bk. 1, ch. 13, § 176). Also: “A subject may repel the
violence of a fellow-citizen when the magistrate’s assistance is not at hand; and with much greater
reason may he defend himself against the unexpected attacks of foreigners.” Id. at 399 (bk. 3, ch. 15,
§ 223). In order to prevent dueling, Vattel urged enforcement of the custom that only military men
and nobles should be allowed to wear swords in public. Id. at 141 (bk. 1, ch. 13, § 176).
266. Id. at 18; see also id. at 75 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 54) (a prince who kills innocent persons “is no
longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom
his people are allowed to defend themselves.”). Joseph Chitty (1828–1899), besides being an English
translator of Vattel, was a prominent English judge and author of legal treatises. Chitty’s annotation
of Vattel quoted with approval Grotius’s statement that if a sovereign violated the laws of the
country, the people were absolved of their oath of allegiance. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 73, n.*
(bk. 1, ch. 4, § 46), quoting HUGO GROTIUS, 2 ANNALS OF THE NETHERLANDS (1797) (“past
generations” had “made effectual use of arms” to redress the abuses of sovereigns such as John II,
who was King of Aragon and Navarre).
267. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 216 (bk. 2, ch, 4, § 56). United States Senator Henry Clay, in
his famous oration “The Emancipation of South America,” cited Vattel as authority for American
support for the South American wars of national liberation against Spanish colonialism:
I maintain that an oppressed people are authorized, whenever they can, to rise
and break their fetters. This was the great principle of the English Revolution.
It was the great principle of our own. Vattel, if authority were wanting,
expressly supports this right. We must pass sentence of condemnation upon
the founders of our liberty, say that you were rebels, traitors, and that we are
at this moment legislating without competent powers, before we can condemn
the cause of Spanish America. . . . Spanish America for centuries has been
doomed to the practical effects of an odious tyranny. If we were justified, she
is more than justified.
Henry Clay, The Emancipation of South America, in 4 THE WORLD’S FAMOUS ORATIONS 82–83
(1906).
268. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 156 (bk. 2, ch. 4, § 56). Vattel noted that “All antiquity has
praised Hercules for delivering the world from an Antaeus, a Busiris, and a Diomede.” Id. Diomedes

92

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

The personal right of self-defense also showed why a protectorate
may renounce its allegiance to a sovereign which fails to provide
protection. When Austria failed in its obligation to protect Lucerne,
Austria lost its sovereignty over Lucerne, and so Lucerne allied with the
Swiss cantons. Austria complained to the Holy Roman Emperor, but the
people of Lucerne retorted “that they had used the natural right common
to all men, by which every one is permitted to endeavor to procure his
own safety when he is abandoned by those who are obliged to grant him
assistance.”269
Vattel pointed out that the town of Zug had been attacked and the
duke of Austria had refused to defend it. (He was busy hunting with
hawks and would not be interrupted.) Zurich too had been attacked, and
the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV had failed to protect it. Vattel
concluded that both Zug and Zurich were justified in asserting their
natural right to self-protection and in joining the Swiss confederation. 270
Similar reasoning justified the decision of other Swiss cantons to
separate themselves from the Austrians, who never protected them.271

was a king who fed human beings to his four carnivorous horses. Antaeus was a giant in Libya who
challenged travelers to a wrestling match, always defeated them, and then killed them. The story of
Hercules and Busiris is this:
After Libya he [Hercules] traversed Egypt. That country was then ruled by
Busiris, a son of Poseidon by Lysianassa, daughter of Epaphus. This Busiris
used to sacrifice strangers on an altar of Zeus in accordance with a certain
oracle. For Egypt was visited with dearth for nine years, and Phrasius, a
learned seer who had come from Cyprus, said that the dearth would cease if
they slaughtered a stranger man in honour of Zeus every year. Busiris began
by slaughtering the seer himself and continued to slaughter the strangers who
landed. So Hercules also was seized and haled to the altars, but he burst his
bonds and slew both Busiris and his son Amphidamus.
APOLLODORUS, § 2.5.11, at 223–27 (James G. Frazer trans., 1921), available at
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_herc_lab11.htm. The original source is Bibliotheke, an
ancient collection of Greek myths. It was originally attributed to the second-century BC Greek writer
Appolodorus, but scholars now recognize that the book was composed much later. “PseudoAppolodorus” is sometimes designated as the author. The characters from the Hercules myth are
fictional, of course, as Vattel knew. But can it be disputed that there are monstrous rulers in the
modern world, at least as wicked and bloodthirsty as Busiris, Antaeus, and Diomedes? Those ancient
rulers killed innocents one at a time, but never perpetrated genocide.
269. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 153 (bk. 1, ch. 16, § 196).
270. Id. at 96–97 (bk. 1, ch. 17, § 202).
271. Id.
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C. Some Post-Grotius Scholars
1. Johann Textor
Johann Wolfgang Textor, the great-great-grandfather of Johann
Wolfgang Goethe, was a law professor, judge, and legal advisor to
governments in Germany in the late seventeenth century.272
More than most of the other scholars discussed in this Part, Textor
was a legal positivist. Textor was an especially outstanding scholar of
Roman law. (As will be detailed infra, Roman law was the foundation of
much of the law in Europe at the time.273) Textor was intimately familiar
not only with the multi-volume treatises which had been produced during
the reign of the Emperor Justinian but also with many commentaries (or
“glosses”) which had been written in the margins of various editions of
the treatises, beginning with the Western rediscovery of Roman law in
the eleventh century.
Textor’s book Synopsis of the Law of Nations included a full chapter
“On Self-defense against Violence.”274 He wrote that use of deadly force
in self-defense is lawful against a deadly attack, rape, or mayhem.275 For
defense against lesser assaults, and for defense of property, self-defense
is also permissible, but deadly force is not, unless the circumstances of
the crime create the risk of death.276 As Textor demonstrated, there were
many Roman law and Canon law commentators on each side of the
various questions and subquestions involving deadly force against lesser
assaults and property crimes.277
2. Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694–1748) was Professor of Natural Law
at the Academy of Geneva.278 His treatise The Principles of Natural and
Politic Law was translated into six languages (besides the original
French) in sixty editions.279
272. Ludwig von Bar, Introduction to JOHANN WOLFGANG TEXTOR, SYNOPSUS JURIS
GENTIUM (Synopsis of the Law of Nations) (Ludwig von Bar ed., John Pawley Bate trans., William
S. Hein 1995) (1680) [hereinafter TEXTOR].
273. See infra Parts V.D and V.G.
274. TEXTOR, supra note 272, at 34–46.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Petter Korkman, Introduction to JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW ix (Petter Korkman ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (1747) (Principes du droit
naturel first published in 1747 and Principes du droit politique first published in 1751).
279. Id. at x.
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His vision of constitutionalism had a major influence on the
American Founders; for example, Burlamaqui’s understanding of checks
and balances was much more sophisticated and practical than that of
Montesquieu, in part because Burlamaqui’s theory contained the seed of
judicial review. He was frequently quoted or paraphrased, sometimes
with attribution and sometimes not, in political sermons during the prerevolutionary era.280
He was the first philosopher to articulate the quest for happiness as a
natural human right, a principle that Thomas Jefferson later restated in
the Declaration of Independence.281 When Burlamaqui affirmed the right
of pursuing happiness, he stated the right as intimately connected to the
right to arms: all men have a “right of endeavoring to provide for their
safety and happiness, and of employing force and arms against those who
declare themselves their enemies.”282
The same principle that legitimates self-defense also provides the
appropriate boundaries: “necessity can authorise us to have recourse to
force against an unjust aggressor, so this same necessity should be the
rule and measure of the harm we do him . . . .”283
National self-defense is simply an extension, with appropriate
modifications, of the right and duty of personal self-defense.284
Defensive war, both personal and national, is essential to the preservation
of peaceful society; “otherwise the human species would become the
victims of robbery and licentiousness: for the right of making war is,
properly speaking, the most powerful means of maintaining peace.”285
The right to collective self-defense against tyranny (a criminal
government) is an application of the individual right of self-defense
against a lone criminal: “when the people are reduced to the last
extremity, there is no difference between tyranny and robbery. The one
gives no more right than the other, and we may lawfully oppose force to

280. RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI: A LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1937) [hereinafter BURLAMAQUI].
281. Id. at 16–17, 119–24.
282. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 280, at 446 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 5).
283. Id. at 157 (bk. 1, pt. 2, ch. 4, § 16).
284. [W]ar is nevertheless permitted in certain circumstances, and sometimes
necessary both for individuals and nations. This we have sufficiently
shewn . . . by establishing the rights which nature has invested mankind for
their own preservation. The principles of this kind, which we have established
with respect to particulars, equally, and for stronger reasons, are applicable to
nations. . . . The law of God no less enjoins a whole nation to take care of their
preservation, than it does private men.
Id. at 447 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, §§ 10–11).
285. Id. at 448 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 11).
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violence.”286 Thus, people have a right “to rise in arms” against “extreme
abuse of sovereignty,” such as tyranny.287
Burlamaqui agreed with the Englishman Algernon Sidney that
subjects are “not obliged to wait till the prince has entirely riveted their
chains, and till he has put it out of their power to resist him.” 288 Rather,
they may initiate an armed revolt “when they find that all his [the
prince’s] actions manifestly tend to oppress them, and that he is
marching boldly on to the ruin of the state.”289
Burlamaqui acknowledged that if the people have the power to
revolt, they might misuse it, but the risk would be much less than the risk
of allowing tyranny to flourish: “In fine, though the subjects might abuse
the liberty which we grant them, yet less inconveniency would arise from
this, than from allowing all to the sovereign, so as to let a whole nation
perish, rather than grant it the power of checking the iniquity of its
governors.”290
Similarly, the fact that “every one has a natural right to take care of
his preservation by all possible means” suggests that if “the state can no
longer defend and protect the subjects, they . . . resume their original
right of taking care of themselves, independently of the state, in the
manner they think most proper.”291 Thus, whenever a state fails to protect
one of its subjects from criminal attack, the subject has a right of selfdefense.
In an international law application, the same principle proves that a
sovereign has no authority to “oblige one of his towns or provinces to
submit to another government.” 292 Rather, the sovereign may, at most,
withdraw his protection from the town or province, in which case the
people of the town or province have a complete right of self-defense, and
of independence if they can prevail in their self-defense.293
Burlamaqui, like Vattel, supported a broad rule of humanitarian
intervention to liberate the tyrannized people of another nation—
provided that “the tyranny is risen to such a height, that the subjects
themselves may lawfully take up arms, to shake off the yoke of the
tyrant.”294 This principle is an extension of personal assistance in selfdefense, for “[e]very man, as such, has a right to claim the assistance of
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 373 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 22).
Id. at 372 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, §§ 16–17).
Id. at 373 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 30).
Id.
Id. at 378 (bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 6, § 38).
Id. at 443 (bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 5, § 55).
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442–43 (bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 5, § 42).
Id. at 465 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 47).
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other men when he is really in necessity.”295
Burlamaqui acknowledged that the principle of humanitarian
intervention is often misused. Nevertheless, the misuse of a good
principle does not mean that the principle should be eliminated, any more
than the misuse of weapons means that weapons should be prohibited:
“the bad use of a thing, does not hinder it from being just. Pirates
navigate the seas, and robbers wear swords, as well as other people.”296
3. George Frederick von Martens
The late eighteenth century marked the end of the classical period of
international law. One of the last of the founding treatises was written by
the University of Göttingen professor George Frederick von Martens:
Summary of the Law of Nations Founded on the Treaties and Customs of
the Modern Nations of Europe.297 He acknowledged that some
uncivilized nations did not follow the norms of international law, but he
argued that the nations of Europe did, and so he confined his treatise to
what Europeans did.
The principles of Grotius, Pufendorf, and the other founding giants
were so well established that Martens could simply state, as an obvious
truth, “our right to wound and kill being founded on self-defense,” it is
impermissible in warfare to target non-combatants.298

295. Id. at 466 (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 49).
296. Id. § 50. He made a related point about firearms in order to illustrate his point that action
can only be imputed to a person based on his knowledge of foreseeable consequences:
A gunsmith sells arms to a man who has the appearance of a sensible, sedate
person, and does not seem to have any bad design. And yet this man goes
instantly to make an unjust attack on another person, and kills him. Here the
gunsmith is not at all chargeable, having done nothing but what he had a right
to do; and besides, he neither could nor ought to have foreseen what
happened.
Id. at 208 (bk. 1, pt. 2, ch. 10, § 5). In contrast, if a careless person left a pair of loaded pistols on a
table in a public place, he would be chargeable if a child found the pistols and accidentally injured
himself. Id. Barbeyrac had made a similar argument in favor of liability for the pistol owner.
PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 46 n.2 (bk. 1, ch. 5, § 3).
297. E.g. MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND
CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 89, n.† (William Cobbett trans., Fred B. Rothman
1986) (reprint of 1795 English translation) (1788) (“The roman law ought to be considered as the
subsidiary law in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Polon, and in some
of the tribunals in Great Britain.”).
298. MARTENS, supra note 297, at 282 (bk. 8, ch. 3, § 4).
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4. George Bowyer
Englishman George Bowyer was the author of four legal treatises in
the mid-nineteenth century. His work was so highly regarded that the
University of Oxford awarded him its greatest honor, naming him a
Doctor of Civil Law (a title usually reserved for heads of state and the
Chancellor of the University).299 In his 1854 Commentaries on Universal
Public Law, he aimed to describe the shared elements of public law “of
human society in general throughout the world, including the foundations
of International Law.”300
Bowyer cited and agreed with Grotius’s theory of self-defense.
For a chief object of society is that each person may enjoy
peaceably all that belongs to him, with the assistance of the
power of his whole body. Therefore the law of society cannot
justly prevent a man from defending and enforcing his own
rights, unless society will undertake that task for him.301

Thus,
Every man has a right to defend himself or his property, or
even to defend others, where there is not time or opportunity
to call in aid the civil power. The reason is obvious; for if it
were not so, men would find themselves in a worse condition
in those cases, under civil government, than they would be in
if they were living in a mere natural society without any civil
government.302

Not all nineteenth century legal scholars followed Bowyer’s practice
of reminding readers of first principles. By the nineteenth century, a
large edifice of international law had been built on the foundation of
Grotius and the other classical authors. Just as people who work on the
sixty-fifth story of a skyscraper may not spend much time thinking about
the building’s foundation, many of the international law scholars of the
nineteenth (and twentieth century) tended to concentrate on elaborating
the details and applications of particular subjects—such as maritime
rights, or the extent of ambassadorial immunities—without discussion of
first principles. The first principles, like the foundation of a skyscraper,
299.
300.
301.
302.

BOOTHMAN, supra note 221.
BOWYER, supra note 183, at 12.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
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were still there of course, for the whole edifice would collapse without
them.
5. George B. Davis
As of the early twentieth century, the direct connection between the
national right of self-defense and the individual right continued to be an
obvious element of international law. George B. Davis was West Point’s
most renowned Professor of Law. In his 1901 treatise The Elements of
International Law, George B. Davis explained that the “Right of SelfPreservation” is “called in being whenever the corporate existence of a
state is menaced, and corresponds to the individual right of selfdefence.”303
D. Conclusion: Burning Down the House
Frey’s attempt to deny the existence of a human right to self-defense
has terrifying implications, which run far beyond her narrow effort to
assist international gun prohibition. If Frey is right—that there is no
human right to self-defense—then Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Victoria,
and all the rest of the humanitarian founders of international law are
wrong.
And these humanitarians would not be wrong about an incidental
matter (such as whether consuls have the same rights as ambassadors);
they would be wrong in the very foundation of their humanitarian
principles. The personal right of self-defense is the foundation of the
humanitarian edifice built by the classic authors. The personal right to
self-defense is why the Indians had a right to resist Spanish pillaging. It
is why prisoners of war must be treated humanely, why armies must not
target non-combatants, and why aggressive war is unjust.
If Frey is correct that self-defense is not a fundamental human right,
then the structure of more than five centuries of humanitarian
international law collapses. All the generals, admirals, and diplomats
who restrained the conduct of their militaries because they believed in
the international law taught by Grotius and the rest were fools, because
Grotius and his fellows were concocting international law on the basis of
a human right that does not really exist; they were as misguided as the
chemists who believed in phlogiston.304
303. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 74.
304. Phlogiston was, in the theory of some seventeenth and eighteenth century chemists, an
odorless, colorless, weightless substance which was released during combustion. The phlogiston
theory was disproved by Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, who showed that combustion requires oxygen;
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Justice Felix Frankfurter decried the short-sighted advocates of
repressive law enforcement who would “burn the house to roast the
pig.”305 Frey’s target is gun ownership, but in order to get at gun owners,
she is promoting a radical theory which tends towards the destruction of
humanitarian international law itself.
In modern international law, there is a continuing controversy over
natural law versus positivism. As detailed supra, the positivist tradition
and the natural law position both have historically recognized the right of
personal self-defense.306 Johannes Textor was an international law
positivist avant la lettre, and also a firm defender of self-defense. Later
scholars have argued about the degree to which Grotius, Pufendorf, et al.,
used natural or positive law.
Frey’s position is premised on an extremist version of positivism:
that humans have no rights other than the rights which governments
grant them via international human rights treaties or other positive
enactments. (Although, even if one accepts the view that rights are only
created by positive law, Frey has failed to inform the Human Rights
Council about many positive laws of the right of self-defense, as
discussed in Part V and Part VI.) The positivist-only view is contrary to
the essential nature of human rights—which is that all humans have
certain fundamental rights, regardless of whether those rights have been
codified in a national code or international treaty. If all the human rights
treaties in the world were repealed tomorrow, could a person still assert
that she has a right to freedom of religion, a right not to be raped, a right
to criticize the government? We think that the answer is clearly “yes”—
that these rights have always been inherent; the human rights treaties of
the twentieth century recognized these rights, but did not create them.307
There are some modern scholars, such as Yoram Dinstein of Israel,
who insist that natural law is anachronistic because it came from an
“ecclesiastical” era.308 Of the many authors we have surveyed, some of
once combustion was understood to be a form of oxidation, the evidence supporting the phlogiston
theory disappeared.
305. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (rejecting the notion that literature for
adults should be censored in order to protect children from seeing inappropriate materials).
306. See supra Part IV.A–C.
307. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the right to arms, like the right to
peaceably assemble, is not created by positive law, but rather derives “‘from those laws whose
authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.’ It is found wherever civilization
exists.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
211 (1824)). The “civilized man” quote comes from the Court’s discussion of the right to assemble;
the right to arms discussion follows immediately, and adopts the same reasoning as the right to
assembly analysis. For a more detailed discussion of Cruikshank, see David B. Kopel, The Supreme
Court’s Thirty-five Other Second Amendment Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 177 (1999).
308. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 179–80. Although Dinstein’s credentials as an international
law scholar are indisputable, his knowledge of the ecclesiastical theory and practice is weak. For
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the important Spanish predecessors of Grotius were indeed ecclesiastics.
Today, there are some people who, writing from a religious foundation,
believe that natural law is a bulwark of human liberty.309 But it is much
too glib to dismiss natural rights theory as religiously based. In this Part,
almost none of the arguments—including the arguments made by
ordained members of religious orders—depend on any proof deriving
directly from revealed religion. Rather, the arguments often used Bible
stories—as they used stories from ancient Greece and Rome—to
illustrate or reinforce their points
Moreover, one hardly needs to believe in natural law to recognize
self-defense as a fundamental right. When we examine the sources of
international law, we will not expect to find that all the great founders of

example, he claims that before the Roman Emperor Constantine made Christianity the state religion
(in 312 AD), Christians were entirely pacifist. Dinstein further claims that the theoretical
justification for Christians serving in the Roman armies was invented by Augustine, in his fifthcentury book The City of God. Id. at 64. While Augustine elaborated “Just War” principles with
great sophistication, he was far from the first Christian apologist to justify Christian service in the
Roman army. See, e.g., CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, PAEDAGOGUS, (The Instructor), bk. 2, ch. 12; bk.
3, ch. 12, para. 7, (G.W. Butterworth trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1919) (Clement of Alexandria lived
between 150–215 AD); available at www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-02/anf02-52.htm#P3288_976824
(Christian men should wear shoes only when they serve in the military, and Christian soldiers should
not extort money from civilians); EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, THE PROOF OF THE GOSPEL
(Demonstratio Evangelica) 48–50 (bk. 1, ch. 8) (W.J. Ferrar ed. & trans., 2001) (One way to be a
Christian is to adopt a religious vocation, such as becoming a monk. The other way, “more humble,
more human, permits men to join in pure nuptials and to produce children, to undertake government,
to give orders to soldiers fighting for right.”) (Eusebius of Caesarea lived approx. 260 to 339 AD);
ST. ATHANASIUS, Letter to Amun, Letter 48, available at www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-04/Npnf204-102.htm#P9806_3501911 (written before 354 AD) (“[I]n war it is lawful and praiseworthy to
destroy the enemy; accordingly not only are they who have distinguished themselves in the field
held worthy of great honours, but monuments are put up proclaiming their achievements.”); ST.
AMBROSE, THE DUTIES OF THE CLERGY, bk. 1, ch. 28–29 (Christians should fight wars to give
people freedom, as Moses did, and not for selfish purposes; Christian armies should fight fairly, and
should not be excessively hard to vanquished enemies who did not fight with brutality.) (St.
Ambrose lived from 339 to 397 AD, and this piece was written approximately 391 AD). The notion
that the pre-Constantine Christians were all pacifists who would not serve in the army is contradicted
by numerous other sources, starting with the New Testament. See, e.g., Acts 13:6–12 (Sergius
Paulus, the deputy military governor of Cyprus, becomes a Christian, without abandoning his post.);
Acts 10; 11:1–18 (A centurion—that is, a Roman army unit commander—and an enlisted man
become Christians.); Timothy S. Miller, Introduction to PEACE AND WAR IN BYZANTIUM 9
(Timothy S. Miller & John Nesbitt eds., 1995) (Sometime between 193 and 235 AD, a Christian
church was built in the large Roman military camp at Dura Europos, in Syria. The existence of the
camp shows that, at least in Syria, there were a large number of Christians in the army, and that the
military leadership not only tolerated them, but tried to accommodate their religious needs.); ADOLF
HARNACK, MILITIA CHRISTI: THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND THE MILITARY IN THE FIRST THREE
CENTURIES 94–95 (David McInnes Gracie trans., 1981) (Before the Emperor Diocletian began the
final, most severe persecution of Christians, the Roman military had come to an accommodation
with its many Christian soldiers: the soldiers would attend the army’s numerous pagan rites, but they
would be allowed to make the sign of the cross, which would protect them from demons).
309. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, The Universal Common Good and the Authority of
International Law, 9 LOGOS 28 (2006) (discussing natural law theory of international relations of
Pope John Paul II).
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international law were unanimous in their epistemology, or that all their
sensibilities are congruent with our own. Wherever one thinks rights
come from, it is quite significant that there is unanimity of opinion
among the founders of international law: personal self-defense is a
fundamental human right, essential to the foundation of international law
and order. If one agrees with the opening paragraphs of the U.S.
Declaration of Independence, that it is “self-evident” that all men
inherently have inalienable human rights, then one agrees with the
general principles of Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and the rest.
On the other hand, if one takes Dinstein’s position that “law” is
solely a creation of governments and of bodies created by governments,
then consider what the governments of the world have created in their
constitutions, in their most fundamental statements of the structure of the
legal order. The constitutions of at least sixteen nations explicitly affirm
that human rights are inherent (or “natural” or created by God); they
affirm human rights are recognized by governments, but not created by
governments.310 And so does the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,311 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,312 and the main human rights treaty of the Western
Hemisphere—the American Convention on Human Rights.313 Thirty-five
310. See THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 23 (“Life is a gift of God and a natural
right of human beings.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 4 (“The
Constitution recognizes the intangibility of the human dignity and guarantees the person’s inviolable
and imprescriptible rights . . . .”); AZERBAIJAN CONSTITUTION art. 24 (“Everyone . . . possess
inviolable and inalienable rights and liberties.”); CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE pmbl., § a (recognizing
“inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their
Creator . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 41 (“Individual freedom is a
natural right not subject to violation . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 10 (“Human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind,
are inviolable and inalienable.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA art. 11 (“All
persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA art. 18 (“The rights and freedoms of individuals shall be inborn.”);
CONSTITUTION art. 11 (“The State guarantees the natural rights of the individual . . . .”);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 4 (Para.) (“The right to the life is inherent to the human person.”);
CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA Part II, sched. III, b (“[A]ll persons have been endowed equally by
God with inalienable rights . . . .”); SAUDI ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 26 (“The state protects human
rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”); SPAIN CONSTITUTION art. 10 (“[I]nviolable rights
which are inherent . . . .”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art. 25 (“Freedom is a sacred right.”); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO pmbl. (“[T]he equal and inalienable
rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator . . . .”); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY art. 12 (“Everyone possesses inherent fundamental
rights . . . .”).
311. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (recognizing “the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”).
312. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (same language as Universal Declaration).
313. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“[T]he essential rights of man are not derived from
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American state constitutions, too, affirm that human rights are inherent,
natural, or otherwise not the mere creation of positive law; quite often,
the affirmations of inherent rights include the enumeration of selfdefense.314
one’s being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human
personality . . . .”); see also Judicial Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, advisory
opinion OC-18/03 Ser. A, no. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003) (“All persons have attributes inherent to their
human dignity that may not be disregarded and which are, consequently, superior to the power of the
State, whatever its political structure.”).
314. ALA. CONST. § 1 (describing the equality and rights of men and their “inalienable
rights . . . life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”); ALASKA CONST. art. 1 (“[A]ll persons have a
natural right to life, liberty . . . .”); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and
inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All persons have certain natural, essential and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties . . . .”); DEL. CONST. pmbl. (“Through Divine goodness, all people have by nature the
rights . . . of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art 1, § 2 (“All natural
persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and
liberty . . . .”); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“All persons are free by nature and are equal in their
inherent and inalienable rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty . . . .”); IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and
defending life and liberty . . . .”); ILL. CONST. art. 1m, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and
inalienable rights among which are life . . . .”); IND. CONST. § 1 (“all people are . . . endowed . . .
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty . . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1
(“All men and women . . . have . . . inalienable rights . . . of enjoying and defending life . . . .”); KAN.
CONST. § 1, Bill of Rights. (“All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among
which are life, liberty . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 1, Bill of Rights (“All men are, by nature, free and
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: The right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have
certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life . . . .”); MASS. CONST. art. 1 (“All men . . . have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights . . . enjoying and defending their lives . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“all persons have a
natural right to life . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All persons . . . have certain inalienable
rights . . . and the rights of . . . defending their lives . . . .”); NEB. CONST. art 1, (“All persons have
certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life . . . and the right to keep and bear arms
for security or defense of self, family, home, and others . . . .”); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“all
persons . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are
life . . . .”); N.H CONST., Bill of Rights, art 2. (“All men have certain inalienable rights among which
are those of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All persons . . . have certain natural
and unalienable rights, among which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 4
(“All persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights
of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“all persons . . . are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All
individuals . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . defending life . . . to keep and bear arms for the
defense of their person, family, property, and the state . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men are,
by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (“ All persons have the inherent right to
life . . . .”); PA. CONST., § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights . . . defending
life . . . .”); S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent rights. . .defending
life . . . .”); UTAH CONST., art. 1, § 1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties . . . .”); VT. CONST. art. 1 (“That all persons . . . have certain natural,
inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which [is] . . . defending life . . . .”); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1
(“That all men . . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life . . . .”);
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Thus, the principle of inherent human rights would be, in a sense, a
widespread enactment of positive law. The positive law would be
supported by the consensus of the great jurists of international law.
The status of self-defense in international law does not depend on
precisely how an individual resolves the natural law versus positive law
debate. Either the unanimous consensus of the founding scholars reflects
natural law, or it reflects positive law as articulated unanimously by the
experts themselves. 315 In any case, it is apparent that self-defense forms
the intellectual foundation of international law.
The reader may wonder how Frey, acting as a Special Rapporteur,
could fail to inform the Human Rights Council about the overwhelming
consensus of the founding scholars of international law. Perhaps an
international law professor might not know about Giovanni da Legnano,
but it is inconceivable that an international law professor would not
know about Grotius and Pufendorf. The answer may be found in
Professor Frey’s artfully-worded statement that “[n]o international
human right of self-defence is expressly set forth in the primary sources
of international law: treaties, customary law, or general principles.”316
The statute of the International Court of Justice describes “the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”317 Thus, by
referring only to “primary” sources, Frey evades the responsibility of a
conscientious Special Rapporteur to inform the Human Rights Council
about each of the four sources of international law. Yet Frey is not
consistent, for she is actually quite liberal about using quotes and

W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent rights . . . the enjoyment of life . . . .”);
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have certain inherent rights; among these are life . . . .”);
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“In their inherent right to life . . . .”).
315. More eloquently:
There are two ways of investigating the law of nature: . . . either by arguing
from the nature and circumstances of mankind, or by observing what has
generally been approved by all nations. The former is the more certain of the
two: but the latter will lead us, if not with the same certainly, yet with a high
degree of probability to the knowledge of this law. For such a universal
approbation must arise from some universal principle; and the principle can be
nothing else than the common sense of mankind. Since, therefore, the general
law of nature may be investigated in this manner, the same law as it is applied
particularly to nations as moral agents, and hence called the law of nations,
may be investigated in the same manner.
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE
SCIENCE 39–40 (The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1836) (quoting Grotius).
316. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21.
317. Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of Just., art. 38, § 1(d).
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citations from scholars to buttress her other points.318 So, in short, she
informs the Human Rights Council about the opinions of scholars who
support some tangential aspects of her theories, but fails to inform the
Human Rights Council of the opinions of the most influential
international law scholars of all time regarding the primary subject of her
report.
In any case, Frey’s claim about the “primary” sources of
international law is also quite wrong, as will be detailed in the next two
Parts. Frey engages in some other verbal obfuscation in order to avoid
informing the Human Rights Council about what the sources of
international law really say.
V. HISTORICAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Major legal systems are a source of international law, especially
when there is consensus among the systems. The statute of the
International Court of Justice tells the court to apply “the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”319 Frey acknowledges
that these “general principles” are a “primary” source of international
law.320 While Part VI will discuss contemporary law, this Part examines
the historical practices of civilized nations and the influence of those
practices on the evolution of international law. These historical sources
are important because “modern international law—making all proper
allowance for its greater comprehensiveness, more solid basis, and more
determinate character—is by no means a new creation, but partly a
reassertion and refinement of ancient doctrines, partly a restoration or
continuation or adaptation of ancient customs and institutions.”321
A. Greek Law
It is often said that Western Civilization was built on the foundations
of Athens and Jerusalem, on the synergy of ancient Greece and ancient
Israel which produced Christianity.322 So let us begin with Athens.
The best source of ancient Athenian law on self-defense is the speech
of Demosthenes, “Against Aristocrates.” Aristocrates had convinced the
Athenian Senate to enact a decree for the protection of the mercenary
leader Charidemus. The laws provided for automatic punishment of
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 15, 19, 21.
Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of Just., art 38, § 1(c).
Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21.
Phillipson, supra note 161, at 12a.
See, e.g., LEO STRAUSS, STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 171 (1983).
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anyone who killed Charidemus. The decree failed to win the approval of
the Assembly, and did not go into effect.323
An opponent of Aristocrates brought a case in the law courts, where
Demosthenes presented an argument that the decree had been repugnant
to the legal principles of Athens. For example, the decree provided for
automatic punishment, rather than the due process of a trial with factfinding. Similarly, the decree had no exception for a killing in selfdefense, even though Athenian law clearly provided for self-defense.324
Demosthenes cited the Athenian statute: “If any man while violently
and illegally seizing another shall be slain straightway in self-defence,
there shall be no penalty for his death.”325 Pufendorf quoted this passage
with approval.326 (Pufendorf also cited Plato’s Laws, which repeatedly
justify self-defense, although today we do not know if Plato’s particular
ideas were actually followed as law.)327
Demosthenes explained that “straightway” meant that the victim had
slain the aggressor in immediate self-defense, rather than after “long
premeditation.” 328 The words “in self-defense” made it clear that the law
was “giving indulgence to the actual sufferer, and to no other man.”329
In Part VI, we will examine Frey’s astonishing theory that there is no
self-defense right because all self-defense is an excuse, rather than
justification.330 The Greeks did not agree. Demosthenes explained, “there
is such a thing as justifiable homicide,” for some kinds of homicide can
“be accounted righteous.”331

323. J.H. Vince, Introduction to “Against Aristocrates” in 3 DEMOSTHENES, ORATIONS 212–
13 (1935) (originally delivered in 352 BC) [hereinafter DEMOSTHENES].
324. Id.
325. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 69, at 253.
326. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, bk. 2, ch. 5, § 16, n.(t), at 198. Pufendorf wrote his own
footnotes, which used letters as footnote markers. The Barbeyrac footnotes are indicated by
numerals.
327. PLATO, LAWS, bk. 9, at 216 (Benjamin Jowett trans.), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/ etext99/plaws11.txt (“If a brother kill a brother in self-defence
during a civil broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free
from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a
parricide. A man is justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or
youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father, mother, brother, wife,
or other relations.” (emphasis added)).
328. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 60, at 253.
329. Id.
330. See infra Part VI.F.4 notes and accompanying text.
331. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 323, § 74, at 265. Athenian law presumed that the citizen
militia would possess their own arms, which they would use when called to military service. Armscarrying was allowed in the countryside, but not in the city unless there was a particular need.
XENOPHON, HELLENICA, bk. 1.
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B. Jewish Law
Jewish law, as expressed in the Jewish Bible (what Christians call
“the Old Testament”), became part of Christianity, and the Jewish texts
on self-defense and defense of others were frequently cited by Christian
writers. Jewish law is also important in its own right as an early form of
transnational law. After Judea was conquered by Babylon in 587 BC,
some of the Jewish community was forcibly transported to Babylon,
while some remained behind in Judea (part of modern-day Israel). Later,
a thriving Jewish community developed in Alexandria, Egypt. Following
an unsuccessful war of national independence against the Roman Empire
in 70 AD, many (although not all) of the Jews in Israel were dispersed
throughout the Empire. In the subsequent centuries, Jews lived all over
Europe and the Middle East, often in segregated, self-governing
communities. These communities regulated their internal affairs
according to Jewish law and used it in their dealings with Jewish
communities in other nations.
Jewish law explicitly authorized personal and family self-defense
against criminal attack. The book of Exodus absolved a homeowner who
killed a burglar at night: “If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten
that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.”332 The Modern
Language Bible renders the verse: “When a burglar is caught breaking in,
and is fatally beaten, there shall be no charge of manslaughter.”333
Under the Mosaic Law, the nearest relative of a person who was
murdered was obliged to kill the murderer, providing blood restitution
for the death of the innocent. However, when a nocturnal burglar was
killed in the act, there was no wrongdoing. Thus, his relatives had no
right of restitution against the homeowner.334 That no restitution was
allowed suggests that, in modern terms, the killing of the home invader
would be in the category of justification, rather than excuse (contrary to
Frey’s theory that self-defense is not a justification, but is instead an
332. Exodus 22:2. For more extensive analysis of Jewish law, see, e.g., David B. Kopel, The
Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 17 (2004). The next verse stated that “If the sun be
risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him.” Exodus 22:3. Jewish legal scholars interpreted
the “sun” language metaphorically: if the circumstances indicated that the burglar posed a violent
threat to the victims in the home, the burglar could be slain regardless of the time of day; conversely,
if it were clear that the burglar was only taking property, and would not attack the people in the
home, even if they interfered with the burglary, the burglar could not be slain. Kopel, supra, at 32–
34.
333. THE WORD: THE BIBLE FROM 26 TRANSLATIONS 225 (Curtis Vaughn ed., 1993) (quoting
THE MODERN LANGUAGE BIBLE: THE NEW BERKELEY VERSION IN MODERN ENGLISH).
334. EDWARD J. WHITE, THE LAW IN SCRIPTURES 77 (2000). If the deceased were not a real
burglar, but someone who was mistaken for a burglar, there was no criminal offense. SAMUEL
MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS 33 n.55 (The Lawbook
Exchange 2001) (1891).
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excuse).335
The Talmud, a multi-layered and ever-expanding commentary on
Jewish law, is itself a source of Jewish law. Regarding the passages in
Exodus, the Talmud explains:
What is reason for the law of breaking in? Because it is certain that
no man is inactive where his property is concerned; therefore this one
[the thief] must have reasoned, “If I go there, he [the owner] will oppose
me and prevent me; but if he does, I will kill him.” Hence the Torah
decreed “If he come to slay thee, forestall by slaying him.”336
This last sentence is sometimes translated, “If someone comes to kill
you, rise up and kill him first.”337
The final sentence is not an option; it is a positive command. A Jew
has a duty to use deadly force to defend herself against murderous attack.
The Talmud also imposes an affirmative duty for bystanders to kill if
necessary to prevent a murder, the rape of a betrothed woman, or
pederasty.338 The commentators agree that a person is required to hire a
rescuer if necessary to save the victim from the “pursuer” (the rodef).339
Likewise, “if one sees a wild beast ravaging [a fellow] or bandits coming
to attack him . . . he is obligated to save [the fellow].”340
The duty to use force to defend an innocent is based on two
passages. The first is Leviticus 19:16, “you shall not stand up against the
life of your neighbor.”341 Or in a modern translation, “nor shall you stand
idly by when your neighbor’s life is at stake.”342
The second passage comes from Deuteronomy and explains that if a
man and a betrothed (engaged) woman have illicit sex in the city, it
would be initially presumed that she consented because she could have
cried out for help. But if the sexual act occurred in the country, she
would be presumed to have been the victim of a forcible rape, “For he
found her in the field, and the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none

335. See infra Part VI.F.4.
336. HEBREW-ENGLISH EDITION OF THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SANHEDRIN, folio 72a. (I.
Epstein ed., 1994).
337. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, folio 72a.
338. 2 TALMUD BAVLI; THE GEMARA: THE CLASSIC VILNA EDITION WITH AN ANNOTATED,
INTERPRETIVE ELUCIDATION, AS AN AID TO TALMUD STUDY, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN folio 73a1
(Michael Wiener & Asher Dicker elucidators, Mesorah Pubs., 2d ed. 2002) [Hereinafter VILNA
TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN].
339. Id. at folio 73a3.
340. Id. at folio 73a1 (brackets in original).
341. See also Prov. 24:11–12 (“Rescue those who are being taken away to death; hold back
those who are stumbling to the slaughter. If you say, ‘Behold, we did not know this,’ does not he
who weighs the heart perceive it?”) (English Standard Version).
342. Lev. 19:16 (New American Bible).
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to save her.”343 The passage implies that bystanders must heed a
woman’s cries and come to her rescue.344
C. Roman Law
The law of the Roman Republic and Empire was the dominant legal
system in the Western world for many centuries. Indeed, in Europe,
North Africa, and Asia west of Persia, the Roman legal system was the
only enduring legal system, as the Roman Empire encompassed every
civilized region.
Even after the Western Roman Empire fell in the fifth century AD,
Roman law remained a foundation of European law, as we shall detail
infra.345 As a foundation of European law, Roman law became part of the
laws of much of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, through the process of
colonization. Roman law continued to be a major part of the European
legal system during the Napoleonic era.346
Although post-colonial nations have developed their legal systems in
diverse ways, it is still fair to say that Roman law comes closer than any
other legal system to being the common heritage of all mankind. In 1901,
an international law treatise stated that it was “easy for Grotius and his
successors to deduce from the Roman law by far the greater part of the
system of international law as it exists to-day. In its fundamental
principles it has changed but little since Grotius’s day.”347
The foundation of Roman law was the Twelve Tables.348 The Twelve
Tables were, literally, twelve bronze tablets containing some of the basic
legal rules, published in the final form in 449 BC. They were placed in
the Forum, so that every citizen could easily read them. They were
created after extensive public debate and discussion, by a committee of
ten (decemvirs) which relied in part on Greek law, and which made
revisions based on public comment by citizens.349
343. Deut. 22:23–27. The presumption was not conclusive and could be overcome by other
evidence.
344. 2(a) THE MISHNEH, SEFER NEZEKIN 150–51 (Matis Roberts trans. & commentary, 1987)
(ch. 8, § 7); see also VILNA TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, folio 73a. Nezekin or Neziqin is the
portion of the law dealing with damages of all sorts. Sefer means “Book of.”
345. See infra Parts V.D–H.
346. E.g. MARTENS, supra note 297, at 89 n.† (William Cobbett trans., 1986) (reprint of 1795
English translation) (1788) (“The [R]oman law ought to be considered as the subsidiary law in
Germany, Switzerland, Holland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Polon, and in some of the tribunals in
Great Britain.”).
347. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 19.
348. Lex Duodecim Tabularum, or Duodecim Tabulae.
349. TITUS LIVIUS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 192–248 (bk. 3, *8–59) (Aubrey de
Sélincourt trans., Penguin Books 1971) (First published sometime during the reign of Augustus
Caesar).
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The very creation of the Twelve Tables was a monumental
development in due process; the laws were published, readily accessible,
and written to be readily understood by an ordinary citizen. Previously,
the laws had been closely guarded by an élite which secretly manipulated
and perverted the law to its own benefit. As one legal historian
summarized:
From an historical point of view, their importance cannot be
overrated. The fixing of the brazen tablets, in a conspicuous
position in the heart of the city, marks, at a critical period in
the infancy of the commonwealth, the successful issue of one
of the many struggles of the plebeian element for that equality
of rights which was denied them by the patricians, and which
it was vain to look for until a preliminary step had been
obtained, viz., the withdrawal, from the hands of a dominant
caste, of the exclusive knowledge of, and power of perverting
to their own ends, those hitherto unwritten usages which had
served the purposes of law.350

Unfortunately, the Twelve Tables themselves were later destroyed,
so what we know of them comes from secondary sources. The selfdefense rules are in Table VIII:
12. If a theft be committed at night, and the thief be killed, let his
death be deemed lawful.
13. If in the daytime (only if he defend himself with weapons).351
The Twelve Tables thus contained a counterpart of the Hebrew law
from Exodus, based on the principle that the slaying of a night-time
burglar was lawful, because the burglar was presumed to be a deadly
threat.352 A daytime burglar could also be slain, if the facts indicated that
he were a deadly threat.

350. T. Lambert Mears, Introduction to THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN: THE
TWELVE TABLES, AND THE CXVIIITH AND CXXVIITH NOVELS, lvi (T. Lambert Mears trans., The
Lawbook Exchange 2004) (1882).
351. Id. at Table 8, items 12–13 (parenthetical addition by translator); see also ALLAN
CHESTER JOHNSON et al., ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 11 (2003) (alternate translation, to the same
effect). Another scholar puts this law in Table 8, law 3: “If one is slain while committing theft by
night, he is rightly slain.” INTERNET ANCIENT HISTORY SOURCEBOOK, http://www.fordham.edu/
HALSALL/ancient/12tables.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). Still another scholar puts the law in
Table 2, law 4. “Where anyone commits a theft by night, and having been caught in the act is killed,
he is legally killed.” S. P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES, THE
INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE RULES OF ULPIAN, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE ENACTMENTS OF
JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LEO (1932), available at http://www.constitution.org/
sps/sps01_1.htm.
352. See supra Part V.B.
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For a thousand years, the Twelve Tables were venerated as the
embodiment of Roman law. For example, they were held in the highest
esteem by the great Roman lawyer and orator of the first century BC,
Cicero.353 Cicero himself, in a text that was studied for many centuries
afterwards by almost everyone who learned Latin (that is, almost every
well-educated person), affirmed the right of self-defense:
What is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords?
Surely it would never be permitted to us to have them if we
might never use them. This, therefore, is a law, O judges, not
written, but born with us—which we have not learned, or
received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and
sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we
were not taught, but to which we were made—which we were
not trained in, but which is ingrained in us—namely, that if
our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or
from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of
securing our safety is honorable. For laws are silent when
arms are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for,
when he who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty
before he can exact a merited punishment.
The law very wisely, and in a manner silently, gives a
man a right to defend himself . . . the man who had used a
weapon with the object of defending himself would be decided
not to have had his weapon about him with the object of
killing a man.354

The principle of self-defense led directly to the commendation of
tyrannicide.355 Self-defense against lone criminals and against tyrants
353. “Though all the world exclaim against me, I will say what I think: that single little book
of the Twelve Tables, if anyone look to the fountains and sources of laws, seems to me, assuredly, to
surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in weight of authority, and in plenitude of utility.”
CICERO, DE ORATORE (On the Orator), bk. 1, § 44, ¶ 195 (John Selby Watson trans., George Bell &
Sons 1884) (55 BC).
354. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Speech in Defence of Titus Annius Milo, in 3 ORATIONS OF
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 134, 158–59 (Charles Duke Yonger trans., Colonial Pr., ed., rev. 1899)
(52 BC), available at http://www.uah.edu/student_life/organizations/SAL/texts/latin/classical/
cicero/promilone.html. Cicero never delivered the speech as written, because Milo’s enemy Pompey
surrounded the courtroom with troops. However, the speech was preserved and studied by many
generations of Latin students and scholars.
355. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES], bk. 3, ch. 4, ¶ 19, at 287 (Walter Miller trans.,
Harvard University Press 1975) (44 BC) (“[I]f anyone kills a tyrant . . . of all glorious deeds, they
[the Roman People] hold such an one to be the most noble.”); see also id. at bk. 3, ch. 6, ¶ 32, at 298
( “[T]those fierce and savage monsters in human form [tyrants] should be cut off from what may be
called the common body of humanity.”).
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were both applications of the natural “instinct of self-preservation.”356
Cicero’s political theory thus drew a parallel between personal selfdefense against criminals, and national self-defense against public
enemies. From this principle he extrapolated some basic principles of
Just War, such as only fighting for a just cause, and sparing enemies who
surrendered (unless they had fought the war with unusual cruelty).
Cicero traced the decline of Roman fortunes in the first century BC to the
abandonment of the Roman Republic’s adherence to just war
standards.357 His views were based, in part, in his desire to strengthen
“the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the
members of the human race.”358
Under Roman law, citizens had a right to carry personal arms. This
right was sometimes denied to conquered people. For example, at the
time of Jesus, Roman law forbade the Jews and other subject people to
carry swords, under penalty of death.359 (Apparently, the apostles of
Jesus violated this law by carrying a pair of swords.)360 In AD 212,
Roman citizenship was extended to all free subjects of the Empire,361 and
356. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 4, ¶ 11, at 13.
357. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS [ON THE LAWS], bk. 1, chs. 11–12 (n.p., n.d.); CICERO, DE
OFFICIIS, supra note 355, at bk. 1, chs. 11–12, 23; bk. 2., ch. 8; bk. 3, ch. 20; see also WHEATON,
supra note 214, at 20–24.
358. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, supra note 355, at bk. 1, ch. 42, ¶ 149.
359. GOODENOUGH, supra note 257, at 151 (citing 1 L. MITTEIS & U. WILCKEN, GRUNDZÜGE
UND CHRESTOMATHIE DER PAPYRUSKUNDE [FUNDAMENTALS AND COLLECTIONS OF PAPYRUS
KNOWLEDGE], pt. 2, No. 19 (1912)). The weapons prohibition was enacted sometime between 35
BC and AD 5.
360. At the Last Supper, Jesus gave his final instructions to the apostles, and revoked the
previous order about not carrying useful items. He asked, “When I sent you out with no moneybag
or knapsack or sandals, did you lack anything?” “Nothing,” the apostles replied. Jesus continued:
But now, let the one who has a moneybag take it, and likewise a knapsack.
And let the one who has no sword sell his cloak and buy one. For I tell you
that this scripture must be fulfilled in me: And he was numbered with the
transgressors. For what is written about me has its fulfillment.
The apostles responded, “Look, Lord, here are two swords.” Jesus said to them, “It is enough.” Luke
22:35–38 (English Standard Version). The Apostle Matthew was a tax collector (Matthew 10:3).
Accordingly, he might have been allowed legally to carry a sword. It is possible that Matthew
walked around carrying two swords, although it was unusual for one person to carry two swords. The
swords might have been carried concealed in a bag or knapsack, although Luke 22 suggests that the
Apostles did not carry bags or knapsacks before the last supper. The typical Roman sword of the
Republic was the gladius Hispaniensis, whose blade was approximately thirty inches long. In the
first century AD, the gladius was replaced by the Pompeii-type sword, whose blade was only sixteen
inches. James Hurst, The Roman Sword In The Republican Period And After,
http://www.unc.edu/courses/rometech/public/content/special/James_Hurst/THE_ROMAN_
SWORD_IN_THE_REP.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). The latter type of sword would have been
relatively easy to carry concealed, especially under loose flowing garments.
361. Emperor Caracalla, Constitutio Antoniniana De Civitate, in PAUL ROBINSON COLEMANNORTON, FRANK CARD BOURNE, ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON, & CLYDE PHARR, ANCIENT ROMAN
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consequently they all enjoyed the right to arms.
The right to arms was abolished in 361, at least for persons who did
not have advance approval from the government.362 However, the
Empires’ inability to protect their subjects led to a restoration of the right
in 440 in both the Western and the Eastern Empires. The restoration was
re-confirmed several years later by the Western Emperor Majorian
Augustus.363
D. Justinian’s Corpus Juris
The Western Roman Empire vanished in 476, when the last emperor,
Romulus Augustulus, was deposed. The Eastern Roman Empire, also
known as the Byzantine Empire, was much stronger. The Eastern Empire
lasted until 1453, when Constantinople fell to a Turkish Moslem army.
The Byzantines never called themselves “Byzantines.” Instead, they
considered themselves “Romans”—a continuation of the state which had,
according to tradition, been founded in 753 BC.
Around AD 534, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian ordered the
creation of a compilation of all Roman law, which became known as the
Corpus Juris.364
STATUTES: A TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY, GLOSSARY, AND INDEX 212,
225–26 (2003).
362. CLYDE PHARR, THE THEODOSIAN CODE § XV.15.1, at 439 (2001) (Emperors Valentian
(Valentinianus I) and Valens Augustuses to Bulphorus, Governor of Campia, Decree of Oct. 5, 364,
“No person whatever, without Our knowledge and advice, shall be granted the right to employ any
weapons whatsoever.”).
363. Emperors Valentinianus III (West) and Theodosius II (East) “to the Roman People:”
[B]ecause it is not sufficiently certain, under summertime opportunities for
navigation, to what shore the ships of the enemy can come, We admonish
each and all by this edict that, with confidence in the Roman strength and the
courage with which they ought to defend their own, with their own men
against the enemy, . . .they shall use those arms which they can, but they shall
preserve the public discipline and the moderation of free birth unimpaired.
CLYDE PHARR, Restoration of the Right to Use Weapons (De Reddito Jure Armorum), in The Novels
of the Sainted Valentinian Augugustus, in THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND NOVELS, tit. 9, 524 (June 24,
440). “Novels” was a legal term of art for new laws. The “enemy” mentioned in the law was the
Visigoths, whose military victories in North Africa had exposed the entire Western Roman Empire
to amphibious invasion.
The Emperor Majorian reigned in the West from 457 to 461. He was “the only man to hold that
office in the 5th century who had some claim to greatness.” ENCYLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2002
DVD edition). There are records of twelve laws enacted during his reign. One of those is titled
Restoration of the Right to Use Weapons (De Reddito Jure Armorum). No text of the law survives. It
is not known if the Restoration was co-issued with Leo I, the Eastern Roman Emperor. Of the ten
Majorian decrees with surviving texts, the first two were not co-issued with Leo, and the latter eight
all were.
364. The modern legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum was apparently named,
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The Roman law was considered, in many respects, to embody
universal principles of law. Gaius, a second-century Roman legal scholar
who was a major source of authority for the Corpus Juris, explained that:
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law
which is partly theirs alone and partly shared by all mankind.
The law which each people makes for itself is special to itself.
It is called ‘state law’ [jus civile], the law peculiar to that state.
But the law which natural reason makes for all mankind is
applied the same way everywhere. It is called ‘the law of all
peoples’ [jus gentium] because it is common to every
nation.365

The term jus gentium (“the law of all peoples”) implied that the same
law applies to individuals and to states, in that states are made up of
peoples. Francisco de Victoria was among international law pioneers
who used the principle of the necessarily universal application of the jus
gentium in order to restrain the conduct of governments.366

somewhat optimistically, with the intention that the encyclopedia become a modern equivalent of
Justinian’s Corpus Juris.
365. THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, supra note 350, at G. INST. 1.1. We have
changed the translator’s use of two letters, so that “ius ciuile” reads as “jus civile” and “ius gentium”
as “jus gentium;” in a translation of Latin, either choice of modern English letters is correct, and we
chose to use letters which are easiest for a modern English reader—since English readers say
“justice” instead of “iustice” and “civil” instead of “ciuil.”
The legal scholar most-quoted in the Corpus Juris, Ulpian, explained—in the very first passage of
the Digest—that jus gentium was the law “which all human peoples observe,” while jus naturale
also included animals. DIG. 1.1.1 (Ulpian, Institutes). Domitius Ulpianus was a lawyer from Tyre (in
modern Lebanon), active during the Severan dynasty (AD 193–235). TONY HONORÉ, ULPIAN:
PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 2002). “Europe’s view of the law has been formed more by
Ulpian than by any other lawyer. This is true as regards substance, style, method of reasoning, and
background philosophy . . . [I]t was Ulpian who expounded Roman law as a universal system
capable, as it turned out, of being adapted to the needs of the radically different societies that
emerged from the breakdown of the empire.” Id. at 229. His legal philosophy was “cosmopolitan and
egalitarian,” believing that the law and its interpretation and application “should take account of the
natural freedom, equality, and dignity of all.” Id. at 85. He emphasized that all human beings have
dignity, and that dignity is the core of the human personality. “To be beaten up or defamed infringes
a person’s dignity.” Thus, he argued that a legal remedy should protect even slaves who were
unjustly beaten or tortured. His principles “freedom, equality, and dignity” are the basis “of the
contemporary civil rights movement. . . . Because they form the framework and underpinning of
Ulpian’s writing, he is properly to be regarded as the first human rights lawyer.” Id. at 85–86.
In this Article, most of our citations to the Corpus Juris are to the Digest, which was the most
important part of the Corpus Juris. The Digest (Digesta) consisted of fifty books that compiled
excerpts from cases decided by Roman judges, and opinions written by legal scholars. Some of the
material in the Digest was so old that it came from the time before Julius Caesar destroyed the
Roman Republic and turned it into a dictatorship. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 127–28 (1983).
366. SCOTT, supra note 96, at 140.
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The Corpus Juris, by preserving for posterity the work of Rome’s
legal scholars, thereby transmitted to the world the greatest surviving
elements of Rome’s historic culture of liberty.367
The Emperor Justinian’s Corpus Juris formally replaced the Twelve
Tables as the embodiment of Roman law, and the self-defense principles
of the Twelve Tables were incorporated into the Corpus Juris:
The Law of the Twelve Tables permits one to kill a thief caught in
the night, provided one gives evidence of the fact by shouting aloud, but
someone may only kill a person caught in such circumstances at any
other time if he defends himself with a weapon, though only if he
provides evidence by shouting.368
The universal jus gentium included
the right to repel violent injuries. You see, it emerges from this
law that whatever a person does for his bodily security he can
be held to have done rightfully; and since nature has
established among us a relationship of sorts, it follows that it
is a grave wrong for one human being to encompass the life of
another.369

Significantly, for Frey’s theory that self-defense is an excuse rather
than a justification,370 the Corpus Juris says that self-defense is “done
rightfully”—a phrase which cannot apply to an excuse. For example, if a
person committed a crime because of duress or insanity, we might excuse

367. After the Roman Republic was replaced by the Empire:
The civil law was the only walk of public life in which the genius of old Rome
still survived. The heart of the Roman patriot there still recognized his
country. In performing the duty of interpreting the laws to their clients and
fellow citizens, the patricians invented a sort of judicial legislation, which was
improved from age to age by the long line of jurisconsults, following each
other, in regular and unbroken succession, from the foundation of the republic
to the fall of the empire. The consequence was that civil law, which seems
never to have grown up to be a science in any of the Grecian republics,
became one very early at Rome, and was thence diffused over the civilized
world. The mighty fame and fortune of the Roman people in this respect
cannot be contemplated without emotion. Its martial glory has long since
departed, but the “Eternal City” still continues to rule the greatest part of the
civilized and Christian world, through the powerful influence of her civil
laws.
WHEATON, supra note 214, at 30–31 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 1, ch. 1,
pt. 3).
368. DIG. 9.1.4 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 7).
369. DIG. 1.1.3 (Florentinus, Institutes 1).
370. See infra Part VI.F.4.
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the person from criminal punishment, but we would not say that a person
had acted “rightfully.”
Far more detailed than the Twelve Tables, the Corpus Juris
contained numerous provisions affirming the right of self-defense. The
general principle was that the use of deadly force was permissible when
no lesser force would suffice.
If someone kills anyone else who is trying to go for him with a
sword, he will not be deemed to have killed unlawfully; and if for fear of
death someone kills a thief, there is no doubt he should not be liable
under the lex Aquila. But if, although he could have arrested him, he
preferred to kill him, the better opinion is that he should be deemed to
have acted unlawfully.371
A person lawfully in possession has the right to use a moderate
degree of force to repel any violence exerted for the purpose of depriving
him of possession, if he holds it under a title which is not defective.372
But anyone who uses force to retain his possession is not, Labeo
says, possessing it by [illegitimate] force.373
Someone who recovers by force in the same conflict a possession of
which he has been forcibly deprived is to be understood as reverting to
his original condition rather than possessing it by force. So if I eject you
and you immediately eject me, and I then eject you, the interdict “where
by force” will lie effectively in your favor.374
[I]t is not always lawful to kill an adulterer or thief, unless he
defends himself with a weapon . . . .375
371. DIG. 9.2.5 (Ulpian, Edict 18).
372. Code Just. 8.4.1 (Honorius & Theodosius , 422). The Code (Codex Justinianus) was part
of the Corpus Juris, and collected the laws and decisions made by Roman Emperors before
Justinian. For detailed analysis of Code provisions on self-defense and arms, see Will Tysse, The
Roman Legal Treatment of Self Defense and the Private Possession of Weapons in the Codex
Justinianus, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 163 (2004). This section of the Code was cited by the
French Huguenots in the sixteenth century as justification for armed resistance to France’s central
government, which was attempting to wipe them out. Parrow, supra note 257, at 45–46, citing Peirre
Fabre, Traitte Du Quel on peut apprendre en quel cas il est permis à l’homme Chrestien de porter
les armes et par lequel est respondu à Peirre Charpentier, tendant à la fine d’empescher la paix, &
nous laisser la guerre (trans. from Latin to French 1576), in French Political Pamphlets collection in
Newberry Library (Lindsay and Neu, no. 877) (arguing that the undisputed right of self-defense in
“the case of a Christian assaulted by brigands in the forest” could be applied to national self-defense
against an invader or a domestic tyrant).
373. DIG. 43.16.1.28 (Ulpian, Edict 69) (bracketed text added by translator).
374. DIG. 43.16.17 (Julian, Digest 48). In other words, the original rightful owner who
forcefully reclaimed his own property would not lose a lawsuit which was based on the claim that
the owner’s possession of the land was based merely on force. But see J. INST. 4.2 (Peter Birks &
Grand McLeod trans., 1987) (A person who uses force to recover property which he thinks belongs
to him is not punished, even if the person is mistaken. However, the forcible recovery is not
authorized by law. Roman law aims “to induce men to renounce every type of violent seizure”). The
Institutes, also part of the Corpus Juris, was an introductory textbook summarizing the law.
375. DIG. 4.2.7 (Ulpian, Edict 11).
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If anyone kills a thief by night, he shall do so unpunished if and only
if he could not have spared the man[‘s life] without risk to his own.376
[I]f I kill your slave who is lying in ambush to rob me, I shall go
free; for natural reason permits a person to defend himself against
danger.377
Someone who kills a robber is not liable, at least if he could not
otherwise escape danger.378
A person who acted in lawful self-defense was immune from civil
damages for any harm caused.379 As we will discuss infra, immunity
from civil damages is one of the key distinctions between justification
and excuse.380
The famous formulations of the self-defense rule were “arms may be
repelled by arms” and “it is permissible to repel force by force.”381 The
latter formulation is embodied in the self-defense provision of the
modern Italian criminal code (è lecito respingere la violenza con la
violenza), which recognizes self-defense as a justification, not a mere
excuse.382
The Corpus Juris authorized the possession of arms for lawful
defense, while forbidding the accumulation of arms for seditious
purposes. For example, “[p]ersons who bear weapons for the purpose of
protecting their own safety are not regarded as carrying them for the
purpose of homicide.”383
376. DIG. 48.8.9 (Ulpian, Edict 37) (bracketed text added by translator).
377. DIG. 9.2.4 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 7).
378. J. INST. 4.3.
379. DIG. 9.2.45 (Paul, Sabinus 10).
380. See infra Part VI.F.4.
381. DIG. 43.16.1.27 (Ulpian, Edict 69) (“Cassius writes that it is permissible to repel force by
force, and this right is conferred by nature. From this it appears, he says, that arms may be repelled
by arms.”). For another formulation of the rule, showing its use in the Portuguese legal system, see
Henerik Kocher, Dicionário De Expressões E Frases Latinas, available at
http://www.hkocher.info/minha_pagina/dicionario/v04.htm (item 720).
382. CODICE PENALE [C.P] art. 52 (It.); see also Id. art. 53 (legitimate use of arms as a
justification).
383. DIG. 48.6.11 (Paul, Views 5); see also THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, supra
note 350, at J. INST. 4.18 (“Next, the Cornelian Act on Assassins. This puts to the sword murderers
and those who carry arms with murderous intent.”). Also:
A man is liable under the lex Julia on vis publica on the grounds that he
collects arms or weapons at his home or on his farm or at his country house
beyond those customary for hunting or a journey by land or sea.
But those arms are excepted which someone has by way of trade or
which come to him by inheritance.
Under the same heading come those who have entered into a conspiracy
to raise a mob or a sedition or who keep either slaves or freemen under arms.
1. A man is also liable under the same statute if, being of full age, he appears
in public with a missile weapon.
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In the world of the Eastern Roman Empire—what we today call the
Byzantine Empire—the Corpus Juris reigned for many centuries as the
greatest and most complete expression of the law. But in the world of the
fallen Western Roman Empire, a Dark Age descended, and most of the
intellectual inheritance of Greece and Rome was lost. Cicero was one of
the very few classical authors whose works remained available to the
small fraction of the western population that was literate.384
In “the Little Renaissance” that began in the twelfth century, one of
the most important events was the western rediscovery of Aristotle and
of the Corpus Juris. The University of Bologna was the first western
academic institution to study the Corpus; almost as soon as the Corpus
Juris was rediscovered, and for centuries afterward, the greatest
scholarly activity of law professors was studying the Corpus Juris and
writing commentaries on it; the commentaries were usually written
Talmud-style, in the form of marginal annotations.385 The Corpus Juris
led to the University of Bologna creating the first law school that the
western world had known since the fall of Rome.
The Corpus Juris served as a source—and often as a primary
source—for local laws, and was regarded as the authoritative source of
international law. Indeed, the jus gentium became synonymous with what
we today call international law.386 During the Middle Ages and
thereafter, the portions of the Corpus Juris dealing with the proper
authority of the king were analyzed to show that the king was granted his
authority by the people, and that a king who broke his agreement with
the people—by exercising ungranted powers, or by using his powers
tyrannically—was a traitor, and could be resisted with force, as could
any traitor.387

DIG. 48.6.1–3 (Marcian, Institutes 14 & Scaevola).
384. Even after the rediscovery of most of the works of classical Greece and Rome, Cicero’s
popularity remained undiminished. His book De Officiis [On Duties] was the first classical book
produced on a printing press (in 1465). CICERO, supra note 355, at xv.
385. See, e.g., BERMAN supra note 365; CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON, THE CIVIL LAW IN
SPAIN AND SPANISH AMERICA 75 (2003) (In medieval times, “the history of Rome, and above all,
the study of its laws and practices” was the favorite subject “of the wise men of Europe and its
schools.”).
386. WHEATON, supra note 214, at 32–33.
387. Parrow, supra note 257, at 54.
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E. Later Byzantine and Rhodian Law
The Roman Byzantine Empire survived for nearly a millennium after
the publication of the Corpus Juris. New laws created by the Byzantines
continued to guarantee the right of self-defense.388
The rulers of the island of Rhodes, in the eastern Mediterranean Sea,
promulgated the first true international legal code. The Rhodian Law, the
earliest maritime code,389 was put into its final form between AD 600 and
800.390 The Rhodian Law extended far beyond the boundaries of the
island of Rhodes, and was the widely accepted international law for the
thriving maritime trade of the eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes, having
once been ruled by the unified Roman Empire, and then by the
Byzantines, incorporated many principles of Byzantine law into the
Rhodian Law.
Notably, the Rhodian Law also addressed personal self-defense:
Sailors are fighting and A strikes B with a stone or log; B returns the
blow; he did it from necessity. Even if A dies, if it is proved that he gave
the first blow whether with a stone or log or axe, B, who struck and
killed him, is to go harmless; for A suffered what he wished to inflict.391
F. Islamic Law
During the period when the Rhodian Law was being established as
the first true international legal code, a new transnational legal system
was being created: Islamic law. While Shari’a law is the only law in
several countries, it is also broadly influential in many more, where its
values play an important role in the legal codes, and it is cited in
constitutions as a source of law.392
388. WALTER ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LAW lxxxvi (The Lawbook Exchange 2001).
389. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 9. Earlier versions had been incorporated into the Roman legal
code by the time of the Emperors Tiberius and Hadrian. Id.
390. ASHBURNER, supra note 388, at lxxv.
391. ASHBURNER, supra note 388, at 84.
392. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN art. 2 (“Islam shall be the religion of
the State; Islamic Sharia a main source of legislation.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT art. 2 (“Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.”); QANUNI ASSASSI
JUMHURI’I ISLA’MAI IRAN [Constitution] 1358 [1980], pmbl. (“judicial system on the basis of
Islamic justice, manned by just judges, well acquainted with the exact rules of the Islamic code.”);
CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ch. 6 (creating a judicial system of civil
courts Shari’a courts, and religious courts for communities of non-Muslims, based on their
particular religion); KUWAIT CONSTITUTION art. 2 (“Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of
legislation.”); CONSTITUTION ch. 7, part I, § E, ¶¶ 260–64, part II, § B, ¶¶ 275–79 (Nigeria) (creating
Shari’a courts of appeal in one federal territory and in several states); PERMANENT CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF QATAR art. 1 (“Shari’a law shall be a main source of its legislations.”); SAUDI
ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 8 (“in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art
3 (“Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation.”); YEMEN CONSTITUTION art. 3 (“Islamic
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While there are several distinct schools of Islamic law, all Islamic
law agrees that self-defense, including defense of property, is lawful.
According to a modern scholar’s summary of Islamic criminal law:
There is a natural right to self-defense. One may defend oneself from
a criminal act that poses an imminent threat to person or property, but
only necessary force may be used. An intruder who might be repelled
with a stick may not be shot and killed; neither may one pursue an
intruder who has retreated and is no longer a threat. Violation of the
limits of self-defense is aggression and renders one criminally liable.393
The nineteenth century Islamic jurist ‘Ulaysh wrote that all jurists
have always agreed that Muslims have the right to defend their life and
their property. From this undisputed right, ‘Ulaysh argued that the selfdefense right includes resistance to a government which is destroying
Muslim lives or property. The people who resist such a government are
not rebels; rather, it is the wrongdoing government that is in rebellion.394
The right of resistance is affirmed in Universal Islamic Declaration
on Human Rights.395 This document was proclaimed at UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization),
adding a United Nations imprimatur to the right of resistance “by all
available means” against the suppression of the “inalienable right to
freedom.”

jurisprudence is the main source of legislation.”).
393. MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI, ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 56 (1988).
394. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION & VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 334–35 (2001).
‘Ulaysh was making a point which was also made in England in the seventeenth century, and in
America in the twentieth:
In the English Bill of Rights dated Feb. 13, 1688 . . . [a]nother complaint was
that of “causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed and
employed contrary to law.” If we are to erect this complaint against disarming
part of the people into a general principle, it must be that in order to maintain
freedom we must keep alive both the spirit and the means of resistance to
government whenever “government is in rebellion against the people,” that
being a phrase of the time. This of course included the right to advocate the
timeliness and right of resistance.
THEODORE SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 105–06 (1916) (Schroeder was a founder of
the Free Speech League, the first group in American history to defend the rights of all speakers on
all subjects, based on the principles of the First Amendment). See also MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND
PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM, 12–13, 69, 78 (2006) (explaining that Khawārij legal thought
emphasized democracy, social contract theory, and the right of revolution against a tyrant, while
other Islamic schools of thought argued for obedience even to tyrants).
395. Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights, 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401, art. 2 (Sept. 19
1981), available at http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html (emphasis added).
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G. Canon Law
Just as Islamic law became established as a law applied across
national boundaries, so did the Canon law established by the Roman
Catholic Church. Canon law was closely intertwined with Roman law.
“The church lives by Roman law” (ecclesia vivit lege Romana) was the
saying, for the law of the Roman Catholic Church entwined itself with
Roman law in order to incorporate ancient Rome’s principles of justice,
and in order to share in the esteem in which ancient Rome was
universally held.396
In the medieval Christian world, Canon law became the foundation
for international law.
For centuries the great offices of state, especially those having to do
with foreign relations, were held by bishops learned in canon law, and, as
canon law was based upon Roman law and especially adapted to the
government of the Church whose jurisdiction was not bounded by state
lines, it naturally suggested many of the rules that have found a place in
international law.397
“Unquestionably the most powerful influence that was exerted upon
the science of international law during its formative period was that of
the Roman Church.” 398 Canon law was “found to be applicable to the
decision of a great variety of controversies, ranging in importance from
the disputes of private individuals to the adjustment of difficulties of
serious international concern.”399
As with Islamic law and Jewish law, we will not, in this Article,
attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of Catholic Canon law. We
will simply point to the foundational text of Canon law, the Decretum,
written around 1140 by Gratian, a Professor of Theology at the
University of Bologna.400 The Decretum began: “The human race is ruled
by two things, namely natural law and usages.”401 Gratian explained

396. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 111 (1995); WHEATON, supra note 214,
at 33.
397. New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “International Law,” http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/09073a.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
398. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 13.
399. Id. at 12.
400. New
Advent
Catholic
Encyclopedia,
s.v.
“Corpus
Juris
Canonici,”
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04391a.htm; New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Johannes
Gratian,” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06730a.htm. The University of Bologna was where, in
the late eleventh century, the Western re-discovery of the Corpus Juris had created such an
intellectual sensation.
401. GRATIAN: TEXT UND IMAGES DER EDITION FRIEDBERGS Pt. 1, D.1 p.1. (1879)
(“uiolentiae per uim repulsion”), available at http://mdz.bib-bvb.de/digbib/gratian/text/
@Generic__BookView;cs=default;ts=default.
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natural law:
Natural law is common to all nations because it exists everywhere
through natural instinct, not because of any enactment.
For example: the union of men and women, the succession and
rearing of children, the common possession of all things, the identical
liberty of all, or the acquisition of things which are taken from the
heavens, earth, or sea, as well as the return of a thing deposited or of
money entrusted to one, and the repelling of violence by force. This, and
everything similar, is never regarded as unjust but is held to be natural
and equitable.402
Later in the Decretum, Gratian explained that war is lawful, but is
allowed only for necessity. Even then, wars must not be fought with
cruelty.403
An especially influential commentary on the Decretum was written
by Joannes Teutonicus sometime in 1211–15, in a work which drew
heavily on Roman law. He distinguished vengeance (injuring someone
when there was no longer any danger) from legitimate defense of person
and property against an immediate attack.404
Also foundational in Canon law were the Decretals of Pope Gregory
IX, published in 1234, which continued the consolidating work of the
Decretum, incorporated the commentary by Teutonicus, and affirmed the
legitimacy of self-defense.405 The Canon lawyer Raymond of Pennaforte
(or Peñafort) (ca. 1180–1275)—who wrote Pope Gregory IX’s
Decretals—followed the Corpus Juris self-defense rule: “it is always
lawful to meet force with force.”406
The Decretum (including later commentaries) was the definitive
consolidation, harmonization, and analysis of all church laws since the
time of the apostles. The Decretum was taught in law schools, and until
1917 served as the first volume of the Corpus Juris Canonici, the law of
the Roman Catholic Church.
The principles articulated by the Decretum and the Decretals were
developed in sophisticated detail by the Scholastics, including the
402. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at Pt. 1 D.1 p.2c.7. For the original Latin text, see
http://mdz.bib-bvb.de/digbib/gratian/text/@Generic__BookView;cs=default;ts=default (“uiolentiae
per uim repulsion”).
403. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at Pt. 2, D. 23; see also Nys, supra note 95, at 58.
404. Parrow, supra note 257, at 30 (citing FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 131–32 (Walter Ullman ed., Cambridge University Press 1975)).
405. The Latin Library at Ad Fontes Academy, Decretals of Gregory IX (1234), V.12.18,
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/gregdecretals5.html (citing Dat. Viterbii Kal. Iul. Pont. nostr. Ao.
XII. 1209).
406. RAYMOND OF PENNAFORTE, SUMMA, vol. 2, ch. 5, § 18, quoted in M. H. KEEN, THE
LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 67 (Routledge & Kegan Press 1965). Raymond was so
influential that, centuries later, his works were a primary text in universities.

122

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

“universal doctor,” Thomas Aquinas, in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. Aquinas and the other scholastics affirmed the right of selfdefense against lone criminals and against tyrants, and used the
principles of legitimate personal defense to build a theory of just war and
limits on the conduct of warfare.407 As discussed supra, the Spaniards of
the School of Salamanca in the sixteenth and seventeenth century,
including Victoria and Suárez, were known as the “Second Scholastics,”
and their humanitarian scholarship achieved the apogee of
Scholasticism.408
The Reformation removed Canon law as an authority in a large
fraction of Europe. Roman law, however, remained prestigious and
influential in Protestant nations and in Catholic ones.409
H. Spanish Law
Self-defense has always been well-established in Spanish law. As
part of the Roman Republic, and, later, the Roman Empire, Spain was
part of the Roman law system with its right of self-defense.
The Visigothic kingdom succeeded the Roman Empire as ruler of
Spain, and incorporated self-defense into its own legal code, following
the Roman Twelve Tables.410 Self-defense was considered to be a
“justifiable” form of homicide.411
407. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2d Pt. of the 2d. Pt., questions 42, 64 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed., 1947) (1265–1274), discussed in
Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, supra note 100.
408. See supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.A.5.
409. For example, the Protestant authors discussed in Part IV, such as Gentili, Grotius,
Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Textor, all frequently cited Roman law.
410. THE VISIGOTHIC CODE: (FORUM JUDICUM) 230 (bk. 6, tit. 5, law 19) (S. P. Scott ed.,
Riverdale Press 1910), available at http://libro.uca.edu/vcode/visigoths.htm (if “the parricide was
committed in self-defense[,] the party accused shall be in no danger of his life, and shall be
discharged, without loss of property or subjection to torture; such discrimination being used as is
proper in all cases of homicide.”); see also id. at 222 (bk. 6, tit. 5, law 12), id. at 243 (bk. 7, tit. 2,
law 15) (“If a thief should be killed in the daytime, while defending himself with a sword, no
responsibility shall attach to anyone on account of his death.”); id. at 243 (bk. 7, tit. 2, law 16) (“If a
thief should be surprised at night, and should be killed while he is attempting to remove stolen
property, his death shall under no circumstances be punished.”); id. at 270 (bk. 8, tit. 1, law 13) (“
Where anyone takes the property of another by force, and is wounded, or killed in the act,” there
shall be “no legal responsibility for the same.”).
411. Homicide was justifiable, as has been seen, when committed in self-defense against an
attacking party; in certain cases of trespass vi et armis. . . . Justification could also be
pleaded where a criminal was killed while committing highway robbery, larceny, or
burglary; the latter (furtum nocturnum) being a much more comprehensive term than
ours, and including all kinds of nocturnal depredations. The employment of that popular
American fiction, the “unwritten law,” by means of which so many homicides have been
acquitted, and which appeals so strongly to the primitive sense of retributive justice
which still dominates humanity, was thus openly endorsed by the Visigothic Code.
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The greatest Western scholar during that time was the Spanish
theologian Isidore of Seville (ca. AD 560–636). In Isidore, “Spain found
the writer to express those principles which became the philosophy of
her government” for many centuries to come.412 Gratian’s explanation of
natural law and self-defense was directly quoted from Isidore’s
encyclopedia, the Book of Sentences and Etymologies.413 Isidore is
considered the last of the Western Fathers of the Church, and has been
canonized (officially labeled as a Saint) by the Roman Catholic
Church.414
Following the Moorish conquest of Spain, Shari’a law was imposed
on much of Spain, and of course Shari’a includes the right of selfdefense.415 Pursuant to Shari’a, the Christian and Jewish communities
continued to govern their internal affairs according to their own laws,
including the relevant self-defense provisions.
In the thirteenth century, King Alfonso X of Castile, the Learned,
compiled an extensive legal code known as Las Siete Partidas (The
Seven Divisions), which was strongly influenced by Roman law.416 Las
Siete Partidas is considered one of the proto-sources of international law.
As Spain’s empire grew, Las Siete Partidas grew into a major global
source of law—in Spanish colonies in South America, Central America,
Texas, California, Louisiana, and the Philippines.
One of the best features of Las Siete Partidas was its prohibition on
double jeopardy, a principle that was not entirely original, but which was
expressed by Las Siete Partidas in terms which left little room for
evasion.417
Las Siete Partidas protected the right of defensive homicide:
[F]or it is but natural and proper that every man should have the
power to protect himself from death when anyone seeks to kill him; and
he should not wait for the other to strike him first, because it might
happen that the attacked party would be killed by the first blow which he
received, and afterwards could not defend himself.418
S.P. Scott, Note for Book VI, Title V in THE VISIGOTHIC CODE, supra note 410, at 224 n.1.
412. MARIE R. MADDEN, POLITICAL THEORY AND LAW IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN 19 (The
Lawbook Exchange 2005).
413. GRATIAN, supra note 401, at 142.
414. TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 142.
415. See supra Part V.F; WALTON, supra note 385, at 60–61 (2003) (Islamic law in Spain was
based on the Koran, without local innovation).
416. Id. at 75.
417. The only exception was when the defendant had originally “caused the accusation to be
fraudulently brought,” and, in furtherance of the fraud, had concealed evidence. LAS SIETE
PARTIDAS, 5 UNDERWORLDS: THE DEAD, THE CRIMINAL, AND THE MARGINALIZED 1309 (Div. 7, tit.
1, law 12) (Robert I. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Penn. Press 2001).
418. Id at 1342 (Div. 7, tit. 8, law 2).
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Defensive homicide was also allowed against rape, arson (including
arson of agricultural property), any attempt to take property by force, or
“any one who is well known to be a thief, or any robber who publicly
frequents the highways.”419
Throughout the Middle Ages, Spanish law, legal commentators, and
popular culture authorized resistance to a king who became a tyrant.420
One modern exemplar of the traditional Spanish law principles is the
Argentine Penal Code, which broadly protects self-defense while
specifically authorizing unlimited use of force against home invaders.421
I. Anglo-American Law
The English legal system at its height was the rule of law in a third of
the world, and its international influence is today at least as extensive as
any other contemporary legal system.
The earliest laws of the Anglo-Saxons protected the right of selfdefense.422 The right of self-defense is affirmed by Bracton,423 Matthew
419. Id. at 1342–43 (Div. 7, tit. 8, law 3).
420. MADDEN, supra note 412, at 115–18, 167–69 (citing, inter alia, the Valencia constitution
of June 1340).
421. CÓD. PEN. § 34:
The following are not criminally liable:
...
6. Anyone acting in defense of his person or rights under the following
circumstances:
(a) unlawful aggression,
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or avert
aggression,
(c) absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender
Any person who at nighttime repels another who climbs or breaks fences,
walls or entrances to his dwelling or an inhabited part thereof, or of the
curtilage, regardless of the extent of harm caused to the aggressor, shall be
deemed to be in compliance with these circumstances. The same provision is
applicable to any person who acts against a resisting stranger found in the
home.
THE ARGENTINE PENAL CODE 2004, at 11–12 (2004) (English translation).
422. Laws of King Ine,, law 16 in ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 49
(Benjamin Thorpe ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1840) (whoever slays a thief must swear an
oath that the thief was slain while offending). Ine was the King of Wessex from 688 to 726, and is
most-remembered for his legal code. Other similar laws: Laws of King Withraed (reigned 690–725),
laws 25–26, in ANCIENT LAWS 19 (no need to pay blood money for the slaying of thief caught in the
act; reward of seven shillings for slaying a thief); Laws of King Alfred (King of Wessex, reigned
871–901), laws 21, 25, in ANCIENT LAWS 21, 23 (no punishment for self-defense killing; no
punishment for slaying a night-time burglar).
423. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET COVSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ, bk. III, 155, 36, cited in SCOTT,
supra note 351; Also FLETA, COMMENTARIUS JURIS ANGLICANÆ, bk. I, XXIII, 14.
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Hale,424 Edward Coke,425 and by statute.426 The law in Scotland was
similar.427 And so were the laws of Wales, which included laws
prohibiting the disarming of a man.428 These laws supported the duty of
citizens in England (and in France, under Norman law) to arrest
criminals at the scene of the crime, and to pursue fleeing criminals, upon
the “hue and cry” (or haro in French).429 It was also a crime to disarm a
man.430
From at least 1330 onward, English law recognized an absolute
justification for the killing of home invaders. Against a home invader,
424. MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Historia Placitorum
Corone) 487–88 (The Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1736).
425. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 8.
426. Stat. 24, Hen. VIII, ch. 5 (1532–33) (stating that defensive killings of robbers, murderers,
and nocturnal burglars are not crimes).
427. SCOTT, supra note 351, n.1 available at http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps01_1.htm
(citing JOHN BURNETT, A TREATISE ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND
57 (1811)).
It is lawful to kill a Thief, who in the night offers to break our Houses, or steal
our Goods, even though he defend not himself, because we know not but he
designs against our Life; and Murder may be easily committed upon us in the
night, but it is not lawful to kill a Thief who steals in the day time, except he
resist us when we offer to take him, and present him to Justice.
Id.; see also GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF SCOTLAND IN MATTERS CRIMINAL,
110–16 (The Lawbook Exchange 2005) (1678); DAVID HUME, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 217–29 (3d ed. 1729) (“The right to kill” includes defense of self
and others against felony attacks, including rape, forcible robbery or invasion of property, night-time
home burglary, daytime burglary when lesser force will not suffice, and arson).
428. THE ANCIENT LAWS OF CAMBRIA (William Probert trans., The Lawbook Exchange 2005)
(1823). “The paraphernalia denotes clothes, arms, and the implements of the privileged arts; for
without these a man is deprived of his just station in society; and it is not right for the law to unman
a citizen, or to prevent him from practising the arts.” Id. at 23. “There are three native rights
belonging to every free born Cambrian, whether male or female. . .Second, the privilege of carrying
defensive arms and armorial bearings, which are not allowed to any one except a free born Cambrian
of unquestionable nobility.” Id. at 33. “There are three persons who ought to be kept from arms: a
captive, a child under fourteen years of age, and an idiot . . . .” Id. at 51. “There are three reasons for
deposing arms, so that they may not be held naked in the hand: [at a religious meeting, in courts or
other government meetings, and] the guest in his lodging.” Id. at 52. “But none are allowed to have
arms except the free born Cambrian, or the bondman upon the third of his lineal descendants, so that
they may guard against treachery and concealed murder.” Triad 222, at 79.
429. Parrow, supra note 257, at 17 (citing, inter alia, HIPPOLYTE PISSARD, LE CLAMER DE
HARO DANS LE DROIT NORMAND 95–101 (1911); Laws of King Aethelstan (reigned 924–939),
Judicia Civitatis Londoniae, §§ 4–5, in ANCIENT LAWS 98–99; Laws of King Cnut (a/k/a Canute the
Great; Danish King who ruled England 1017–1035), law 29 in ANCIENT LAWS 168 (financial penalty
for anyone who finds a thief but does not raise the hue and cry, or who fails to assist the hue and
cry). The hue and cry was still in use in 1735. 1 HALE supra note 424, at 494 (ch. 41, § 6); 2 HALE
supra note 424 at 98–104 (ch. 12) (detailing the procedures for the hue and cry). In addition, citizens
had the authority to arrest felons in many circumstances, and the killing of a felon during arrest was,
if unavoidable, considered “justifiable.” Id. at 72–82 (ch. 10).
430. Laws of King Cnut (1017–1035), law 61 in ANCIENT LAWS 175 (“If any one unlawfully
disarms a man, let him compensate with his ‘heals-fang’ [a financial penalty].”).
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English law had no requirement for proportionality, or for use of lesser
force when possible. A home invasion was considered such a grave
threat to society that the slaying of the invader was regarded as a very
positive social good.431
Again, Frey’s assertion that self-defense is always an excuse, rather
than justification,432 is simply incorrect.
Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 specifically guaranteed the right of subjects to possess
arms for personal defense.433
William Blackstone’s Commentaries is the most influential legal
treatise ever written in English, with enormous authority in every nation
which has adopted the common law. In detailing the common law’s
protection of human rights, Blackstone first set forth the three primary
rights: personal security, personal liberty, and private property.434
Blackstone then turned to the auxiliary rights—such as the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances—which protect the
primary rights:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at
present mention, is that of having arms for their defence
suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed
by law . . . and it is indeed a public allowance under due
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.435

So according to Blackstone, humans have “the natural right of
resistance and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.” Blackstone
also upheld self-defense against ordinary criminals.436

431. David Caplan & Susan Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal
Code, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1080 (2005) (also noting that Glanville’s earlier restrictive statements
about self-defense were clearly not followed after 1330 for cases involving the home).
432. See infra text at Part VI.F.4.
433. “That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to
their Conditions and as allowed by Law.” English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
Catholics, who constituted about two percent of the population, were excluded from the formal right,
because they were considered potentially subversive, but in practice they were allowed to own and
carry personal defensive arms. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS
OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 118–26 (1994).
434. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *142.
435. Id. at *143.
436. Id. at 4 COMMENTARIES *1–3, *176, *183–85.
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The historical English common law is incorporated as part of the
legal system almost everywhere among England’s former colonies.437 In
Fiji, the rights based on the English common law are specifically
protected by the Constitution.438 Just as many English kings infringed, or
sometimes completely ignored, the rights guaranteed in the Magna
Carta,439 many of the rights guaranteed by the common law and by the
English Bill of Rights have been ill-treated by modern governments in
the common law system.440 The same could be said regarding how many
nations have treated modern human rights treaties.441
Regarding human rights treaties, the common approach of human
rights advocates is not to despairingly pronounce that the treaties are
irrelevant because they are often honored only in the breach; rather,
human rights activists strive for the meaningful implementation of the
treaties. Similarly, for the human rights which are protected by the
common law and by the English Bill of Rights (and those rights
protected by Shari’a, or other modern legal systems), human rights
advocates, when seeking to discover the state of international human
rights, would recognize and respect the rights which are stated in
principle, even while acknowledging that the rights are too often violated
in practice.
Currently, the most influential nation within the Anglo-American
legal system, and internationally, is the United States. The United States
Constitution includes the Second Amendment, which does not explicitly
437. For the post-Blackstone common law, which was fully in accord with Blackstone, see,
e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 201 (New American ed., from 3d
English ed. 1894); ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed., Foundation Press 1969)
(summarizing the views of Bishop, Stephens, and other authorities); Caplan & WimmershoffCaplan, supra note 431 (summarizing English and American views up to and including the twentieth
century).
438. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE FIJI ISLANDS § 43 (“The specification in this
Chapter of rights and freedoms is not to be construed as denying or limiting other rights and
freedoms recognised or conferred by common law . . . .”).
439. The Magna Carta guarantees a right of armed resistance to a tyrannical king, with
resistance to be led by the barons. See Magna Carta art. 61 (1215); DAVID I. CAPLAN & SUE
WIMMERSHOFF-CAPLAN, 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 371–72 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., ABC-CLIO 2002).
440. For example, the English Bill of Rights forbids fines without trial. Yet the Blair
government has created a procedure by which a policeman can decide to impose an on-the-spot fine
on an alleged offender. See Q&A: On-the Spot Fines, BBC NEWS, Aug. 12, 2002; Spot Fine Britain,
BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2006 (“This week we look at a developing area of the law which empowers
police, or your local council, to declare you guilty without going before a judge.”); see generally
Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition in
England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399, 438–47 (1999)
(describing erosion of freedom of speech and of the press, tremendous shrinkage of the right to jury
trial, and destruction of the right to grand jury indictment).
441. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1940 (2002) (“[N]oncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common.”).
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mention personal self-defense; but until the early twentieth century, the
Amendment was (except by one judge in Arkansas) unanimously
construed to include the right of individuals to possess arms for personal
defense.442 The Amendment became more controversial in the twentieth
century, but the overwhelming number of Supreme Court cases which
have mentioned the Second Amendment, including all of the cases in
recent decades, treat the Second Amendment as an individual right,
although usually doing so in dicta.443
Thirty-seven American state constitutions include the explicit right
of personal self-defense; sometimes the self-defense is stated in
conjunction with an arms right and sometimes stated independently.444
442. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1359 (1998). Explaining the Second Amendment, St. George Tucker, the leading constitutional
scholar of the Early Republic, began: “This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. . . .
The right of self-defence is the first law of nature . . . .” ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. at 300 (Lawbook
Exch. 1996) (1803).
443. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding the
Washington, D.C., handgun ban and ban on any use of a firearm for self-defense to be violations of
the Second Amendment and summarizing the current status of the circuit split); David B. Kopel, The
Supreme Court’s Thirty-five Other Second Amendment Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99
(1999) (reviewing Supreme Court cases).
444. See ALA. CONST. § 26 (“That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself
and the state.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 26. (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in
defense of himself or the state shall not be impaired . . . .”); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § (“All men . . .
have certain inherent and inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty . . . .”), id. art. 2, § 5 (“The citizens of this state shall have the right to keep and bear
arms, for their common defense.”); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All
persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . .”), id. art. 2, § 13 (“The right of no
person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question . . . .”); CONN. CONST. § 15
(“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); DEL. CONST. pmbl.
(“Through Divine goodness, all people have by nature the rights . . . of enjoying and defending life
and liberty . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art 1, § 2 (“All natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among
which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty . . . .”), id. art 1, § 8a (“The right of the
people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall
not be infringed . . . .”); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inalienable rights,
among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . .”); IND. CONST. 32. (“The people shall
have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.”); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1
(“All men and women . . . have . . . inalienable rights . . . of enjoying and defending life . . . .”);
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and
security . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 1 Bill of Rights (“All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have
certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: The right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties. . . . The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying
concealed weapons.”); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life . . . .”); MASS. CONST. art.
1 (“All men . . . have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights . . . enjoying and defending
their lives . . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the
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J. A Universal Human Right
Modern international law is the product of millennia of legal
development, and has grown from the soil of many great legal systems. It
would be easy to identify many important differences among the legal
defense of himself and the state.”); MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 12 (“The right of every citizen to keep and
bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto
legally summoned, shall not be called in question . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (“That the right of
every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully
summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (“All
persons . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . and the rights of . . . defending their lives . . . .”), id.
art. 2, § 12 (“The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and
property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in
question . . . .”); NEB. CONST. art 1, (“All persons have certain inherent and inalienable rights;
among these are life . . . and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family,
home, and others . . . .”); NEV. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All men have certain inalienable rights among
which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”), id. art. 1, § 11 (“Every citizen has the right to keep and
bear arms for security and defense . . . .”); N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art 2. (“All men have certain
natural, essential, and inherent rights. . . . All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense
of themselves, their families, their property and the state.”); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All persons . . .
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of . . . defending life . . . .”);
N.M. CONST. art. 2 § 4 (“All persons . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among
which are the rights of . . . defending life . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 “all persons are . . . with
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All
individuals . . . have certain inalienable rights . . . defending life . . . to keep and bear arms for the
defense of their person, family, property, and the state . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men are,
by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their
defense and security . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms
in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally
summoned, shall never be prohibited . . . .”); PA. CONST. § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 21 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (“All men . . .
have certain inherent rights . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 6, § 24 (“The right of the citizens to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.”); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 23
(“Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the
State . . . .”); UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties . . . .”); id. art. 1, § 6 (“The individual right of the people to keep and
bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other
lawful purposes shall not be infringed . . . .”); VT. CONST. art. 1 (“That all persons . . . have certain
natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which are . . . defending life . . . .”); id. art. 16
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State . . . .”);
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or
the state, shall not be impaired . . . .”); W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22 (“A person has the right to keep
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (“The
people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense . . . .”); WYO. CONST., art. 1, § 24
(“The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.”).
Some states which do not have a self-defense clause but do have a right to arms clause have
specifically interpreted the arms right to include self-defense. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; State v.
Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 692 P.2d 610 (1984) (state constitutional right to arms includes arms which
are useful for personal defense); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I.
2004); TENN. CONST. art I, § 26; Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 165 (1871) (right protects
personal possession and use of arms “which will properly train and render him efficient in defense of
his own liberties . . . .”).
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systems of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic law, or among the laws of
Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Spain, and the Anglo-American nations.
Notably, the self-defense principles of every one of these great legal
systems are remarkably similar; their distinctions consist, at most, of
details, while there is universal agreement on the core issues. As the
twentieth-century American legal scholar Herbert Wechsler observed,
laws regarding self-defense reflect the “universal judgment that there is
no social interest in preserving the lives of the aggressors at the cost of
those of their victims.”445
If any principle of international human rights law can be discerned
from the universal agreement of major legal systems, it is the right of
self-defense.
Frey’s narrow interpretation claims that there is no right to selfdefense because it is not specifically enumerated in enough
contemporary treaties to satisfy her. Yet the survey of the jurists and the
world’s legal systems shows that the right of self-defense has always
been an essential part of international law, and has always been a
principle of all major legal systems.
Frey, while briefly acknowledging that self-defense has been widely
recognized, argues that self-defense is not “expressly” declared to be a
“right.”446 Frey is doubly wrong. First of all, the Statute of the
International Court of Justice instructs its international law judges to be
guided by “general principles.” There is no requirement in the Rome
statute for Frey’s “Mother may I?” tenet that a general principle must be
“expressly” stated as a “right.” Moreover, many of the major legal
systems have expressly described self-defense as a “right.”447
VI. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SYSTEMS
In Part VI, we first examine contemporary international treaties.
Next, we examine current state practice, as demonstrated by statutes and
constitutions. Finally, we address Frey’s inaccurate claim that selfdefense is always regarded as an excuse rather than a justification.

445. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 701, 736 (1937).
446. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 20–21.
447. See supra Part V.C–I (describing Roman law, Islamic law, Canon law, Anglo-American
law as having expressly described self-defense as a right).
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A. Modern Human Rights Treaties
Frey states that self-defense is only mentioned in a single
international human rights treaty. First of all, most international human
rights treaties deal with very particular subjects (e.g., torture,448
discrimination,449 and cultural rights450) in which it would be unexpected
to enumerate a general human right of self-defense. There are really only
a few “general” international law human rights treaties, and of these,
most do incorporate self-defense in one form or another. Only the
American Convention on Human Rights says nothing directly about selfdefense.451
As the commentators discussed above made very clear, the right of
collective self-defense against tyranny is simply the right of personal
defense writ large. The right of collective self-defense against tyranny
(such as colonial oppression) is part of the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights.452 It is likewise implicitly part of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.453 The European Convention on
Human Rights states:
448. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
449. E.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 1995; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Cf. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, GA Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/45/49s (Dec. 18, 1990).
450. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (explaining rights to participate in cultural life, economic rights
such as right to work and right to form trade unions, and social rights such as right to old-age
pensions).
451. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
452. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 20, available at
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199259113/resources/cases/ch02/1981_african_chpr.pdf. The
Article states:
1. All peoples . . . have the unquestionable and inalienable right to selfdetermination . . . .
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from
the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the
international community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States Parties to the
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it
political, economic or cultural.
Id.
453. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art. 1(1) (“All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status.”). The same language appears in the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, supra note 450, art. 1(1).
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Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape
of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a
riot or insurrection.454

Frey asserts that deadly force may be used in self-defense only as a
last resort against a deadly threat.455 However, the European Convention
takes a contrary view, contemplating the use of deadly force for defense
against “unlawful violence”—such as attempted rape, mayhem, or
robbery.456
In the European Convention, self-defense is not stated as a “right,”
notes Frey. This is a fair point. If we had no international resources other
than the European Convention, Frey would be correct in stating that
international law does not “expressly” include a “right” of self-defense.
For the moment, let us leave aside the many sources of international
law which do include an express right, and which Frey has failed to
acknowledge. Even then, a right of self-defense is a necessary
implication of all modern international human rights treaties.
The European Convention does not explicitly state that there is a
right to breathable air, to food, to sleep, or to clean drinking water. By
Frey’s artificially narrow reading then, there would be no violation of the
Convention if a European government forbade breathing, eating,
drinking, or sleeping—or even if the government took affirmative steps
to make it impossible for citizens to breathe, eat, drink, or sleep.
Yet, obviously, a person cannot survive if he cannot breathe, eat,
drink, or sleep. Accordingly, a government depriving people of the
ability to breath, eat, drink, or sleep would be in violation of the right to
life, which is explicitly guaranteed in the European Convention, and in
the other broad modern treaties.

454. European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 2 [hereinafter European
Convention].
455. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9, ¶ 21.
456. European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2.
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Similarly, if a government forbade a person to defend her own life
from a deadly attack, the government would violate the right to life.
Forbidding self-defense against rape or robbery would also violate other
rights which are included in the human rights treaties.457
Of course, if a government set up a program that provided everyone
with sufficient food, then a government might, theoretically, forbid the
private cultivation of food, and the prohibition would not necessarily
violate the right to life. Similarly, a government that provided full-time,
effective protection to every citizen might, theoretically, be able to
abolish self-defense without violating the right to life. On the other hand,
if the government forbade the private cultivation of food, and if the
government supplied only enough food for some people to survive, and
other people died of starvation, then the government would be culpable
of violating the right to life.
The analogy to self-defense is straightforward. If a government
forbids self-defense, and simultaneously provides sufficient police
protection to protect only some of the people some of the time, and some
undefended people are killed by criminals, then the government is guilty
of violating the right to life.
Accordingly, even if one accepts Frey’s claim that self-defense is not
a right in itself, self-defense is a necessary corollary to the right to life
(and the right to property, and the right not to be maimed or raped), and
government may abolish self-defense if, and only if, government
provides citizens with complete security. To state the obvious, no
government in the world is currently capable of providing the necessary
replacement for the right of self-defense.458 No government has sufficient
police forces to protect everyone all the time; the existence of violent
criminal attacks, some of them deadly, even in wealthy nations which are
relatively safe by global standards, proves that abrogation of the
unenumerated right to self-defense would be a direct breach of the
enumerated right to life.
457. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 312, art. 5(1) (“Every person has
the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.”); id. art. 7(1) (“Every person
has the right to personal liberty and security.”); id. art. 21(1) (“Everyone has the right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of
society.”); European Convention, supra note 454, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); id. art. 5(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person.”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 311, art. 3 (“Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”); id. art. 17(1) (“Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others.”); id. art. 17(2) (“No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art.
7 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”); id. art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”).
458. In a few very tranquil nations, such as Japan and Taiwan, the government comes fairly
close, mainly because there is so little (non-organized) violent crime in the first place.
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B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Another important contemporary international law source in which
the right to self-defense is recognized is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (hereinafter Universal Declaration), adopted by the
United Nations in 1948.459 The Universal Declaration is not a binding
legal treaty, but rather a statement of principles.460
The Universal Declaration’s Preamble clearly recognizes the right of
people to defend themselves against tyranny, with force if necessary:
“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse,
as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
rights should be protected by the rule of law . . . .”461 The principle of a
right of resistance is reinforced by Article 8 of the Universal Declaration:
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy.”462
The principle of the Preamble is congruent with Vattel’s statement
that armed resistance to an absolute ruler “ought to be attempted only in
cases of extremity, when the public miseries are raised to such a height
that the people may say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel beno mutatri,
that it is better to expose themselves to a civil war than to endure
them.”463
The Preamble likewise parallels Blackstone’s statement that the
primary purpose of the right to arms was “the natural right of resistance
and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”464
459. The Universal Declaration was most of all the work of Eleanor Roosevelt, America’s first
Ambassador to the United Nations. Mrs. Roosevelt, incidentally, began carrying a handgun for
protection in 1933, and continued to do so for the rest of her life, including when she traveled alone
to dangerous parts of the American South, in order to speak out for civil rights. See Dave Kopel,
Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Her Own Bodyguard, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel012402.shtml.
To ensure continued U.N. attention to Human Rights, the United Nations Human Commission on
Human Rights was created. Eleanor Roosevelt served as the first Chair of the Commission, from
1946 to 1950. She used her chairmanship to lead the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly created the “Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” which, after being ratified by a sufficient number of
nations, became international law in 1951.
460. Ambassador Roosevelt explained that the entire Declaration is “not a treaty” and “does
not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligations.” 19 Dept. of State Bull. 751 (1948); see
also Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004).
461. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 311, pmbl.
462. Id. art. 8.
463. VATTEL, supra note 262, at 19 (bk. 1, ch. 4, § 51). Vattel noted that when there were
checks on the prince’s power, such as a senate or parliament, it was much easier to redress
grievances without causing “violent shocks.” Id. The Tacitus quotation, which Vattel slightly
misphrased, is miserman pacem vel bello mutari (exchanging agreeably an unhappy peace for war).
TACITUS, ANNALS (bk. 3, § 44).
464. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 434, at *143.
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Tellingly, Frey does not address the international law implications of
the Universal Declaration’s recognition of a pre-existing right of people
to use force as a last resort against tyranny.465
C. The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression
The Universal Declaration’s principle about the legitimacy of selfdefense against tyranny is reinforced by the UN General Assembly’s
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression:
Nothing in this definition . . . could in any way prejudice the
right to self-determination, freedom and independence . . .
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other
forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support.466

The General Assembly resolution is especially concerned with
“peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination.”467 Yet significantly, the resolution is not limited to
situations of racism, colonialism, or foreign domination. To the contrary,
the language of the resolution applies to all places in which a
government violates the right of “self-determination” or “freedom” or
“independence.” Almost any dictatorship that prohibits fair elections
violates the people’s right to “self-determination.” Likewise, almost
every dictatorship violates the right of “freedom.”
D. The United Nations Charter
Article 51 of United Nations Charter affirms “the inherent right” of
self-defense.468 Frey accurately states that Article 51 is directly
concerned with the defense of states, and not of individuals.469 We agree.
465. Instead, she cites Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra note 58, and in a parenthetical
summarizes the article’s point about the Universal Declaration, but she never addresses the
argument. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9 n.14.
466. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 7 (Dec.
14, 1974), reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 704 (5th ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2003). General Assembly resolutions do not create binding international law.
467. Id.
468. U.N. Charter art 51. See also General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928,
94 L.N.R.S. 57; H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States,
22 AM. J. INT’L L. 105, 109–13 (1928) (describing formal notes exchanged between the signatories,
reserving the right to self-defense).
469. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 13, ¶ 39 (“Article 51 was not intended to apply to
situations of self-defence for individual persons.”)
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However, what Frey elides is that the right of national self-defense is
the child of the right of personal self-defense—as we detailed supra.470
Notably, the UN Charter does not purport to grant states a right of selfdefense. The charter simply recognizes an “inherent” right. In the French
text of the UN charter, it is a “droit naturel”, which means natural right
or natural law. As Yoram Dinstein observes, “The choice of words has
overtones of jus naturale, which appears to be the fount of the right to
self-defense.”471 (Jus naturale is Latin for “natural law”; as discussed
above, jus naturale included a strong right of personal defense.)472
Given the UN Charter’s choice of language which explicitly invoked
natural right, it was not surprising that the International Court of Justice
wrote: “The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only
meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of selfdefense . . . .”473
Elucidating Article 51, Dinstein writes:
The legal notion of self-defence has its roots in inter-personal
relations, and is sanctified in domestic legal systems since
time immemorial. From the dawn of international law, writers
sought to apply this concept to inter-State relations,
particularly in connection with the just war doctrine.474

If one explicitly recognizes the existence of the child, then one can
scarcely deny the implication that a parent exists. “I admit that there was
a person named Martin Luther King, Jr., but I deny the existence of
Martin Luther King, Sr.” The previous sentence is illogical—and so is
Frey’s claim that the explicit recognition of the natural, inherent right of
national self-defense in Article 51 can be reconciled with the denial of
the natural, inherent right of personal self-defense.

470. See supra Parts III.C–V.
471. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 179. Dinstein goes on to reject the overtone, because he
rejects the whole concept of natural law, for reasons detailed supra note 308.
472. See supra Part IV.
473. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
474. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 176; see also M. A. Weightman, Self-Defense in International
Law, 37 VIR. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1102 (1951).

43]

THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

137

E. Contemporary Constitutions and Statutes
1. Personal self-defense
The International Court of Justice is instructed to use as a source of
law “the general principles” from the laws of “civilized nations.”475
Without arguing about what nations currently count as “uncivilized,” we
note that personal self-defense is part of the law of every legal system in
the world today.476 In addition, many nations have constitutionalized
self-defense, in a variety of forms.
Before surveying the constitutions, we must acknowledge that
around the world, many constitutional rights are honored only in the
breach. For example, the constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees the right
of free assembly477 but all forms of dissent are ruthlessly suppressed. In
2007, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was badly beaten by the
government.478 In Kenya, the constitution is clear: “No person shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a
court . . . .”479 However, in 2007 shoot-to-kill orders were issued to
police who executed the orders with a series of extrajudicial killings.480
Even so, the expression of a standard in a national constitution is a signal
of the importance of that standard in the national and international
community, such that even governments which do not obey the standard
feel compelled to assert that they do.481
475. Stat. of the I.C.J. supra note 64.
476. See Schlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced
Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999 (2005) (“the right to self-defense is recognized in all
jurisdictions”).
477. THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE ch. III, art. 21(1) (“[N]o person shall be hindered in
his freedom of assembly and association . . . and in particular to form or belong to political
parties . . . .”).
478. See Tsvangirai Held in Intensive Care, BBC News, Mar. 14, 2007 (concerning breach of
Zimbabwe’s guarantees “Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is being treated in an
intensive care unit as doctors examine wounds he received in police custody . . . . He and dozens of
other activists were arrested at a rally on Sunday.”)
479. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA ch. 5, art. 71(1).
480. See Cyrus Ombati, Govt Burns 8,000 Guns As Minister Orders Police to Kill Thugs, THE
EAST AFRICAN STANDARD (Nairobi), Mar. 16, 2007. (Internal Security minister John Michuki
stated: “An illegal weapon in the hands of a criminal has no other purpose except to kill an innocent
person. It is, therefore, justifiable for the law enforcers to take equal measure against such a
person.”).
481. “Hypocrisy is a form of homage that vice pays to virtue.” FRANÇOIS DE LA
ROCHEFOUCAULD, COLLECTED MAXIMS AND OTHER REFLECTIONS 63 (E.H. Blackmore, A.M.
Blackmore & Francine Giguère, trans., Oxford Univ. Pr. 2007) (incorporating the 1678 5th edition
of Rochefoucauld’s Réflexions ou Sentences et Maximes morales). “If a State acts in a way prima
facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.”
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There are fifteen nations which use nearly-identical language to
constitutionalize self-defense: Antigua & Barbuda,482 the Bahamas,483
Barbados,484 Belize,485 Cyprus,486 Grenada,487 Guyana,488 Jamaica,489
Malta,490 Nigeria,491 Samoa,492 St. Kitts & Nevis,493 Saint Lucia,494 Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines,495 and Zimbabwe.496 Another country,
Slovakia,497 uses a variation of the formula.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 473, at 98.
482. THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA & BARBUDA art. 4.
483. THE BAHAMAS CONSTITUTION art. 16.
484. CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS art. 12.
485. CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE art. 4.
486. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS art. 7.
487. THE GRENADA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1973 art 2.
488. THE CONSTITUTION OF GUYANA art. 138.
489. THE JAMAICA ORDER IN COUNCIL [Constitution] art. 14.
490. CONSTITUTION OF MALTA § 33.
491. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA art. 33.
492. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA art. 5.
493. THE CONSTITUTION OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS art. 4.
494. CONSTITUTION OF ST. LUCIA art. 2.
495. THE ST. VINCENT CONSTITUTION ORDER 1979 art. 2.
496. THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE art. 12:
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of
the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been
convicted.
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in
contravention of subsection (1) if he dies as the result of the use, to such
extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case
(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained;
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or of
dispersing an unlawful gathering; or
(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or
if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.
(3) It shall be sufficient justification for the purposes of subsection (2) in any
case to which that subsection applies if it is shown that the force used did not
exceed that which might lawfully have been used in the circumstances of that
case under the law in force immediately before the appointed day.
497. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 15:
(1) Everyone has the right to life. Human life is worthy of protection even
before birth.
(2) No one shall be deprived of life.
(3) The death penalty shall be inadmissible.
(4) No infringement of rights according to this Article shall occur if a person
has been deprived of life in connection with an action not defined as unlawful
under the law.
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One more nation, the United Kingdom, has, in a more limited sense,
put similar language into its supreme law. The U.K. has no written
constitution, but the U.K.’s Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the
European Convention on Human Rights, and makes it pre-eminent over
any conflicting national statute.498 The Human Rights Act thereby
incorporates the European Convention’s language on self-defense; the
incorporation complements the English Bill of Rights provision that
subjects have the right to possess arms “suitable for their defence.”499
The language in the seventeen constitutions (eighteen, if we count
the U.K.) is similar to the language of the European Convention on
Human Rights on self-defense.500 Although Frey asserts that use of lethal
force for self-defense is permissible only against a deadly peril, the
European Convention—and fourteen of the sixteen national
constitutions—specifically legitimize deadly force used in defense
against “violence” or in “defense of property.” These constitutions
declare that when a person dies as a result of such self-defense, his right
to life was not violated.
In the next section, we will address Frey’s theory that the European
Convention language requires that self-defense be considered an excuse
rather than a justification. Her theory would necessarily apply to the
nearly-identical language in all the national constitutions. The Zimbabwe
constitution explicitly contradicts her theory. That constitution contains a
“right to life” article very similar to that of the European Convention.
The Zimbabwe constitution also specifically states (in a clause making
the constitutional self-defense provision retroactively applicable) that
self-defense is a “justification.”
Regarding the European Convention, Frey made the plausible
argument that the language (in which self-defense is enumerated as one
of the exceptions to the right to life) could be construed as not granting a
right of self-defense.501 On the other hand, the European Convention and
national constitutions are also consistent with the interpretation that the
constitution-writers carefully enumerated the exceptions on the right to
life so as not to interfere with the pre-existing right of self-defense.
It would not be surprising that some constitution-writers would
decide that nothing more regarding self-defense was needed, because
(until very recently), the right itself has hardly been questioned. In
contrast, many governments have pervasively violated the right to
freedom of expression, and so the need to make an especially firm
498.
499.
500.
501.

Human Rights Act 1998, 42 U.S.C. ch. 22 (1998).
See supra text accompanying note 433.
See supra text accompanying note 454.
See supra Part VI.A.
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statement about the right of free expression in a constitution is
understandable.
While many tyrannical governments have adopted censorship rules
which restricted the entire population, there are few, if any, historical
examples of governments prohibiting self-defense for the entire
population. There are many examples of particular groups in a society
being restricted in self-defense (e.g., Blacks in Jim Crow America being
deprived of defensive arms;502 Jews in medieval Europe being deprived
of arms;503 disarmed commoners in feudal Japan being forbidden to
defend themselves when attacked by an aristocrat;504 Jews and Christians
in Muslim countries being forbidden to possess arms and to defend
themselves from attacks by Muslims.505). But all of these deprivations of
the right of self-defense were based on some form of class, racial, or
religious discrimination. There were never broadly applicable bans on
self-defense per se. Even in feudal Japan, a commoner who was attacked
by another commoner could defend himself, as could a Muslim who was
attacked by another Muslim in nineteenth-century Algeria. The right to

502. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEORGETOWN L.J. 309 (1990); Robert J. Cottrol and
Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms
Regulation and Racial Disparity-the Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence? 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995).
503. DAVID NIRENBERG, COMMUNITIES OF VIOLENCE: PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 146, 221 (1996). Cf. VISIGOTHIC CODE, supra note 410, bk. 12, tit. 2, law 15 (“XV.
All Christians are Forbidden to Defend or Protect a Jew, by Either Force or Favor. . . . No one shall
attempt, under any pretext, to defend such persons in the continuance of their depravity, even should
they be under his patronage. No one, for any reason, or in any manner, shall attempt by word or
deed, to aid or protect such persons, either openly or secretly, in their opposition to the Holy Faith
and the Christian religion.”).
504. GORDON WARNER & DONN F. DRAEGER, JAPANESE SWORDSMANSHIP: TECHNIQUE AND
PRACTICE 68–69 (1982); DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 30 (1992) (describing
how the peasantry was disarmed by the central government. The inferior status of the peasantry
having been affirmed by civil disarmament, the Samurai enjoyed kiri-sute gomen, permission to kill
and depart. Any disrespectful member of the lower class could be executed by a Samurai’s sword).
505. See A.S. TRITTON, THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS: A CRITICAL STUDY
OF THE COVENANT OF ‘UMAR 5–9 (F. Cass) (1970) (describing the standard formulation from the
Covenant of ‘Umar, which traditionally was said to have been a seventh-century treaty between the
Caliph Umar I and Syrian Christians. Although the true historical origins of the Covenant are
unclear, the Covenant was universally accepted by Muslim legal scholars as setting forth the basic
standards for Christian rule over conquered monotheists. The Covenant requires that the conquered
people agree “not to ride on saddles; not to keep arms nor put them in our houses nor to wear
swords . . . he who strikes a Muslim has forfeited his rights.”); see also BAT YE’OR, MIRIAM
COCHAN & DAVID LITTMAN, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, 56 MIDDLE EAST
J. 733 (2002); BAT YE’OR, THE DECLINE OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY UNDER ISLAM: FROM JIHAD TO
DHIMMITUDE (1996); BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (1985); David
B. Kopel, Dhimmitude and Disarmament, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. (forthcoming 2008). In
practice, conquered Jews and Christians were often left unprotected by Muslim governments, and
were forbidden to resist violence perpetrated by Muslim criminals or bullies.
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self-defense, like the right to sleep, or the right to breast-feed infants,
was itself never in doubt; accordingly, self-defense, like sleeping and
breast-feeding, was not necessarily a right that needed protection by
being constitutionally enumerated as a right. Even so, more than a dozen
national constitutions, with lawyerly caution, did explicitly ensure that
the right to life was not misconstrued so as to forbid self-defense.
Two national constitutions include an explicit right to armed selfdefense which is coupled with an explicit arms right. These are Haiti
(“[e]very citizen has the right to armed self defense, within the bounds of
his domicile . . . .”),506 and Mexico (arms for legitimate defense in the
home).507 The United States and Guatemala508 constitutions have a right
to arms, although the right is not expressly tied to personal self-defense.
(As noted supra, many American state constitutions do have an express
right of self-defense, which is sometimes, but not always, tied to an arms
right.)509 Two other countries constitutionally enumerate a right of selfdefense without specific reference to arms: Honduras (“the right of
defense is inviolable”)510 and Peru.511
506. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI art. 268-1 (“Every citizen has the right to
armed self defense, within the bounds of his domicile, but has no right to bear arms without express
well-founded authorization from the Chief of Police.”).
507. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [Constitution], as
amended, art. 10 Dario Oficiale de la Federación [D.O], 5 de Febero de 1917 (Mex.) (“Los
habitantes de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos tienen derecho a poseer armas en su domicilio, para su
seguridad y legítima defensa, con excepción de las prohibidas por la Ley Federal y de las reservadas
para el uso exclusivo del Ejército, Armada, Fuerza Aérea y Guardia Nacional. La ley federal
determinará los casos, condiciones, requisitos y lugares en que se podrá autorizar a los habitantes la
portación de armas.”) (The inhabitants of the United States of Mexico have the right to possess arms
in their domiciles, for security and legitimate defense, with the exception of the prohibitions by
federal law and the reservations for exclusive use of the military, army, air force, and national guard.
Federal law will determination the cases, conditions, requirements, and place under which the
inhabitants will be authorized to carry arms.)
508. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 38 (“Tenencia y portación de armas. Se reconoce el
derecho de tenencia de armas de uso personal, no prohibidas por la ley, en el lugar de habitación. No
habrá obligación de entregarlas, salvo en los casos que fuera ordenado por el juez competente. Se
reconoce el derecho de portación de armas, regulado por la ley.”) ( Possession and carrying of arms.
The right of possession of arms for personal use is recognized, not prohibited by the law, in the
home. There will be obligation no to surrender them, save in cases that are ordered by a competent
judge. The right of carrying of arms is recognized, and regulated by the law.).
509. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
510. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982, art. 82.
511. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2 (“Toda persona tiene derecho: . . . § 23. A la
legítima defensa.”) (Every person has the right: . . . § 23 [t]o legitimate defense.). The Peruvian
constitution also contemplates the possession, carrying, and use of non-military firearms by the
public, in accordance with the law. Id. art. 175 (“Sólo las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional
pueden poseer y usar armas de guerra. Todas las que existen, así como las que se fabriquen o se
introduzcan en el país pasan a ser propiedad del Estado sin proceso ni indemnización. . . . La ley
reglamenta la fabricación, el comercio, la posesión y el uso, por los particulares, de armas distintas
de las de guerra.”) (Only the Armed Forces and the National Police can possess and use military
arms. All those that exist, as well as those that are made or they are introduced in the country,
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To these countries which directly mention personal self-defense in
their constitutions we might also add the nations which constitutionally
base their law, in whole or in part, on Islamic law; as discussed supra,
Shari’a considers self-defense to be a right (albeit not when practiced by
non-Muslims against Muslims).512 Accordingly, the constitutionalization
of Shari’a serves, indirectly, to constitutionalize self-defense.
2. Self-defense against tyranny
As Grotius, Pufendorf, and many other legal and moral philosophers
have elaborated, self-defense against tyranny is just a larger application
of self-defense against a lone criminal. Many nations have
constitutionalized the right of self-defense against tyrants. In five
countries, the constitutionalization is framed as a constitutional intention
to assist the liberation of other nations from tyranny: Algeria,513
Angola,514 Cuba,515 Portugal,516 and Suriname.517
In thirteen nations, the constitution affirms a right and duty of
citizens to resist or revolt against domestic or foreign tyranny:
Andorra,518
Argentina,519
Congo,520
Greece,521
Guatemala,522
523
524
525
526
527
Honduras, Hungary, Lithuania, Mauritania, Peru, Portugal,528
become property of the State with neither process nor indemnification. . . . The law regulates the
manufacture, the commerce, the possession and the use, by the individuals, of arms different from
the military ones.”).
512. See supra text accompanying notes 393–95.
513. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA art. 27 and 33.
514. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA art. 16.
515. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA DE 1976 art. 12.
516. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 7(3) (“Portugal recognizes the right
of peoples to revolt against all forms of oppression, . . . .”).
517. CONSTITUTION OF SURINAME art. 7.
518. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 5 (incorporating the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The Universal Declaration affirms the right of violent
resistance to tyranny (see supra text accompanying notes 311), so the incorporation of the Universal
Declaration into a national constitution thereby incorporates the rightfulness of resisting tyranny.
519. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARGENTINE NATION § 36 (“This Constitution shall rule even when
its observance is interrupted by acts of force against the institutional order and the democratic
system. These acts shall be irreparably null . . . Those who, . . . . were to assume the powers foreseen
for the authorities of this Constitution . . . . shall be punished . . . . and shall be civil and criminally
liable for their acts. . . . All citizens shall have the right to oppose resistance to those committing the
acts of force stated in this section . . . .”).
520. CONGO CONSTITUTION art. 17.
521. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN] [Constitution] art. 120(4) (Greece) (“Observance of the
Constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to
resist by all possible means against anyone who attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution.”).
522. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 45.
523. CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982 art. 3 (“Nadie debe
obediencia a un gobierno usurpador ni a quienes asuman funciones o empleos públicos por la fuerza
de las armas o usando medios o procedimientos que quebranten o desconozcan lo que esta
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Romania,529 and Slovakia.530
3. Security against home invasion
Finally, a very common item in constitutions that include a Bill of
Rights is the right to security against home invasion. Sometimes—as in
the United States’ Fourth Amendment—the right is stated in terms that
apply only to home invasions by the government.531 Very frequently,
however, the right is stated in terms that are not limited to government
actors. 532 For example, Afghanistan’s constitution insists, “no one,
Constitución y las leyes establecen. Los actos verificados por tales autoridades son nulos. el pueblo
tiene derecho a recurrir a la insurrección en defensa del orden constitucional.”) (Nobody owes
obedience to an usurping government nor to those who assume functions or public powers by the
force of arms or by uses or procedures that violate or are unknown this Constitution and the
established laws. The acts proclaimed by such authorities are null. The people have the right to resort
to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order.”).
524. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 2(3) (Hung.) (“No activity
of any person may be directed at the forcible acquisition or exercise of public power, nor at the
exclusive possession of such power. Everyone has the right and obligation to resist such activities in
such ways as permitted by law.”).
525. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA art. 3.
526. MAURITANIA CONSTITUTION pmbl. (incorporating the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, and thereforce incorporating by
implication the right of resistance contained in those documents. See supra text accompanying notes
452 and 461.)
527. CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DEL PERU art. 46 (similar to Honduras Constitution, supra note
523).
528. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 21 (“Everyone has the right to resist
any order that infringes his rights, freedoms, or safeguards and to repel by force any form of
aggression when recourse to public authority is impossible . . . .”). See also id., at art. 16(2)
(Portuguese constitution shall be construed “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of human
rights”; as discussed supra note 461, the Universal Declaration recognizes the right of violent selfdefense against tyranny.
529. CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 20 (incorporating right of resistance articulated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). See supra text accompanying notes 461.
530. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 32 (“The citizens shall have the right to
resist anyone who would abolish the democratic order of human rights and freedoms set in this
Constitution,”).
531. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
532. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 38.1–2 (“Other than the situations and
methods indicated in the law, no one, including the state, are allowed to enter or inspect a private
residence without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE
PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA art. 14 (“No one shall enter a dwelling or any other premises against the
will of the owner or without a warrant, except in case of flagrant delicto.”); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA art. 44 (“The State shall guarantee the inviolability of the
home . . . .”); THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ch. 2(3)(c) (“protection for his family
life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property . . . .”); THE (FIRST)
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA art. 21 (“It is prohibited to enter a person’s dwelling
against his or her own will except under cases prescribed by law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC art. 33.1–2 (“With the exception of cases specified by Law or Court no one
shall be authorized to enter the Apartment against the will of the Resident.”); THE BAHAMAS
CONSTITUTION ch. 3.15(c) (“protection for the privacy of his home and other property . . . .”);
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS art. 29 (“No person shall have the right, save in due
course of law to enter the premises or other legal property of a citizen against one’s will.”); BELGIUM
CONSTITUTION art. 15 (“The domicile is inviolable; no visit to the individual’s residence can take
place except in the cases provided for by law and in the form prescribed by law.”); CONSTITUTION
OF BELIZE art. II.9.1 (“Except with his own consent, a person shall not be subjected to the search of
his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); CONSTITUTION DE LA
REPUBLIQUE DU BENIN art. 20 (“Le domicile est inviolable. Il ne peut y être effectué de visites
domiciliaires ou de perquisitions que dans les formes et conditions prévues par la loi.”) (The
domicile is inviolable. There may be no inspections or searches except according to the forms and
conditions envisaged by the law.); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA art. 21
(“Toda casa es un asilo inviolable; de noche no se podrá entrar en ella sin consentimiento del que la
habita y de día sólo se franqueará la entrada a requisición escrita y motivada de autoridad
competente, salvo el caso de delito ‘in fraganti’.”) (Every house is an inviolable asylum; at night, no
one may enter without the consent of the inhabitants, and by day only by written authorization of a
competant authority or in case of flagrante delicto.”); CONSTITUICÃO FEDERAL art. 5 (Braz.) (“La
casa es asilo inviolable del individuo, no pudiendo penetrar nadie en ella sin el consentimiento del
morador, salvo en caso de flagrante delito o desastre, o para prestar socorro, o, durante el dia, por
determinacion judicial”) (The home is the inviolable asylum of the individual; it is forbidden to
enter except with the consent of those who live there, in case of a crime detetected in the act, a
disaster, or to give aid, according to a judicial determination.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF BULGARIA
art. 33.2 (“(2) Entering a residence or staying in it without the consent of its occupant or without the
permission of the judicial authority may be allowed only for the purpose of preventing an imminent
crime or a crime in progress, for the capture of a criminal, or in extreme necessity.”); CONSTITUTION
DU BURKINA FASO art. 6 (“La demeure, le domicile, la vie privée et familiale, le secret de la
correspondance de toute personne sont inviolables.”) (“[T]he residence, the domicle, the private and
family life, the secrecy of the correspondence of every person are inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION DE
BURUNDI art. 23 (“Nul ne peut faire l’objet d’immixtion arbitraire dans sa vie privée, sa famille, son
domicile ou sa correspondance . . . . Il ne peut être ordonné de perquisitions ou de visites
domiciliaires que dans les formes et les conditions prévues par la loi.”) (No one can be the subject of
arbitrary interference his private life, his family, his residence or hiss correspondence. . . . There may
not be orders for searches or home inspections except by the forms and the conditions envisaged by
the law.); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA art. 40 (“The rights to privacy of
residence . . . shall be guaranteed.”); XIAN FA art. 39 (1982) (P.R.C.) (“Unlawful search of, or
intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited.”); CONGO CONSTITUTION art. 29 (“Le domicile est
inviolable. Il ne peut y être effectué de visite ou de perquisition que dans les formes et les conditions
prévues par la loi.”) (The home is inviolable. There may not be inspections or searches except
according to the forms and conditions envisaged by the law.); CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA
REPUBLICA DE CUBA DE 1976 art. 56 (“Nobody can enter the home of another against his will,
except in those cases foreseen by law.”); CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
DE 2002 art. 8.3 (“La inviolabilidad de domicilio. Ninguna visita domiciliaria puede verificarse sino
en los casos previstos por la ley y con las formalidades que ella prescribe.”) (Inviolability of the
home. No domiciliary inspection can be legitimate but in the cases anticipated by the law and with
the formalities that it prescribes.); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 44
(“Homes shall have their sanctity and they may not be entered or inspected except by a causal
judicial warrant prescribed by the law.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL
SALVADOR DE 1983 art. 20 (“La morada es inviolable y sólo podrá ingresarse a ella por
consentimiento de la persona que la habita, por mandato judicial, por flagrante delito o peligro
inminente de su perpetración, o por grave riesgo de las personas.”) (The dwelling is inviolable and it
will only be able to be entered by consent of the person who inhabits it, by judicial mandate, in case
of a flagrant crime or imminent danger of its perpetration, or of serious risk to the people.); ERITREA
CONSTITUTION art. 18(2) (“No person shall be subjected to unlawful search, including his home or
other property”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA art. 33 (“No one’s dwelling . . . shall
be forcibly entered or searched, except in the cases and pursuant to procedure provided by law.”);
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 26.1 (“Everyone
has . . . the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property.”); GRUNDGESETZ
FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Constitution] art. 13.1 (F.R.G.) (“The home is
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inviolable.”); THE GRENADA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1973 ch. 1.7 (“Except with his own consent, no
person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his
premises.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 23 (Guat.); THE CONSTITUTION OF GUYANA art. 40.1(c)
(“protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without
compensation.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982, art. 99 (“El
domicilio es inviolable. Ningún ingreso o registro podrá verificarse sin consentimiento de la persona
que lo habita o resolución de autoridad competente.”) (The domicile is inviolable. No entrance or
registry will be able to be authorized without consent of the person who inhabits it or resolution of
competent authority.); XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [Constitution] art. 29 (H.K.) (“Arbitrary or unlawful
search of, or intrusion into, a resident’s home or other premises shall be prohibited.”);
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 22 (“The dignity, life, property, rights,
residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law.”); IRISH
CONSTITUTION art. 40.5 (“The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly
entered save in accordance with law.”); CONST. art. 14 (Italy) (“No one’s domicile may be inspected,
searched, or seized save in cases and in the manner laid down by law”); THE JAMAICA ORDER IN
COUNCIL 1962 [Constitution] art. 19.1 (“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subject to
the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN art. 10 (“Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not
be entered except in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.”); KUWAIT
CONSTITUTION art. 38 (“Places of residence shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the
permission of their occupants except in the circumstances and manner specified by law.”);
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA art. 96 (“Everyone has the right to inviolability of a
private life, place of residence and correspondence.”); THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION art. 14 (“The
citizen’s place of residence is inviolable. No one may enter it except in the circumstances and
manners prescribed by law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA art. 16 (“No person shall
be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”); LIBYA CONSTITUTION art. 12 (“The home is inviolable
and shall not be entered or searched except under the circumstances and conditions defined by the
law.”); CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG art. 15 (“No domiciliary visit may be made except in cases
and according to the procedure laid down by the law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
MACEDONIA art. 26.1 (“The inviolability of the home is guaranteed.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR art. 13.1 (“Everyone shall be assured of protection of his person, his
residence, and his correspondence.”); MONGOLIA CONSTITUTION art. 16.13 (“Privacy of citizens,
their families, correspondence, and homes are protected by law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM
OF NEPAL art. 22 (“Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document,
correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA
REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA art. 26 (“Toda persona tiene derecho: 1. A su vida privada y la de su
familia. 2. A la inviolabilidad de su domicilio, su correspondencia y sus comunicaciones de todo
tipo.”) (Every person has the right: 1. To his private life and that of his family. 2. To the
inviolabilidity of his domicile, his correspondence and his communications of all types.);
CONSTITUTION art. 37 (Nig.) (“The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone
conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.”); THE WHITE
BOOK I. THE BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [Constitution] art. 27 (“Dwellings are
inviolable and it is not permitted to enter them without the permission . . . except in the
circumstances specified by the Law”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA art.
26 (“El domicilio o residencia son inviolables.”) (The domicile or residence are inviolable.);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 33 (Para.) (“La intimidad personal y familiar, así como el respeto a la
vida privada, son inviolables.”) (Personal and familiar privacy, as well as respect to private, are
inviolable.); id. art. 34 (“Todo recinto privado es inviolable.”) (Every private enclsure is inviolable.);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2.9 (“A la inviolabilidad del domicilio.”) (To the
inviolability of the domicide.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA art. 34 (“The
individual’s home and the privacy of his correspondence and other means of private communication
are inviolable . . . .”); QATAR CONSTITUTION art. 37 (“The sanctity of human privacy shall be
inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of
residence . . . may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein.”);
CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 27.1 (“No one shall enter or remain in the domicile or residence of
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including the state, is allowed to enter or inspect a private residence
without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order.”533 The
Slovak constitution combines two principles often stated in other
constitutions: “A person’s home is inviolable. It must not be entered
without the resident’s consent.”534 Zimbabwe’s constitution tends to be
careful about making exceptions to general rules, so the Zimbabwe text
is “Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no
person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the
entry by others on his premises.”535
Thus, it would be accurate to say to a burglar in Afghanistan,
Slovakia, or Zimbabwe, and in many other countries: “You are violating

a person without his consent.”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF] [Constitution]
art. 25 (Russ.) (“No one shall have the right to penetrate the home against the will of those residing
in it unless in cases provided for by the federal law or upon the decision of the court.”); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 22 (“A person’s home is inviolable.”); THE
CONSTITUTION OF SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS art. 9.1 (St. Kitts & Nevis) (“Except with his
own consent, a person shall not be subject to the search of his person or his property or the entry by
others on his premises.”); CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA art. 7.1 (same as St. Kitts); THE SAINT
VINCENT CONSTITUTION ORDER 1979 art. 7.1 (same as St. Kitts); CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK
REPUBLIC art. 21.1 (“Entrance without consent of the person residing therein is not permitted.”);
SAUDI ARABIA CONSTITUTION art. 37 (“The home is sacrosanct and shall not be entered without the
permission of the owner or be searched except in cases specified by statutes.”); CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA art. 16 (“All citizens are free from intrusion into their place of
residence.”); SPAIN CONSTITUTION art. 18.2 (“The home is inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION OF
SURINAME art. 17.1 (“Everyone has a right to respect of his privacy, his family life, his home”);
BUNDESVERFASSUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [BV] [Constitution] art. 13.1
(Switz.) (“Every person has the right to receive respect for their private and family life, home, and
secrecy of the mails and telecommunications.”); SYRIA CONSTITUTION art. 31 (“Homes are
inviolable.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND § 35 (“The entry into a dwelling place
without consent of its possessor or the search thereof shall not be made except by virtue of the
law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO art. 4(c) (“the right of the
individual to respect for his private and family life.”); TUNISIA CONSTITUTION art. 9 (“The
inviolability of the home and the secrecy of correspondence are guaranteed, save in exceptional
cases established by the law.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY art. 21.1 (“The
domicile of an individual shall not be violated.”); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA art. 11
(Uru.) (“El hogar es un sagrado inviolable. De noche nadie podrá entrar en él sin consentimiento de
su jefe, y de día, sólo de orden expresa de Juez competente, por escrito y en los casos determinados
por la ley.”) (The home is an inviolable asylum. At night nobody may enter without consent of the
head of the house, and by day, only by express order of a competent judge, in writing and according
to cases determined by the law.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
art. 47 (“El hogar doméstico y todo recinto privado de persona son inviolables.”) (The domestic
home and all private personal enclosures are inviolable.); CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM art. 73.1–2 (“No one is allowed to enter the another person’s home without
the latter’s consent, unless otherwise [authorized] by the law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
ZAMBIA art. 17.1 (“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his
person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE
art. 17.1 (“Except with his own consent . . . no person shall be subjected to the search of his person
or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”).
533. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 38.1–2.
534. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 21.1.
535. CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE art. 17.1.
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my constitutional rights.” While preventing government intrusions is a
prime objective of the home security provisions, the language articulates
a broader and more fundamental principle of the right to be secure
against any home invader.
It is plausible to infer that the explicit right against home invasion
includes the implicit, derivative right to take steps to prevent or halt a
home invasion—such as the right to put locks on one’s door or windows.
In the common law, there is a strong connection between the right of
home security and the right to defend the home. As discussed supra, the
English common law specially protected, as a justification, the use of
deadly force against home invaders.536 The saying that “a man’s home is
his castle”—a well-established element of popular understanding of
practical rights—comes from a famous English case, and affirms the
right of even the poorest peasant to bar his home to anyone, including,
but not limited, to the king.537 It is not a coincidence that American laws
that protect self-defense rights often style themselves as “Castle
Doctrine” laws.
David Caplan has shown how the common law connection between
self-defense and home defense influenced the American constitution, so
that the Second, Third, and Fourth amendments are placed next to each
other partly because they comprise a cluster of home security
protections.538 The Third Amendment ensures that a family cannot be
forced to allow an armed ruffian into the home.539 The Fourth
Amendment guards the home against irregular intrusions, or intrusions
not supported by probable cause. The Second Amendment ensures that
citizens will have the practical means to stop (and deter) home invasions.
On a global level, we need not resolve the issue of firearms in the
home in order to conclude that the worldwide principle of the sanctity of
the home against violent intrusions reinforces, and is an especially
privileged place for the exercise of, the right of self-defense.

536. See supra text accompanying notes 431, 433–35.
537. Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1603) (That the house of
everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense against injury and violence as for
his repose.); T. 14 Hen. VII (1499) reported in 21 Henry VII 39 pl. 50 (K.B. 1506) (But a man’s
house is his castle and his defense, and where he has an absolute right to stay.) (Original text in Law
French; translations by Kopel).
538. Caplan & Caplan, supra note 431 at 1075; David I. Caplan, The Right to Have Arms and
Use Deadly Force Under the Second and Third Amendments, 2 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y. 165
(1989).
539. At the time of the Third Amendment, the enlisted soldiers in standing armies such as
those of Great Britain and France tended to be drawn from the dregs of society. Forced enlistment in
the army was often the soldier’s only alternative to avoid a prison sentence or execution for a serious
crime.
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F. Frey’s Theory that Self-defense Violates the Aggressor’s Rights
The statute of the International Court of Justice states that the
opinions of leading legal scholars are a source of international law. Frey
does not even address the opinions of the leading scholars, because she
claims that they are not “primary” sources. Yet she inconsistently cites
other scholars when it suits her purpose.540 The Rome statute tells judges
to look to the general principles of law of civilized nations; when we
look at the laws of the nations of the world—from the ancient democracy
of Athens, to the young democracies of Eastern Europe, to the Spanishand Roman-influenced laws of the New World, to the Islamic law of the
Old World—we find that self-defense is a universal right. Indeed, it
would be difficult to find any legal rule that is more universal than selfdefense.
Frey acknowledges the universality in passing,541 but attempts to
make it disappear with a rhetorical sleight of hand:
Self-defence is a widely recognized, yet legally proscribed,
exception to the universal duty to respect the right to life of
others. Self-defence is a basis for exemption from criminal
responsibility that can be raised by any State agent or nonState actor. Self-defence is sometimes designated as a “right”.
There is inadequate legal support for such an interpretation.542

Frey’s paragraph contains a host of errors. She claims “there is
inadequate legal support” to call self-defense a “right.”543 As we have
detailed supra, self-defense is explicitly described as a “right” by the
Corpus Juris, Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Vattel, Burlamaqui,
Martens, and Bowyer, and by numerous legal systems, past and present,
all over the world.
Frey proposes an alternative theory. In support of her theory, she
cites two treaties. It does not seem that Frey is consistent in her standards
about how much legal authority is needed to be “adequate.”
As is turns out, the first treaty actually says directly the opposite of
540. For Frey’s interpretation of “primary sources,” see text accompanying notes 316–18.
541. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9, ¶ 22 (“Self-defence is broadly recognized in customary
international law as a defence to criminal responsibility as shown by State practice. There is not
evidence however that States have enacted self-defence as a freestanding right under their domestic
laws, nor is there evidence of opinio juris that would compel States to recognize an independent,
supervening right to self-defence that they must enforce in the context of their domestic jurisdictions
as a supervening right.”).
542. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 20.
543. Id.
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what Frey claims. For the second treaty, Frey erroneously quotes the
section on duress, rather than the section on self-defense.
1. The European Convention on Human Rights
Frey asserts that “[s]elf-defence is more properly characterized as a
means of protecting the right to life and, as such, a basis for avoiding
responsibility for violating the rights of another.”544
This argument fails as soon as one reads the source on which Frey
bases her theory: the European Convention on Human Rights. According
to Frey, when the victim of attempted murder kills the perpetrator in
lawful self-defense, the victim must seek “a basis for avoiding
responsibility for violating the rights of another.” In other words, the
victim “violat[ed] the rights of another,” namely the criminal who was
trying to murder the victim.
But the European Convention makes it clear that there was no
“violation” of the criminal’s rights; because the criminal was attempting
to commit a murder, the would-be murderer had no “right to life” against
the intended victim: “Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as
inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of
force . . . .” such as self-defense.545 Similarly, the national constitutions
which contain analogues to the European Convention’s right to life and
self-defense articles also explicitly state that the criminal who is killed by
a victim acting in lawful self-defense was not deprived of the right to
life: “A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life
in contravention of this section if he dies as the result of [lawful selfdefense] of person or property.”546
Simply put, Frey’s main source for her theory that self-defense is not
a right states directly the opposite of what she says.
Further, although Frey repeatedly claims that deadly force is lawful
only when used to prevent a homicide, the European Convention
authorizes deadly force when necessary against “unlawful violence.”547
2. The Statute of the International Criminal Court
Frey also cites a trial court from a former Yugoslavian tribunal in
which a defendant raised a self-defense claim. The trial court stated that
self-defense “form[s] part of the general principles of criminal law which
544.
545.
546.
547.

Id.
European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 500.
See European Convention, supra note 454, art. 2.
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the International Tribunal must take into account in deciding the cases
before it.”548 The court then said that self-defense was protected by the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.549
Frey writes:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia noted “that the ‘principle of self-defence’
enshrined in article 31, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court ‘reflects provisions found in most
national criminal codes and may be regarded as constituting a
rule of customary international law’”. As the chapeau of
article 31 makes clear, self-defence is identified as one of the
“grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.” The legal
defence defined in article 31, paragraph (d) is for:
conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting
from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent
serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and
the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat,
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater
harm than the one sought to be avoided.
Thus, international criminal law designates self-defence
as a rule to be followed to determine criminal liability, and not
as an independent right which States are required to enforce.550

This is a difficult argument to take seriously. The statutory language
quoted by Frey is not about self-defense; it is about duress, as the
statutory text plainly states. The self-defense part of the statute, unquoted
by Frey, appears in the preceding subsection.551
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (“I.C.C. Statute”)
makes self-defense an exemption from criminal responsibility. From this
fact, Frey deduces that self-defense is not “an independent right which
States are required to enforce.”552
To state the obvious, the I.C.C. Statute does not name any
548. Kordić & Ćerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, § 449 (Feb. 26, 2001).
549. Id. § 450.
550. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 23 (endnote markers omitted). “Chapeau” here means the
first sentence of Article 31, which applies to all the various subsections of Article 31.
551. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy,
A/CONF.183/9* art. 31(c) (self-defense) & (d) (duress) (July 17, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf [hereinafter I.C.C. Statute].
552. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 23.
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“independent right which States are required to enforce.” The I.C.C.
Statute does not purport to be a bill of rights. It is a statute that sets up a
criminal court for certain heinous offenses and provides rules of
procedure for the operation of that court. The only rights mentioned in
the I.C.C. Statute are various procedural rights of suspects and
defendants in the court itself.553
The mere fact that the Rome Statute (and national criminal codes)
specifies self-defense as an exception to the rule against killing (and
against injuring or hitting) is no contradiction of the numerous
international law sources, which characterize self-defense as a right.
After all, every legally justified form of violence (e.g., a state employee
carrying out a capital sentence) is necessarily an exception to the general
rule against killing or assault.
Consider, for example, Barbeyrac, who believed self-defense to be
an absolutely fundamental human right. Barbeyrac also wrote:
Then we must injure no Man, because every one is our Fellow
citizen of the great City of the World. Do the Hands endeavor
to hurt the Feet, or Eyes the Hands? As therefore the Members
of the Body keep a fair Correspondence with one another for
the Preservation of the whole: So Men ought to deal friendly
one with another, because they are born for Society, which
can’t be preserved, unless all the Parts, of which it is
compounded, love one another, and endeavor mutually their
own Preservation.554

Barbeyrac was articulating a general rule against any person harming
any other person. Barbeyrac also vigorously articulated the right of selfdefense. By Frey’s tendentious reasoning, Barbeyrac did not really
553. I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 3–4 (creating the structure of the court, specifying its
rules and procedures, and asserting jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and “[t]he crime of aggression”—the last item pending UN definition of the crime). To be precise,
there are a few stray references in the statute to other rights: depriving people of their rights to a fair
trial is denominated as a war crime under certain circumstances; the anti-slavery clause refers to the
property right of the slave-owner; and there are various references to rights of governments.
554. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 213 n.2 (Barbeyrac note). Pufendorf’s own text made the
same point. A footnote by Pufendorf then quoted the Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca:
It is a sin to injure one’s Country; and therefore to injure a Fellow Subject,
inasmuch as he is a Member of our Country. The Parts ought to be held
sacred, if the whole deserve our Veneration. And likewise the Person of every
Man ought to be inviolable, because every Man is our Fellow Citizen in the
great and universal Society.
Id. at 214 n.a (quoting LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, DE IRE (Of Anger) bk. 2, ch. 31 (41 AD)).
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believe that self-defense was a right, because Barbeyrac considered selfdefense an exception to the general rule against harming people.
Anywhere there is a government that respects the right of selfdefense, the criminal code regarding illegal use of violence will contain
an exemption for people who act in self-defense. Simply because selfdefense functions as an exemption in many criminal codes, Frey asserts
that there is no right to self-defense. That the right is protected, inter alia,
by the structure of a criminal code is hardly proof that the right itself
does not exist.
The exemption does not in itself prove the existence of the right; the
right is proven by affirmative statements of right in constitutions and
codes, treaties, and treatises. It is quite unpersuasive for Frey to dismiss
all these sources as “inadequate.” More than three thousand years of
legal protection for a human right are much more “adequate” than a pair
of plainly erroneous citations to a treaty and a statute.
3. National self-defense in the United Nations Charter
Another way to see the flaw in Frey’s argument is to look at the
United Nations Charter. The Charter imposes a general prohibition on
the interstate use of force.555 Then the Charter makes an exception, in
Article 51, for “the inherent right of self-defense.” In the UN Charter, the
right of self-defense operates solely as an exemption from the broad rule
against force; the Charter does not, in Frey’s formulation, create a “freestanding” right of national self-defense. Frey argues that personal selfdefense constitutes, at most, one of the “circumstances” which must be
taken into account in a criminal prosecution.556 Likewise, some persons
argue that in Article 51, self-defense “connotes only a de facto condition,
rather than a veritable right.”557
However, explains Yoram Dinstein, “since it is conceded that the
State exercising self-defence is ‘exonerated’ from the duty to restrain
from the use of force against the other side (the aggressor), we fail to see
a difference between that and a de jure right.”558
Similarly, Frey’s whole argument is a “purely nominal” exercise. It
amounts, at best, to a distinction without a difference. Her argument
555. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, ¶¶ 3–4 (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
556. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 24.
557. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 178.
558. Id.
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about individual self-defense depends on her careless misreading of a
treaty (which in truth directly contradicts her) and her misquotation of a
statute (which, if properly quoted, provides no support for her argument).
4. Justification, not excuse
The Frey theory is that self-defense, rather than being a right, is
merely “a basis for avoiding responsibility for violating the rights of
another.”559 If Frey were correct, then self-defense would have to be an
excuse; self-defense could not be a justification. Yet the great weight of
international legal authority treats self-defense as a justification, and not
as an excuse.
Under the Frey theory, self-defense should be treated the same as
insanity or duress. For example, if A (who is insane) and B (who is
acting under legally sufficient duress) burn down C’s house, we would
certainly say that C’s property rights have been violated by A and B.
Even so, the criminal justice system might not punish A and B, because
their conduct was excused. Similarly—according to Frey—a court should
take into account the existence of self-defense, as a court should take into
account all “factual, personal, or extenuating circumstances,” such as
“distress or mental capacity” in deciding whether to punish a
defendant.560
Now consider a different situation: a policeman sees a young man
running down the sidewalk, carrying a woman’s purse. Several dozen
yards away, an elderly woman is shouting “Stop, thief!” The policeman
stops the purse-snatcher. He takes the purse from the purse-snatcher, and
returns it to its owner, the elderly woman. Would we say that the pursesnatcher’s property rights were violated? Of course not. The pursesnatcher had no property rights to the purse. The policeman’s actions did
not violate anyone’s rights; rather, the policeman’s actions protected the
woman’s property rights. Therefore, the policeman’s actions were
justified.
According to the Frey theory, self-defense must be an excuse and not
a justification, because self-defense is a violation of the rights of another
person. Self-defense is “a basis for avoiding responsibility for violating
the rights of another.”561
But Frey has no support for her claim that self-defense means
“violating the rights of another.” As discussed supra, the primary source
of authority for her claim, the European Convention on Human Rights,
559. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 9.
560. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 10.
561. Id. ¶ 20.
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clearly says that self-defense by the victim does not result in the violation
of the rights of the aggressor.562
There are three standard distinctions between a justification and an
excuse, and every one of them shows self-defense to be a justification:
Accomplice liability. If you assist an insane person in the
commission of a crime, you will be guilty as an accomplice. If you assist
in self-defense, you will not be guilty of anything.
Permissible self-defense of the “victim.” If an insane person starts
hitting you, you have the legal right to use violence in self-defense. If the
victim of an attempted rape in progress starts hitting her attacker, the
attacker has no legal right to hit back.563
Civil liability. A person who engages in lawful self-defense will owe
no civil damages to the attacker. A person who—acting under the
influence of duress or a mistake—injures another might be excused from
criminal punishment, but could still be civilly liable to the victim.564
The Oxford University Press treatise International Criminal Law is
written by Antonio Cassese, one of the world’s leading experts on the
subject.565 The Frey Report recommends the book as “an authoritative
discussion” of self-defense in international criminal law.566 But—quite
strangely for a Special Rapporteur—Frey does not inform her audience
about the book’s straightforward and very mainstream explanation of
self-defense.
In the chapter on justifications and excuses, Cassese states that selfdefense is a “justification.” He distinguishes self-defense from
“excuses,” such as duress, insanity, or mistake. Cassese cites six cases in
which international law courts “discussed this justification.” Among the
six is the Yugoslavia Tribunal case, which Frey cited as support for her
theory.567 Cassese here is supplying hornbook law, for, as detailed supra,
562. See supra text accompanying notes 544–47.
563. As Pufendorf pointed out, a person who violently attacks another renounces his own right
of self-defense. PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 220 (“He tacitly disclaims this Right, who in a
violent manner sets upon another without just Cause. For since other has a Right of repelling the
Violence by any Means he can, the Assailant is to accuse himself only for any harm he suffers in the
Repulse of his own unlawful Force.”) (emphasis in original). Cf. United States v. Von Weizsaecker
et al. (“the Ministries case”), 14 N.M.T. 314, 329 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949) (in a national context, “there
can be no self-defense against self-defense”); DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 178.
564. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 220–24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
The three distinctions are Cassese’s; the illustrations are ours.
565. Id.
566. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 16 n.13.
567. CASSESE supra note 564, at 223–24 (citing Kordić & Ćerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, §
449 (Feb. 26, 2001); Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp et al., 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NÜRNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, NÜRNBURG, OCTOBER
1946—APRIL 1949, 1327 (1950); Trial of Willi Bernhard Karl Tessmann et al., 5 UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 66, 73 n.1 (1948); Trial
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the world’s legal systems have long treated self-defense as a
justification.568
That self-defense is a justification does not, by itself, prove that selfdefense is a right under international law. By analogy, capital
punishment is also a justification. Yet if a nation abolishes capital
punishment, no one’s international law human rights are violated.
What we can glean from the well-recognized status of self-defense as
a justification is additional evidence that Frey’s anti-rights theory is
wrong. The fact that self-defense is a justification is one more reason
why she was incorrect to announce that “[s]elf-defence is more properly
characterized as a means of protecting the right to life and, as such, a
basis for avoiding responsibility for violating the rights of another.”569
G. Cassese’s Choice: Can You Only Resist Genocide When the
Perpetrators Are of Another Race?
An endnote in the Frey Report cautions:
[T]he legal concepts discussed herein assume a non-conflict
setting. Situations of mass human rights abuse and armed
conflict involve international humanitarian law and security
law principles that require an extended if not completely
separate set of legal and policy considerations. For the Special
Rapporteur’s findings and recommendations regarding role of
small arms and light weapons in violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law in armed conflict, see her
progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37).570

Yet Frey’s cited report on situations of armed conflict and mass
human rights abuses follows the same IANSA/UN agenda as did the
Brazilian gun confiscation referendum which she worked to support:
promote gun confiscation, and ignore every claim that—even in the most
of Yamamoto Chusaburo, 3 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 76 (1948) (self-defense includes protection of property); Frank C. Schultz, 18
C.M.A. 133 (1969); Trial of Erich Weiss and Wilhelm Mundo, 13 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 149 (1949).
568. See supra Part V. We are not claiming that self-defense has never been regarded as an
excuse in any legal system; for example, medieval and Renaissance English and Scottish law did
sometimes (although not always) treat self-defense as an excuse. See supra Part V.I. Frey has
certainly not produced evidence that making self-defense an excuse is the normal practice of past or
present criminal justice systems; rather, she confines her argument to contemporary international
criminal law, in which self-defense is clearly a justification.
569. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 20.
570. Id. at 16 n.13.
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extreme situations of mass human rights violations or genocide—anyone
except a government employee should be allowed to possess a firearm
for protection.571
The very next endnote contains a citation to our own article, “Is
Resisting Genocide a Human Right?” from the Notre Dame Law
Review.572 The article argued that national or international gun control
laws should be considered inapplicable (under the authority of the
Genocide Convention) in situations in which a group which is the victim
of a continuing genocide wants to acquire arms for self-defense.573 Frey
characterizes our legal argument, which we explicitly and repeatedly
confined to situations of genocide, as “negating or substantially
minimizing the duty of States to regulate possession” of firearms.574 It is
hard to see how any state could have a legal “duty” to prevent the flow of
defensive arms to genocide victims. But Frey does not explicitly state
that genocide victims have no right of self-defense.
That declaration is made instead by Cassese. Like the Founders of
international law, Cassese does not attempt to draw an artificial
distinction between the right of defending oneself against a solitary
criminal and the right of defending oneself against a criminal tyrant
whose minions are carrying out genocide. The Founders argued that
everyone has a human right to resist both. Cassese argues that there is no
human right to resist either one; instead, he argues, positive law (in a
national code, or an international instrument) can and sometimes does
authorize resistance, but the scope of the currently-authorized resistance
against tyrants and genocidaires is quite limited:
The right of self-defence under international law governs
relations between states as opposed to groups and individuals.
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and
Statute of the International Court of Justice (UN, 1945) and
corresponding customary international law, states have a right
to defend themselves against an “armed attack” if the UN
Security Council fails to take effective action to stop it.
Rebels, insurgents, and other organized armed groups do not
have a right to use force against governmental authorities,
except in three cases. Liberation movements can use force in
order to resist the forcible denial of self-determination by (1) a
colonial state, (2) an occupying power, or (3) a state refusing a
571.
572.
573.
574.

For Frey’s role in the Brazil referendum, see supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
Frey Report, supra note 48, at 16 n.14.
See Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra, note 58.
Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 19.
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racial group equal access to government. These situations,
however, are not considered ones of “self-defence” under
international law. Individuals who are not organized in groups
have even less scope for the use of force under international
law. Individuals have no legal right to use force to repel armed
violence by oppressive states. This includes governments that
commit acts of genocide or other serious human rights
violations. Nor does international law grant individuals a right
to defend themselves against other individuals. This right is
provided for by states in their national legal systems as each
state determines the conditions under which individuals can
use force for these purposes. It is not surprising that states
have refused to legitimize the resort to armed violence by
individuals given the threat this would pose to their own
authority. International law is made by states and tends to
reflect their interests and concerns. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights nevertheless provides a moral endorsement
of the violent reaction of individuals to political oppression or
other forcible denial of fundamental human rights: “it is
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that
human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” 575

Cassese is an important contemporary scholar of international law,
but his article does not negate all the other scholars, nor can it negate the
many positive enactments which affirm a fundamental right of selfdefense.
Cassese is commendably forthright in expressing the implications of
his theory, and the applications are quite straightforward: the German
Jews had no right of self-defense against Hitler’s genocide (since the
Nazi government was not an “occupying power” and since the Jews were
of the same racial group—Caucasian—as their persecutors, although
they were of different ethnicity and religion). Similarly the Cambodians
had no right to resist the genocide of the native Pol Pot regime (which
was not based on race).
If a government encourages rape (such as by allowing rape charges
to be brought only if there are four male witnesses), the woman has no
inherent right of self-defense against a rapist.

575. Antonio Cassese, The Various Aspects of Self-Defence, Background paper (Small Arms
Survey 2003), excerpted in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004, 10 (2005).
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If a government (such as the government of Rwanda) incites and
directs the genocide of an ethnic group, the victims have no right to resist
as long as the victims are of the same race as the genocidaires.
By Cassese’s theory, the Darfuri victims of genocide, rape, ethnic
cleansing, and other atrocities have a right to resist only if they are of a
different race than their persecutors. The Darfuri victims have very dark
skins, live in Africa, and are often called “Africans.” The genocidaires
have very dark skin, live in Africa, and are Arabs. It is preposterous that
the Darfuris’ collective right to resist genocide—or an individual Darfuri
female refugee’s right to use a cooking knife to fight off a rapist—would
depend on whether the Darfuris are the same or a different race than their
persecutors.
Cassese argues that international law only justifies resistance in
situations of racism, colonialism, or foreign occupation, but he is
adopting an overly narrow reading of the UN General Assembly’s
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. That resolution did endorse
violent resistance to racist, colonial, or foreign regimes; but the plain
language of the resolution also endorsed resistance to any regime which
violates the people’s rights to self-determination, freedom, or
independence.576
The notion that the rights of individuals or groups to resist genocide
depend on the race of the victims and the race of the perpetrators is a
theory unworthy of international law. An international “law” which
blandly denies victims the right to attempt to save their own lives hardly
deserves to be called a “law” at all. Such a “law” amounts to nothing
more than a pretext for the strong to rape and murder the weak. It is
repugnant. It is contrary to civilization itself, and to the entire course of
development of international law.577
Half a millennium ago, systematic international law arose from the
efforts of Victoria to stop the depredations against Indians and Muslims,
576. See supra text accompanying notes 466–67.
577. The French have sometimes referred to the enactments of the pro-Nazi Vichy government
in terms such as “pretend laws” or “decrees said to be law.” See PIERRE LEMIEUX, CONFESSIONS
D’UN COURER DES BOIS HORS-LA-LOI 42 (2001); Les Acquisitions Immobilieres de la Ville de Paris
Entre 1940 et 1944 Sont-Elles le Produit de Spoliations? Rapport établi par le Conseil du Patrimoine
Privé de la Ville de Paris avec le concours de son Groupe d’experts (Nov. 16, 1998), available at
http://www.v1.paris.fr/FR/La_Mairie/executif/communiques/
ancienne_mandature/mandature_1995_2001/patrimoine.ASP (describing certain Vichy laws as “les
Actes dits ‘lois’”, or as “prétendus lois, décrets et arrêtés, règlements ou décisions”). The
appellations of “pretend law” or “said-to-be laws” rightly recognize that purported acts of a
government, even though the acts may follow the standard form of law, may be so manifestly unjust
(as the Vichy laws were) so as not to be real laws. The pretend laws do not merit the presumption of
obedience which is accorded to real laws. Surely any international “law” (or academic interpretation
thereof) which purported to forbid self-defense against genocide, homicide, rape, or tyranny is
pretend law, not a real one.
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and the efforts of Grotius to stop the pillaging of civilians during the
religious wars in Europe. Victoria, Grotius, Suárez, and the many other
humanitarian Founders knew that personal self-defense was “the greatest
of all rights.”578 Indian, Spaniard, or Turk; Catholic, Protestant, Jew or
Muslim—we all share a common humanity. When we recognize that
each and every one of us has an inherent right of self-defense, then we
can begin to reason towards an international system in which people and
nations (that is, large groups of people) who do not understand each
other can find common rules for treating each other fairly.
That was how the Founders reasoned. Cassese bluntly expresses the
alternative: to deny the individual, inherent, and universal right of selfdefense is to eliminate the right to resist genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape,
and every other atrocity.
VII. IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO GUN CONTROL?
A very large body of international law sources affirms that selfdefense is a human right. But Frey has invented standards so rigorous
that she almost never has to admit to the existence of those sources.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice tells us that the
opinions of scholars are sources of international law, but Frey ignores
them, as they are not “primary”579—even though she often cites other
scholars for other points.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice tells us that the
“general principles of law derived . . . from national laws of legal
systems of the world” are sources of international law,580 and we have
seen that self-defense is a part of every major legal system that gave rise
to international law,581 and of every contemporary legal system.582 But
this too does not count for Frey, because she claims statements that selfdefense is a right are not “expressly set forth.”583 Yet there are in fact a
multitude of “express” statements; moreover, the Statute asks for
“general principles,” not “express” statements.584
All the rest of the evidence Frey waves away with the bizarre—and
plainly incorrect—theory that self-defense is a violation of the criminal’s
rights.585
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.

See TIERNEY, supra note 130, at 314.
See supra Part IV.D.
See I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 15.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.
See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 21.
See I.C.C. Statute, supra note 551, at 15.
See supra Part III.D.
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Frey is not so rigorous, however, when she declares that current
international law mandates highly restrictive gun control, and that the
international mandate is so powerful that it over-rides every contrary
law, including national constitutions. In support of her declaration, the
Special Rapporteur offers no direct support from any source of
international law—not even a “subsidiary” citation to a single
commentator.
Instead, she offers a theory based on a series of deductions she draws
from some general rules of international law. The Special Rapporteur
does not appear to be applying intellectually consistent standards in her
report. Her operative rule could be stated as “no evidence is good
enough.” That is, when the issue is the right of self-defense, it is
impossible for even an immense body of legal authority to be sufficient.
When the question is the “right” of gun control, her conclusion can be
proven without need for legal authority.
A. Due Diligence
The basis for Frey’s right to gun control is the principle that a state
must exercise “due diligence” in preventing human rights violations.586
For example, if police officers are not trained in how to use firearms
safely, and if an untrained officer fires wildly into a crowded street in
order to catch a fleeing thief, and the officer misses the thief but hits a
dozen innocent bystanders, then the state might be culpable of a human
rights violation, for having failed to exercise “due diligence” in training.
Similarly, a state can be responsible when it allows groups that
exercise de facto state power (even though the groups are nominally not
state actors) to attack people. One good example (although not cited by
Frey) would be the contemporary government of Sudan, which supports
Arab tribal proxies in the extermination of the Africans of Darfur.587
Likewise, the government of Mississippi (like several other American
states) had a long-standing practice of tolerating, and tacitly encouraging,
Ku Klux Klan terrorist violence against blacks and other supporters of
civil rights.588
586. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 8–18, 33–37; see also Barbara A. Frey, Small Arms and
Light Weapons: The Tools Used to Violate Human Rights, DISARMAMENT FORUM 37 (no. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter DISARMAMENT FORUM]. “Due diligence” can be subject to widely varying
interpretations. Perhaps the first international law use of the term was in the 1871 Washington
Treaty, settling various disputes between the United States and the United Kingdom. Washington
Treaty for the Amicable Settlement of All Causes of Difference between the Two Countries, 1871,
U.S.–U.K., 143 Consol. Treaty Series 145, 149. While the treaty as a whole was successful, the “due
diligence” language proved difficult to interpret and enforce. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29.
587. See, e.g., Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra, note 58, at 1277.
588. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 502, at 351–55. Cf.
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She also cites one due diligence case in which a government did
nothing to protect a person in peril, refusing to investigate death threats
against an individual in Colombia, and two others where the government
refused to act against discrimination.589
Frey’s summary of due diligence rules, and cases and commentary
thereon, provides no precedent for any government being required to
enact items from a list of regulatory laws drawn up by a commentator or
by an international organization. Nevertheless, Frey and the HRC
subcommission proclaim that every government in the world must
implement their gun control agenda, or else be declared guilty of failing
to practice due diligence.590
Even if we hypothesize that each of Frey’s gun controls would be a
good idea, there is no support in international law for the proposition that
“due diligence” about the general risk of crime can be used as an
international law hammer to force governments to adopt particular types
of regulatory laws.
As noted supra, Frey’s standards for the minimum “due diligence”
required under her purported right to gun control are so severe that even
the laws of New York City and Washington, D.C., would be considered

WILLIAM B. ZIFF, THE RAPE OF PALESTINE 121–29 (1938) (describing the disarmament of Jews in
Hebron, Palestine, in 1929, by British officials, after which British officials incited a program
against the Jews by Arabs and failed to respond to the ensuing violence for eight days). It might be
noted in passing that the depredations of the Sudanese Arabs and the American Klan were made
possible in part because the governments had previously disarmed the intended victims. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra notes 504–05.
589. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 13–14.
590. Frey Report, supra note 48, at 7–8, 12–13. The closest she gets to precedential support
for her mandate about citizen gun control is a quote from a 1975 law review article that under the
European Convention’s right to life provisions, a crime victim should have “a general duty to avoid
the use of force where non-violent means of self-protection are reasonably open to the person
attacked.” Frey Report, supra note 48, at 19 n.36 (citing A.J. Ashworth, Self-defence and the Right
to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 289 (1975)). At most, the law review article might raise questions about
laws in many American states that some persons (e.g., a person in her own home) who are attacked
by violent felons have no duty to retreat. Some American states also state that a person who is
attacked by a violent felon (again, such laws most often apply to the home) and who, under the
circumstances had the right to use force in self-defense, cannot be prosecuted for using deadly force.
Even these laws are not necessarily in conflict with Ashworth’s law review article. The legislative
decision that a victim should not be forced to retreat reflects the social judgment that it is not
reasonable to force a victim to retreat from a place where she has a right to be (especially her own
home). Likewise, the laws against prosecutions for a particular level of force reflect the social
consensus (as reflected in legislation) that it is unreasonable for prosecutors to second-guess a
decision that a victim must make in split seconds. As the United States Supreme Court put it:
“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
In any case, the law review article’s analysis of the proper rules for self-defense have nothing to do
with Frey’s claim that due diligence requires governments to enact laws about the acquisition of
firearms.
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to be human rights violations, since they are not sufficiently restrictive.591
Frey has elsewhere suggested that, under international law, the
minimum investigational standards for issuing a firearms possession
license should be “akin in scope to those required for the effective
investigation of an individual’s death.”592 By this standard, even the gun
laws of Japan and the United Kingdom, the most restrictive in the
industrialized world, would be insufficient. Both nations have very
intrusive licensing systems, including (in the United Kingdom) a home
inspection, but even so, the police resources devoted to issuing a single
gun license do not come remotely close to the resources ordinarily used
to investigate a homicide.
It is hard to see why a sensible government would devote the same
resources to issuing a single gun license as to investigating a single
homicide. Homicide investigation is well known to be a very resourceintensive investigation. Because homicide is the worst of all crimes, it is
easy to understand why a single homicide investigation is given much
greater resources than the investigation of a single robbery, a single
burglary, and so on.
In the United States, there were 17,732 homicides in 2003,593 and
there are tens of millions of lawful gun owners.594 If the police began
devoting homicide-investigation-level resources to gun licenses, which
Frey and the HRC subcommission would require for every gun owner,
with periodic renewals,595 the police would be able to do little else. In the
United Kingdom, there were approximately 1,100 homicides in 2002–
2003.596 Authorities in the UK reported approximately 760,000 firearms
and shotgun certificates “on issue.”597 The criminal justice results would
591. See supra text accompanying notes 586–90.
592. DISARMAMENT FORUM, supra note 586, at 43.
593. See Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2004, National Vital Statistics Reports, Centers for
Disease Control, and Prevention, Vol. 54, Number 19, June 28, 2006, Table 2. But see FBI UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2003, Table 2.4 (14,408 murder victims),
http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/03cius.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
594. See L. Hepburn, M. Miller, D. Azrael & D. Hemenway, The US Gun Stock: Results from
the 2004 National Firearms Survey, 13 INJ. PREV. 15 (2007) (57 million adult gun-owners in the
U.S.).
595. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 16; U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 6, at 10.
596. See CRIME IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2002/2003: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 1: HOMICIDE
AND GUN CRIME 1 (David Povey ed., 2004), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb0104.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007) (“There were 1,045 deaths initially recorded as homicides in England
and Wales based on cases recorded by the police in 2002/03. This includes 172 victims of Dr Harold
Shipman (see note 1 on page 3) all of which relate to offences committed in previous years.”); see
also STATISTICS RELEASE HOMICIDE IN SCOTLAND, 2003 – STATISTICS Published, 4 November
2004, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/11/20292/47178 (last visited Mar. 15, 2007)
(“In 2003, there were 108 cases currently recorded as homicide by the police.”).
597. See Olivia Christophersen & Jason Lal, Firearm Certificates in England and Wales,
2002/2003, Home Office Online Report 03/04, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/
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be catastrophic if each gun license application were ramped up to
homicide investigation levels.
Practically speaking, there could be two results: the police could try
conscientiously to process the license applications within a few weeks or
months (the time for a typical homicide investigation); if so, police
resources available for patrol and for investigation of crimes would be
reduced to nothing. Alternatively, the police could simply decide that the
investigations take too much time, and so license applications would
languish for years; law-abiding gun owners would be turned into felons
as their license renewal applications sat in an immense stack in a police
office. That is what has happened in South Africa, thanks to a highlyrestrictive gun owner licensing law enacted several years ago.598
If the Frey/HRC theory that “due diligence” mandates highly
restrictive gun control were to be accepted, then the same reasoning
would require an almost limitless series of international law mandates for
repressive legislation on many subjects. For example, in all industrial
countries, including the United States, more people die from automobile
accidents than from gunfire.599 A fortiori, governments would have to act
rdsolr0304.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2007). In England and Wales, the renewal cycle for rifles and
shotguns is 5 years. See Renewal of a Rifle Certificate, Metropolitan Police, Firearms Enquiries,
http://www.met.police.uk/firearms-enquiries/f_renew.htm, (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); Renewal of a
Rifle Certificate, Metropolitan Police, Firearms Enquiries, http://www.met.police.uk/firearmsenquiries/s_renew.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); see also Frequently Asked Questions, Sussex
Police Online, http://www.sussex.police.uk/online_forms/firearms_faq.asp (last visited Mar. 19,
2007). In Scotland, the renewal cycle is also five years for rifle and for shotgun certificates. See
STATISTICAL BULLETIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES CRJ/2004/4 FIREARM CERTIFICATES STATISTICS,
SCOTLAND, 2003 (May 2004), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/ Publications/2004/05/19425/38096#2
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
598. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Human Rights and Gun
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2008),
available
at
Confiscation
26
QUINNIPIAC
http://www.davekopel.com/2A/Foreign/Human-Rights-and-Gun-Confiscation.pdf; Lizel Steenkamp,
No Legal Guns Sold Since July, NEWS24.COM (Johannesburg), Sept. 27, 2004,
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1595913,00.html (noting a drop
in monthly gun sales from 15,000 to zero and a backlog of appeals from individuals whose license
applications were refused); see also Michele O’Connor, New Gun Law Chaos, NEWS24.COM (Cape
Town), Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_
1758060,00.html (no new gun licenses, and only sixteen renewals, have been issued in Western
Cape since the new law took effect; at the current rate, processing the current license applications
will take thousands of years); Wyndham Hartley, Firearms Control Act Well Wide of its Target,
BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/
topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A93763 (“Implementation of the Firearms Control Act is threatening to
spiral out of control with government’s Central Firearms Registry processing only a fraction of the
hundreds of thousands of reapplications for gun licences it was scheduled to process this year.”);
Sheena Adams, Firearms Registry Slammed for ‘Ineptitude’, INDEPENDENT ONLINE (South Africa),
Sept.
15,
2005,
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=6&art_id=
vn20050915060958770C464804 (“Of the 20,397 applications for competency certificates received
since January, 3,937 had been finalised.”).
599. In 2003, there were 37,341 fatalities of vehicle occupant and motorcycle riders; there
were also 5,543 non-motorist fatalities. Thus, the total of automobile-related fatalities in 2003 was
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with “due diligence” to protect the right to life by enacting extremely
strict anti-automobile laws. Like firearms, automobiles are already
pervasively regulated,600 but “due diligence” for the right to life would
seem to require much, much more.
Not that there is any need for international organizations to actually
create anti-automobile treaties, or for such treaties to be ratified by
national governments. The requirement for severe anti-automobile
legislation is already, by Frey’s theory, a mandatory requirement of
international human rights law. Any government that has ratified a treaty
respecting the right to life has, by necessary implication, accepted a
requirement to enact drastic automobile control legislation in order to
fulfill Frey’s mandate that governments “must maximize protection of
the right to life.”601 The maximization rule, invented by Frey,602 offers
nearly limitless opportunities for coercive utopians to use international
law to force governments to enact extremely restrictive laws on almost
everything.
We suggest that there are many good pro and con arguments
about what kind of automobile controls are best—and that nations have
not foreclosed their choices about automobile regulation simply by
ratifying treaties guaranteeing the right to life.
The same point can be made about firearms control. Whatever the
arguments for or against particular gun laws, Frey’s theory that the right
to life necessarily creates an international law mandate for her favorite
forms of gun control has no precedential support.
B. Frey’s Erroneous Claims of Empirical Support
As a Special Rapporteur, Frey was obligated to inform the Human
Rights Council of the leading research on her topic. Unfortunately, while
insisting that her proposed gun controls should become international
42,884. See Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) Web-Based Encyclopedia, NHTSA,
http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2007); see also Deaths: Final Data for 2003, 54
Nat’l Vital Statistics Reps. (no. 13, Apr. 19, 2006, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), at
80, table 19 (listing total firearm-related deaths for 2003 as 30,136, including justifiable homicides).
600. See David B. Kopel, Treating Guns Like Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV 1701
(2000) (detailing how U.S. laws for possession for carrying guns in public places, or for
possessing/using guns on private property are much more restrictive than the laws for driving
automobiles in public places or possession/driving on private property; also detailing how firearms
are much more highly regulated than alcohol or prescription drugs).
601. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 9.
602. Frey’s only citation for her alleged duty of maximization is a book which never claims
that there is a duty of maximization: “As a norm of jus cogens, no government may deny the
existence of the right to life and a higher duty and standard of protection of the right is imposed upon
governments.” Frey Report, supra note 48, at 15 n.3 (quoting B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE RIGHT TO
LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1985)).
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mandates, Frey did not inform the HRC of significant research, which
casts serious doubt on her claim that her proposals would be effective.
For example, in 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”), released a meta-study of the efficacy of gun
control. The report included a review of fifty-one published studies on a
variety of restrictive gun laws, including bans on specific firearms and
ammunition, measures prohibiting felons from purchasing guns,
mandatory waiting periods, firearm registration, and background
checks.603 The Associated Press summarized the report: “A sweeping
federal review of the nation’s gun control laws—including mandatory
waiting periods and bans on certain weapons—found no proof such
measures reduce firearm violence.”604
The National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) reached a similar
conclusion in 2004: no link could be established between restrictive
firearm laws and lower violent crime rates, firearm-related violence, or
even firearm accidents. The 328-page report contained a review of 253
journal articles, 99 books, and 43 government publications, as well as
independent research by the NAS.605
There is no requirement that other scholars, such as Frey, agree with
the CDC or NAS assessments of the research evidence. But it is
surprising that a Special Rapporteur would not even inform the HRC
about the existence of the two most extensive meta-studies ever
conducted on gun control efficacy.
Agnostic on gun control, the CDC and NAS also declared that the
current evidence did not yield a clear answer on the benefits, if any, of
defensive gun ownership.
The Frey Report attempted to argue that gun possession for selfdefense is ineffective and dangerous. Unfortunately, Frey’s argument—
while omitting the meta-studies—relies on assertions that are not even
supported by her own cited sources.
Frey claims that “research indicates that firearms are rarely used to
stop crimes or kill criminals.”606 Her lone support for this assertion is that
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports recorded “only 203 justifiable

603. See TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PREVENTIVE SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIRST REPORTS EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES FOR
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS LAWS (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm.
604. Kristen Wyatt, CDC Finds No Proof Gun Laws Curb Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
2, 2003, available at http://jacobisrael.us/gunscdc.htm.
605. See Charles F. Wellford, John V. Pepper & Carol V. Petrie eds., COMMITTEE ON L. &
JUST., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW (Nat’l Acad. Press
2004).
606. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36.
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homicides by private citizens using firearms” in 2003.607 From this
datum, she infers that guns are rarely useful for self-defense. By Frey’s
reasoning, we could count the number of criminals killed by police
departments in different jurisdictions and conclude that whoever kills the
most criminals is the best at protecting the public—what an inhumane
method of measuring anti-crime efficacy.
Frey is apparently unaware of research data indicating that the FBI
figures, which are based only on initial police reports, are a gross
undercount, because they do not include determinations later made by
prosecutors, grand juries, petit juries, or appellate courts that an
individual acted in self-defense.608
In any case, Frey provided data only about how often firearms are
used to “kill criminals” while providing no data about how often firearms
are used “to stop crimes.” Although her footnote cites the CDC for data
about non-justifiable firearms deaths, she does not discuss the report
from the CDC showing that in the United States, firearms are used over
half a million times in a typical year against home invasion burglars;
usually the burglar flees as soon as he finds out that the victim is armed,
and no shot is ever fired.609
Frey also asserts that guns “are often turned on the very person who
may have the best arguments for self-defence—the woman herself.”610
Yet her citation for this assertion, a study led by Kimberly Grassel,611
provides no support for Frey’s statement. The Grassel study did not
collect such data.612 Nor were all the women in the Grassel study
607. See id.
608. GARY KLECK, BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 111–16 (1991).
609. See Robert M. Ikeda et al., Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in U.S.
Households, 1994, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 363 (1997) (reporting results of study conducted by the
CDC). See generally Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and
Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995) (survey data
showing 2.5 million defensive gun uses annually in the United States, most without firing a shot).
Pro-control criminologist Marvin Wolfgang reluctantly praised the methodology used by Kleck and
Gertz, stating: “I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in
this country . . . [Kleck and Gertz] have provided an almost clear-cut case of methodologically sound
research in support of something I have theoretically opposed for years, namely, the use of a gun in
defense against a criminal perpetrator . . . the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and
Gertz study is clear. I cannot further debate it.” Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have
Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188, 188 (1995).
610. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36.
611. K.M. Grassel, G. J. Wintemute, M.A. Wright & M.P. Romero, Association Between
Handgun Purchase and Mortality from Firearm Injury, 9 INJ. PREV. 48 (2003).
612. See Id. Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey show that a victim’s weapon
is taken by the attacker in, at most, one percent of cases in which the victim resists with a weapon.
See Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS 168–69 (1997). The data from the National Crime Victimization
Survey and other sources show that “[t]here is no sound empirical evidence that resistance does
provoke fatal attacks.” See Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim
Action on the Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 903 (2004).
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murdered with firearms. Indeed, the authors admitted that they do not
even know whether the subjects owned a gun at the time of their
deaths.613
Frey cites another study, by Bailey et al., for the proposition that
“having one or more guns in the home makes a woman 7.2 times more

613. Grassel et al., supra note 611, at 48, 51 (“We do not know if the gun deaths of the
purchasers in our study population involved the handguns they bought between 1996 and 1998, nor
do we know if any purchasers resold their guns before death and were no longer exposed.”). Frey
parenthetically describes the Grassel article as “reporting that women who were murdered were
more likely, not less likely, to have purchased a handgun in the three years prior to their deaths.”
Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36.
It is not surprising that women who accurately perceive that they are at high risk of criminal
victimization would be more likely to take protective measures; women who are more at risk of fatal
illness are also more likely to take protective measures, such as going to a doctor. That sick people
go to doctors does not mean that doctors make people worse off; that women at risk of victimization
take protective measures does not mean that the protective measures are harmful.
Suppose a study showed that female murder victims were more likely to have bought high-quality
locks for their homes. Would the study prove that locks are not useful for protection? Would the
study prove that locks “are often turned on the very person who may have the best arguments for
self-defence—the woman herself”?
It is not surprising that women at risk would be more likely to take protective measures. To ascertain
whether the protective measures were effective, one would have to compare the murder victims with
a sample of women who were equally at risk, but who survived. Comparing an at-risk population
with the general population does not tell us about the efficacy of any given protective measure.
Mere association (murder victims were more likely to have bought locks or guns; people who die of
cancer are more likely to have gone to a hospital in the three years before their death) does not prove
causation. Increased levels of ice cream sales are associated with hot days, but the association does
not prove that ice cream makes the weather hotter. In evaluating the relationship between a particular
action and a particular outcome, it is a mistake to assume that the action necessarily causes the
outcome. See Jane L. Garb, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL RESEARCH: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 27–
28 (1996):
To test hypotheses about the relationship between a risk factor and an
outcome, one must always compare two or more groups . . . . When we find a
difference between the groups, we must consider the possible explanations for
this difference:
A spurious association: The difference in the groups is due to noncomparability—that is, a difference in the composition of the groups. This
association is the subject of bias and confounding.
A chance association: The difference in the groups is due to chance. This
association is the basis of statistical analysis.
A causal association: The difference in the groups is due to a true causal
association between the risk factor and the outcome.
In order to prove our hypothesis and conclude that the last explanation is correct—that is, that the
risk factor led to or caused the outcome—we must first rule out the other two explanations.
For example, ice cream, cold drinks, and sleeveless shirts are associated with the heat of
summertime. But although these three items are associated, they are not causal to each other, nor to
the heat of summer, and one would have to be ignorant about association and causality to so state.
The Grassel study does show an association, but does not show causation. See Gary Kleck, Can
Owning a Gun Really Triple the Owner’s Chances of Being Murdered?: The Anatomy of an
Implausible Causal Mechanism, 5 HOMICIDE STUD. 64 (2001).
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likely to be murdered by an intimate partner.”614 This would be a
frightening statistic if odds ratios were equivalent to risk factors.
However, Frey wrongly described the article’s adjusted odds ratio of 7.2
for “keeping 1 or more guns” as a risk factor for violent death.615
C. Jus Cogens
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that under the
principle of jus cogens, a treaty is void if it contradicts “a norm accepted
614. See Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 36 (citing James E. Bailey et. al., Risk Factors for
Violent Death of Women in the Home, 157 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 777, 780 (1997)).
615. Odds ratios are not equivalent to risk factors, and it is odds ratios which are used in the
analysis of the Bailey article. When studying a population group that is at high risk for a disease
(e.g., coal miners for black lung disease), it is scientifically inappropriate to replace risk factors with
odds ratios.
Dr. Jeanine Baker explains that “[a]lthough homicide is quite rare in the general population, caution
is required when interpreting odds ratios on subsets of the population with high risks for the variable
being examined. In these situations, the odds ratio overestimates the risk.” E-mail from Jeanine
Baker, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Adelaide (Australia), to Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen
(Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with authors). Baker continued:
More importantly, in studies such as that described by Bailey et al. (1997), an overestimated odds
ratio combined with the biases and confounding factors introduced by comparing high risk subgroups with the general population will result in the authors postulating causal association,
thus masking the real causes . . . . It is sad that the Frey report has failed to recognise the
methodological constraints of odds ratios and distressing that the real issues facing women and
highlighted in the Bailey et al. study are mental illness and living alone[, which] have been ignored.
These are key areas that still lack real input from the international aid agencies and are neglected by
the community and government funding.
See also Louise-Anne McNutt, John P. Holcomb, Jr., & Bonnie E. Carlson, Logistic Regression
Analysis: When the Odds Ratio Does Not Work: An Example Using Intimate Partner Violence Data,
15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1050 (2000). The authors note:
Many areas of research involve the investigation of events that occur frequently. Intimate partner
violence (IPV) is one such event. Estimates of the prevalence in clinic populations range between
10% and 25%, and sometimes as high as 50% . . . . Often researchers are interested in estimating the
strength of association between a risk factor . . . and an adverse outcome . . . . The prevalence ratio is
a measure of association between the exposure status [e.g. exposure to a firearm] and the outcome
status [e.g., violent death] . . . . Another measure of association is the odds ratio . . . . [I]f the measure
of association needs to be adjusted for other factors . . . the odds ratio is much easier to calculate
[than the prevalence ratio]. And more important, the confidence intervals for the odds ratios are
simpler to calculate compared with the prevalence ratios’ confidence intervals. Using the knowledge
that the odds ratio approximates the value of the prevalence ratio when the outcome is rare (less than
10%), the odds ratio gained popularity in scientific research . . . . Many articles in the violence and
health literature incorrectly interpret odds ratios . . . as relative risks or prevalence ratios. When the
incidence or prevalence of the health outcome is more than 10%, this will typically result in an
overestimation of the effects of violence on women’s health.
See also Ulka B. Campbell, Nicolle M. Gatto & Sharon Schwartz, Distributional Interaction:
Interpretational Problems When Using Incidence Odds Ratios to Assess Interaction, 2
EPIDEMIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES & INNOVATIONS (2005), http://www.epi-perspectives.com
/content/2/1/1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2007) (“The incidence odds ratio is a very convenient measure
of effect with many appealing statistical properties including estimability in a case-control study.
However, when assessing interaction, as when assessing main effects, interpreting the incidence
odds ratio as if it were a risk ratio can be misleading.”).
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and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”616
Charles de Visscher, one of the most influential international judges
and scholars in the twentieth century, observed that “the proponent of a
rule of jus cogens . . . will have a considerable burden of proof.”617 In
Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie writes that “more
authority exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular
content. . . . However, certain portions of jus cogens are the subject of
general agreement, including the rules [relating] to the use of force by
states, self-determination, and genocide. Yet even here many problems of
application remain . . . .”618
Frey contends that her gun control program is not only part of the
“right to life” protected by various treaties, but also a jus cogens—
meaning that it overrides every other contrary law, including
constitutional rights.619 In 1992, the United States ratified the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which declares
that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life.”620 According to
Frey, the United States thereby signed up for her 2006 gun control
program. And since the gun control program is a jus cogens, it
necessarily supersedes the Second Amendment, the forty-four state
constitutional right-to-arms provisions,621 and all thirty-seven of the state
constitutions which declare that self-defense is a human right,622 not to
mention the multitude of state and federal statutes which authorize selfdefense in circumstances far broader than Frey’s standard that lethal selfdefense cannot be used when it is necessary to prevent a rape or any
other major violent felony short of homicide.623 Also crushed under
Frey’s jus cogens are all the constitutional self-defense guarantees in
other nations which authorize self-defense—against lone criminals and
against criminal tyrants—in circumstances disfavored by Frey.624 This
616. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
617. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THÉORIES ET RÉALITIES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295–96 (4th
ed. 1970), quoted in IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 466, at 516.
618. Id. at 516–17.
619. Frey Report, supra note 48, ¶ 27.
620. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 312, art. 6, pt 1; Office
Of The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status Of Ratifications Of The
Principal
International
Human
Rights
Treaties
11
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
621. See supra Part VI.E.
622. See supra text accompanying note 444.
623. Frey Report, supra note 48.
624. Id.
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result seems hard to reconcile with the 2006 report of the UN’s
International Law Commission that self-defense is one of the “most
frequently citied examples” of jus cogens.625
Frey’s effort to invent a jus cogens against self-defense is contrary to
the very principle of jus cogens—of a universally-binding moral duty
applicable in every nation; for jus cogens itself is a direct application of
natural law,626 and the first principle of natural law is the right of selfdefense.627
All the flaws of Frey’s attempt to claim that the right to life mandates
her severe gun control and anti-self-defense program are magnified by
her claim that the program is a jus cogens. One of the reasons that
international law is viewed with intense suspicion in some circles is the
tendency of some activists to twist international law so that it evades
people’s right to self-government and self-determination, imposing an
elitist, far left social policy agenda on a population against its will. Frey’s
jus cogens claim, and the Human Rights Council’s acquiescence,
represents the worst of this tendency.628

625. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UN
Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682,
at
189,
(Apr.
13,
2006),
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement.
626. See Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Vedross to the Theory of International
Law, 6 EURO. J. INT’L L. 34, 51–54 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/
No1/art3.pdf (without the journal pageination) (explaining that through the 19th century, the natural
law basis of international law made it obvious that some rules were universal and non-derogable;
during the 20th century, the legal positivist view that international law is purely the artificial creation
of states, with no necessary normative content, gained ascendancy. The formalization of the
principle of jus cogens in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties returned to the natural
law principles, albeit without explicitly acknowledging the reliance on natural law.); See also Karen
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling The Law Of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 419 (1989) (“jus cogens is clearly an attribute of natural law.”)
627. See supra Part IV.
628. As we discuss in the next Part, we have argued for a jus cogens right of the victims of an
on-going genocide to acquire defensive arms. See Kopel, Gallant, & Eisen, supra note 59. We
should point out that our jus cogens claim is much, much smaller than the one that Frey makes; the
article makes the jus cogens claim, on the basis of the Genocide Convention, solely in the context of
a continuing genocide in which the international community has failed to take effective steps to stop
the genocide. Moreover, we cite international case law which directly states a jus cogens right of
genocide victims to acquire defensive arms. Id. at 1277–78 (citing Application of Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993
I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13, 1993) (Lauterpacht, J., concurring)) (Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures Order of Apr. 8). Our genocide article does not assert that the narrow application of jus
cogens to cases of active genocide (or, perhaps, imminent genocide) means that all nations are
required to adopt types of firearms laws which we would favor as a matter of policy, or that a wide
range of national firearms laws which we disfavor on policy grounds are necessarily invalid.
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VIII. DOES THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IMPLY A RIGHT TO ARMS?
If there is a right to self-defense, is there a right to arms? In
answering this, we must be careful to distinguish two questions: “Is there
a right to possess some kind of defensive arms?” and “Is there a right to
possess firearms for defense?” The answer to the second question is
much more complicated than the answer to the first.
A. Right to Arms
A common-sense principle is embodied in the legal maxims “[w]hen
the law grants anything to any one, all incidents are tacitly granted”629
and “[w]hen the law gives a man anything, it gives him that also without
which the thing itself cannot exist.” So if people have a right to the free
exercise of religion, then they must necessarily have the right to possess,
buy, and sell the scriptures of their religion, and related religious
writings. If people have a right to freedom of the press, then the people
must have a right to possess, buy, and sell newspapers and magazines.
And since the right to publish newspapers is an incident of the right to
freedom of the press, the publication of newspapers must not be hindered
by, for example, a heavy tax imposed solely on newspaper ink.630
Likewise the freedom of the press and of religion both imply that people
have a right to learn how to read.631
To recognize a right while forbidding the means to exercise it would
make the right a nullity. As Thomas Hobbes wrote: “because it is in vain
for a man to have a right to the End, if the right to the necessary means
be denied him, it follows, that since every Man hath a right to preserve
himself, he must also be allowed a right to use all the means, and do all
the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.”632

629. Cent. Bureau of Investigation v. Shri Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Anr., [Supreme
Court] 36 of 2002, (2006) (India), http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=27925.
630. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1988); See also
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
631. This does not necessarily mean a positive right for the government to teach them how to
read, but at least a negative right that the government not forbid them from learning how to read, not
forbid educators from teaching people to read, and not forbid the sale, possession, and use of tools
which help people learn how to read (such as audio tapes, Montessori materials, and so on).
632. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 223, at 116 (emphasis in original). Hobbes of course
agreed with the other philosophers about the primacy of self-defense; the preceding sentence stated:
“That the first Foundation of natural Right, is the Liberty which each man hath, to preserve, as far as
he is able, his own Life and Limbs, and to apply all his Endeavors towards the guarding his Body
from Death, and from Pains.” PUFENDORF, supra note 196, at 106 (quoting HOBBES, DE CIVE); see
also HOBBES, supra note 223, at 115 (slightly different translation).
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If there is a right of self-defense, there must necessarily be a right to
possess some defensive arms—for otherwise the right would be a
practical nullity. How can a 110 pound woman defend herself against a
pair of 250 pound rapists if she cannot use arms? How can a frail 85year-old man protect himself against three young men who are intent on
robbing and killing him? It is true that some people can successfully
defend themselves, in some circumstances, through martial arts, or
similar techniques of unarmed combat. But, typically, it takes very
extensive practice for a person to obtain proficiency.
Suppose that a government said, “Yes, we admit that our citizens
have a right to freedom of the press. However, we have completely
outlawed all non-government publications in the native language of our
nation. Even so, we are not violating the right to freedom of the press,
since we allow independent publications to be published in Ancient
Greek.” Although Ancient Greek is a beautiful and useful language, to
prohibit vernacular newspapers, while allowing only newspapers in
Ancient Greek, would obviously be contrary to the freedom of the press.
Only a small, elite portion of the public would ever be able to master the
Ancient Greek language sufficiently to take advantage of the freedom of
the press. Likewise, to ban the possession of all defensive arms, while
allowing only unarmed self-defense, would be to confine the right of
self-defense to a small elite possessing the physical capability, the time,
and the money to pay for a long and arduous course of training.
So it seems clear that, because there is a universal human right to
self-defense, there must be a universal human right to some arms.
Because there is a right to possess some (not necessarily “any” or
“all”) arms, there must necessarily be a right to learn how to use those
arms. If there is a right to freedom of religion, then the government
cannot forbid people to be instructed in the tenets of their faith. If there is
a right to freedom of the press, then the government cannot forbid
teaching people how to read and write. The ability to receive instruction
that makes it possible for a person to exercise a right is, necessarily, an
incident of that right. Accordingly, a government may not forbid
instruction in self-defense—either in self-defense with legal arms, or in
unarmed self-defense, or in self-defense with improvised weapons (e.g.,
throwing a paperweight at an attacker’s head, or using a key ring in one’s
fist to strike an attacker).
Functionally speaking, firearms, and especially handguns, are ideal
defensive arms. As the International Committee of the Red Cross
observes, firearms are among the types of weapons that “are easy to
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handle effectively with a minimum of training.”633 What do the data say
about efficacy of the use of firearms for self-defense, and defense of
others? 634
In answering the question, we need data about the order in which
events took place in a crime. For example, in cases where the victim was
injured, we need to know if the injury occurred before the victim used
the gun (which might suggest that use of the gun stopped the crime in
progress), or if the victim was injured after he used the gun (which might
suggest that the display of the gun prompted the criminal to injure the
victim). Before 1992, there was no useful data on the subject.635 In 1992,
the National Crime Victimization Surveys began to record the sequence
of criminal events and victim response.
After analyzing the new data, Tark and Kleck discovered that “[a]
variety of mostly forceful tactics, including resistance with a gun,
appeared to have the strongest effects in reducing the risk of
injury . . . .”636 They concluded that “the best available evidence indicates
that victim resistance to crimes is generally wise.”637 Further, “armed and
other forceful resistance does not appear to increase the victim’s risk of
injury.”638
B. Right to Firearms?
Does the human right to possess defensive arms encompass the right
to possess firearms? We can begin the inquiry by, again, examining the
practices of the major legal systems. The constitutions of the United
States,639 of almost every American state,640 of Mexico,641 of Haiti,642 and
633. International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms Availability and the Situation of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, June 1999, at 21, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0734/$File/ ICRC_002_0734_ARMS%20AVAILABILITY.PDF!Open.
634. The CDC and NAS studies described supra did not attempt to analyze data regarding the
efficacy of armed victim resistance. See supra notes 603–05 and accompanying text.
635. Philip J. Cook, The Relationship between Victim Resistance and Injury in
Noncommercial Robbery, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 414–16 (1986):
Since we cannot distinguish between the influence of the robber’s actions on
the victim’s response and the influence of the victim’s actions on the robber’s
response, we are left simply not knowing how to interpret the statistical patterns
of association between resistance and injury . . . the temporal sequence of
events may not tell us enough about the causal process to support definitive
conclusions.
636. Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the
Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 861 (2004).
637. Id. at 904.
638. Id. at 902.
639. U.S. CONST. amend. II. See supra text accompanying notes 442–43.
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of Guatemala,643 all contain a right to possess arms, particularly firearms,
for personal defense. The English Bill of Rights and the common law
also contain an explicit right to possess firearms for lawful personal
defense.644 As noted supra, the English system is part of the foundation
of the law for approximately one-third of the planet. Of course, it should
also be acknowledged that, particularly in the last decade, many
Commonwealth nations have not respected the right to arms provision of
the 1689 Bill of Rights and have also disrespected many of the other
rights in that Bill of Rights.645
As detailed supra, Roman law (which was foundational for the law
in most of continental Europe and its colonies) recognized a right to
arms. The original Roman law was created long before firearms were
invented. However, the Roman law continued in force in Europe until the
nineteenth century, by which time firearms had been in common use for
centuries.
This Article does not contend for a universal right to firearms under
all circumstances. In the Notre Dame Law Review, the authors of this
Article have argued that current international law, including the
Genocide Convention, guarantees a right of self-defense by groups that
are the victims of an on-going genocide; it further argued that the right
includes the right to defensive firearms.646 The main case in point is the
current genocide in Darfur. The Notre Dame Law Review article suggests
that Darfur refugees have a right to use firearms to protect themselves
against genocide, rape, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities being
perpetrated at the direction of the government of Sudan. When Darfuris
are prosecuted in Sudanese courts for possessing arms in violation of
Sudan’s extremely stringent (but selectively enforced) gun control laws,
the Darfur refugees have a valid claim that their international law right to
use arms for protection against active genocide trumps the Sudanese gun
control laws. (The Notre Dame article acknowledges that Sudanese
courts are hardly likely to respect international human rights law.) The
Notre Dame legal argument was limited solely to the narrow context of
actual genocide, while noting that the argument could be extended to
cases of threatened genocide.

640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.

See supra text accompanying note 444.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 10 (Mex.).
1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI art. 268-1 (Haiti).
GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION art. 38.
See supra text accompanying notes 433–36.
See supra text accompanying notes 437–41.
Kopel, Gallant & Eisen, supra note 58.
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In a non-genocide context, it would be wrong to use international
law to attempt to impose the gun laws of the American state of Wyoming
on Japan (or vice versa). The narrowest statement of international human
rights law is that all people have a human right to self-defense, and
therefore a human right to possess and learn how to use some arms, and
that this right encompasses a right to firearms under some
circumstances.647
It is important to distinguish nations where there is a direct, explicit
right to arms (the United States, Mexico, Haiti, and Guatemala, and, in a
weaker sense, the common law nations)648 from other nations. In the
former, the possession of arms is itself a right. The express right is not
dependent on the citizen showing that he has a “need,” let alone a
“necessity,” to exercise the right.
In many other countries, arms possession is not a right in itself. Arms
possession would be only a derivative right of the primary right of selfdefense, which is a universal right.649 In the latter nations, the right to
arms would exist only to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate
the primary right of self-defense. Similarly, a right to firearms would
exist only to the extent that the possession of other arms could not
reasonably effectuate the self-defense right.
We offer two suggestions in which a right to arms, derivative of the
right of self-defense, would appear to be at its strongest. First of all: in
the home. As discussed supra, the right to arms and the right to security
of the home are closely related in the common law tradition.650 The
sanctity of the home against violent and unexpected invasion is a widely
expressed fundamental human right all over the world.651 More broadly,
a violent home invasion is an especially atrocious crime because it
destroys the peace and security of the home, which are the right of every
person and family. That is one reason why breaking into a home is
usually punished more severely than breaking into an unoccupied
warehouse. Accordingly, the primary right to self-defense, and the
derivative right to arms, are at their apex in the home.
Conversely, prudential concerns about the risks of arms possession—
such as the mistaken shooting of a stranger—are significantly lower in
one’s own home than in a public place. For precisely this reason, the
647. See supra Part V.J. There are always implicit exceptions to almost every broadly stated
rule. For example, a person in a prison or in an institution for the insane would not have a right to
arms. Moreover, as detailed in Part VII, violent criminal aggressors forfeit their legal right to selfdefense.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 506–11.
649. See supra Part V.J.
650. See supra Part VI.E.3.
651. Id.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court, interpreting the state’s newly enacted right to
arms, rejected a right to carry arms in an automobile, while affirming a
right to carry arms in one’s home or privately-owned business.652
The second situation in which the right to arms for self-defense
would be at its apex would be when a particular arm (including, in some
situations, a firearm) is necessary for self-defense. At the least, the
human right to defensive arms would become a human right to defensive
firearms in situations when, like genocide victims, the potential victim
faces grave danger, and, practically speaking, there is no adequate
substitute for a defensive firearm. There are wide varieties of
interpretations that can be placed on “necessary;” at the least,
“necessary” means more than “under no circumstances.”
So, for example, in Canada, the law states that a person may be
issued a permit to possess a handgun for defensive purposes (as opposed
to collecting or target shooting) only to protect life where other
protection is inadequate.653 Yet currently in Canada—a nation of more
than thirty million people, some of whom live in very dangerous areas of
Toronto or Vancouver, or who live in very isolated areas many hours or
days from the nearest police—no one has been issued a permit to possess
a handgun for defense of life.654 A government policy of ignoring an
express statutory command, and refusing to issue defensive handgun
permits in even the most compelling, demonstrated cases of necessity
652. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 804–07 (Wis. 2003) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)):
None of these rationales is particularly compelling when applied to a person
owning and operating a small store. Although a shopkeeper is not immune
from acting on impulse, he or she is less likely to do so in a familiar setting in
which the safety and satisfaction of customers is paramount and the liability
for mistake is nearly certain. There is less need in these circumstances for
innocent customers or visitors to be notified that the owner of a business
possesses a weapon. Anyone who enters a business premises, including a
person with criminal intent, should presume that the owner possesses a
weapon, even if the weapon is not visible. A shopkeeper is not likely to use a
concealed weapon to facilitate his own crime of violence in his own store. The
stigma of the law is inapplicable when the public expects a shopkeeper to
possess a weapon for security . . . . [Thus,] a citizen’s desire to exercise the
right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security is at its apex when
undertaken to secure one’s home or privately owned business. Conversely, the
State’s interest in prohibiting concealed weapons is least compelling in these
circumstances, because application of the CCW statute “has but a tenuous
relation to alleviation” of the State’s acknowledged interests.
653. Authorizations to Carry Restricted Firearms and Certain Handguns Regulations SOR/98207
(Can)
(regulation
implementing
section
20
of
the
Firearms
Act),
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cr/SOR-98-207/bo-ga:l_1-gb:s_2//en#anchorbo-ga:l_1-gb:s_2.
654. Letter from Yves Marineau, Departmental Privacy and Access to Information
Coordinator, R.C.M.P., to Dennis Young, assistant to M.P. Garry Breitkruz (Feb. 15, 2007),
available at http://www.garrybreitkreuz.com/ publications/2007_new/126.pdf.
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would appear to be inconsistent with the right of self-defense.
Defensive arms possession in cases of necessity—as a derivative of
the right of self-defense—might be effectuated by a fact-specific analysis
of the dangers to the family or individual, and the practical adequacy of
other defensive measures.655
The derivative right of arms possession might also imply that
“alternative defensive measures” not be construed to include the sacrifice
of express rights in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, the argument
that “you wouldn’t need a gun for protection from terrorists if you would
just order your newspaper staff to stop writing editorials in favor of
religious liberty” is not valid. It sacrifices one right to eviscerate the need
to use another right—self-defense.656
IX. CONCLUSION
As Grotius wrote in his introduction:
I have used in proof of this law, the testimony of philosophers,
historians, poets, and lastly even of orators. Not that they are
indiscriminately to be relied on as impartial authority, since
they often bend to the prejudices of their sect, the nature of
their argument, or the interest of their cause, but where many
minds of different ages and countries concur in affirming the
same general sentiment, this general concurrence must be
referred to some general cause; which in the questions we
have undertaken to examine, can be no other than a right
induction from the principles of natural justice, or some
common consent. The former indicates the law of nature, the
latter the law of nations . . . . 657

The human right of self-defense is affirmed by the concurrence of
many minds of different ages. Grotius knew this, and as this Article has
elaborated, the concurrence has continued in the nearly four centuries

655. This does not mean that the licensing authority would have to devote resources
equivalent to a criminal homicide investigation. See id.
656. In the United States, the principle that the government cannot withhold a license in order
to coerce people into surrendering a right is known as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
657. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 176, Prolog. § 41, quoted in WHEATON, supra note 315, at 29
n.13. While this Article has usually quoted from the 2005 edition of Grotius, we chose to use the
alternative translation quoted in Wheaton because its English flows more naturally than does the
2005 text’s version of the same quote.
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since Grotius. This Article has cited fewer orators and poets than did
Grotius,658 and we have enjoyed the benefit of many sources which did
not exist at the time of Grotius, including the written constitutions all
over the world, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the vast
structure of international law that was built on the foundation of Grotius.
We have only rarely touched on the many heated arguments between the
great scholars, or the tremendous differences in practices between
leading systems of law, or how the modern world’s constitutions and
treaties are based on strikingly diverse views of civilization and justice.
We have not addressed all the differences among our many sources
because, regarding self-defense, “many minds of different ages and
countries concur in affirming the same general sentiment.”
To examine the evidence is to discover what the Special Rapporteur
so artfully concealed—the overwhelming consensus among the sources
of international law, from ancient times to the present, among diverse
legal systems, religions, and nations: self-defense is a fundamental
human right.
This Article does not claim that the evidence produced thus far
proves the existence of a universal international human right to possess
and carry firearms in all circumstances. It does suggest that the evidence
of an international human right to self-defense is clear. The existence of
a right of personal defense undoubtedly must imply some right to
defensive training, and to the possession of some type of defensive arms.
However, this Article has only attempted to suggest some possible lines
of exploration for subsequent scholarly analysis of the derivative rights
to defensive arms and defensive training. It does seem apparent that it
would be a violation of human rights law for a government to forbid selfdefense, to forbid defensive training, or to forbid the possession of
reasonably necessary defensive arms. No government has the legitimate
authority to forbid a person from exercising her human right to defend
herself against a violent attack or to forbid her from taking the steps and
acquiring the tools necessary to exercise that right.

658. Indeed, the only orator we cited was Cicero (who was also a lawyer), and we have not
cited any poets. So we will conclude the footnotes with an especially apt poet: “the sword Was given
for this, that none need live a slave.” Lucan, Pharsalia, bk. 4, ll. 644–45 (Edward Ridley trans.,
1896) (composed between 59–65 AD) (epic poem of the Roman civil war), available at
http://omacl.org/Pharsalia/book4.html.

